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ABSTRACT
CRITICAL RHETORIC IN THE AGE OF NEUROSCIENCE
FEBRUARY 2013
BRETT INGRAM, B.A., SHIPPENSBURG UNIVERSITY
M.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Stephen Olbrys Gencarella

Although there has been an outpouring of scholarship on the “rhetorical body” in the last
two decades, nearly all analyzes and critiques discourses about the body. Very little work
in contemporary rhetorical studies addresses the ways in which rhetoric affects and alters
the central nervous system, and thereby exerts influence at a level of subjective
experience prior to cognitive and linguistic apprehension. Recent neuroscientific research
into affect, identity, and decision-making echoes many of the claims made by ancient
rhetoricians: namely, that rhetorical activity is corporeally transformative, and that the
material transformations wrought by rhetoric have profound implications for subjects’
capacity to engage in critical thought and agential judgment. This study demonstrates that
emotional political rhetoric is physiologically addictive, that the brain and body can make
decisions independently of the will of the thinking subject, and that symbolic violence
can physically reconfigure the neural networks that make critical cognition possible.

As public culture and discourse becomes increasingly imagistic, non-rational, and
emotionally charged, critics must develop theoretical resources capable of recognizing
and responding to new varieties of constitutive phenomena. Neuroscience can
!
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supplement traditional rhetorical criticism by offering insight into the physiological
processes by which destructive ideas become self-sustaining, and it can help critics
devise more sophisticated rhetorical approaches to the task of promoting social healing.
To advance this conversation, this dissertation outlines a critical neurorhetorical theory
that is attuned to the Sophistic and Burkean rhetorical tradition, informed by
contemporary neuroscience, and responsive to the unique cultural and social conditions
of the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Yes, we have a soul, but it is made up of many tiny robots”—Giulio Giorello,
philosopher and neuroscientist

In the last twenty years, several prominent rhetorical critics have argued for a
more expansive role for the corporeal body and embodied experience in rhetorical theory,
and others have made the case that rhetoric is best conceived as a mediatory art that
synthesizes the symbolic and the material.1 Yet with few exceptions, rhetoricians have
thus far overlooked the brain as a site where the material and the symbolic intersect,
despite an explosion of interest in the brain in other disciplines in the humanities.2
Rhetorical scholars’ reticence on matters of the neurological is perhaps understandable.
Given the field’s long colonization by departments of English and Communication, its
struggle to define its borders and establish its disciplinary independence might be
endangered if it was shown that rhetorical principles could be reduced to neurobiological
functions. However, as Leslie Thiele notes in The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom,
Narrative, and Neuroscience, recent neuroscientific studies of the brain “do not lead in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Proponents of corporeal rhetoric include McKerrow (1998), Selzer and Crowley (1999), Condit (2000),
Deluca and Harold (2005), Hawhee (2009). For theoretical work that emphasizes rhetoric as mediation
between body and environment, see McGee (1982), Engnell (1998), Crable (2003), Gunn (2004).

2

Rhetorical scholars who have addressed the brain include Gregg (1984), Walker (1990), Arthos (2000),
Pruchnic (2008). Scholars from other fields in the humanities who have written extensively about the brain
include Daniel Lord Smail (History), Leslie Thiele (Political Studies), Elizabeth Wilson (Gender Studies),
Daniel Dennett (Philosophy), John Searle (Philosophy), Catherine Malabou (Philosophy), Elizabeth Grosz
(Philosophy), Mark Turner (Literary Studies), Barbara Herrnstein Smith (Cultural Studies), William E.
Connolly (Cultural Studies), Denis Dutton (Art Theory).
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the direction of biological determinism or crass reductionism. Rather, they affirm the
importance of (self)consciousness as a narrative process and confirm our creative ability
to interact with and shape internal and external environments” (ix). They affirm, in other
words, rhetoric’s profound role in the biological, psychological, cultural, and social
constitution of the human.
Nevertheless, most rhetorical criticism focuses on the ways in which words
change the mind, which is vaguely understood as “an immaterial idea processor” (Condit
1999: 330). In this model, the mind translates the influx of sensory data into language,
and uses that language to decide what course of action the body should take. However, as
cultural theorist Brian Massumi points out, “Our body thinks with pure feeling before it
acts thinkingly” (2002: 266). What we experience as linguistic thought occurs after our
brains and bodies have already made a series of judgments that impact what will become
available to our conscious minds.
All perceptions of the world are intersensory—we can never fully divide the aural
sense experience of spoken words from the visual or tactile sensory inputs and affective
charges that accompany and precede the scene of rhetoric. As William Connolly notes,
“the imbrications between embodiment, language, disposition, perception, and mood are
always in operation,” and a theory or philosophy of language that ignores these
influential vectors of experience “may seem precise and rigorous, but it does so by
missing circuits of inter-involvement though which perception is organized” (2010: 182).
Connolly observes that “corporate advertisers, cultural anthropologists, neuroscientists,
TV dramatists, Catholic priests, filmmakers, and evangelical preachers are attuned to
such memory-soaked patterns of inter-involvement,” yet “’intellectualists’”—those who
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overstate “the autonomy of conceptual life, the independence of vision, the selfsufficiency of reason, the power of pure deliberation, or the self-sufficiency of
argument”—are “less so” (2010: 183). It is odd that rhetoricians, who study the
persuasive appeals of marketers, artists, religious leaders, scientists, and researchers in
neighboring scholarly disciplines, should so often narrowly focus on but one aspect of
their subjects’ rhetorical operations: that which is encoded in symbols and circulated
publicly. Despite voluminous evidence that indicates language and cognition are only
parts of a holistic communicative circuit that includes unconscious or preconscious
physiological operations, little work in contemporary rhetorical studies addresses the
ways in which rhetoric affects and alters the brain and body, and thereby influences the
nature of thought before it is mentally apprehended by the subject in linguistic form.

The first rhetoricians would likely not recognize the notion that rhetoric moves
minds, which then move bodies after a period of critical deliberation. From antiquity,
rhetoric has been aligned with powers both natural and supernatural that circumvent or
overpower the rational, deliberative mind and have a direct impact on the physical body.
Both the ancient Sophists and Platonists understood rhetoric as a physically moving
force. Their disagreements were less about whether it was a material or symbolic entity,
but rather, whether it was a destructive or healing practice. As Peter Elbow notes, the
central question for Socrates and Plato was “what pharmakon or antidote could safeguard
the mind from the corruptive rhetorical spell?” (51).
While Platonists sought to protect citizens from rhetoric, Sophists such as Gorgias
reveled in the rhetor’s ability to reconfigure the material world through the savvy
deployment of symbols, and taught paying customers how to administer this potent
!
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substance. In Encomium of Helen, Gorgias writes that “Speech is a powerful lord, which
by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works,” and claims
that
The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of
drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different
secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so
also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others
make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil
persuasion. (S8)
He argues that Helen comes “under the influence of speech (logos), just as if ravished by
force (bia)” (S12). According to Gorgias, persuasive discourse has effects on the human
soul that, like drugs or physical force, overwhelm and cancel out the possibility of
individual agency. Gorgias “shows that to be persuaded is to suffer compulsion no less
than to be physically carried away” (Ford 175), and emphasizes “the extent to which we
are acted upon and pressed into subservience by external forces out of our control”
(Kennerly 276). Indeed, it is this totalizing power of rhetoric—its capacity to seize both
mind and body, and thus render distinctions between them meaningless—that makes it
more insidiously effective than physical force alone. Rhetoric can lead people to “both
believe the things said (tois legomenois) and go along with the things done” (Gorgias
S12); in other words, while brute coercion might induce people to do what is wrong, they
nevertheless remain mentally cognizant of the ethical implications of their actions. By
contrast, persuasive speech has effects that are pre-conscious, rooted in the corporeal
body, and wholly determinative of subsequent thought and behavior. Robert J. Connors
explains that what Gorgias is describing “is not the critical, analytical response of a
literate audience, but rather what Havelock calls ‘submission to the paideutic spell,’
which involved the whole unconscious mind and probably the central nervous system, a
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total loss of objectivity as the audience gives itself up to identification with the speaker
and his goals” (48).
George Kennedy writes that Gorgias considered the rhetor to be “a psychagogos,
like a poet, a leader of souls through a kind of incantation” (35). Jacqueline de Romilly,
in Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, connects Gorgias with figures such as
Empedocles and Pythagoras, practitioners of magical incantations reputed to bring
healing. The physically transformative and interrelated nature of rhetoric, magic, and
medicine was recognized for most of rhetoric’s history. It is rhetoric’s capacity to move
bodies through space and time that led the ancient Greeks to categorize the rhetorician in
the same class as the medical doctor and the mystic. In the sophistic/mystic tradition,
“[M]ind exists in matter, and language affects matter: words and things are themselves
volitional forces” (Covino 1992). Most ancient and pre-modern rhetoricians found
nothing incompatible with idea that symbolic action is quite literally a material force. For
instance, consider the following passage from the most famous of the Renaissance
magicians, Cornelius Agrippa, composed nearly two-thousand years after Gorgias:
Words therefore are the fittest medium betwixt the speaker and the hearer,
carrying with them not only the conception of the mind, but also the vertue of the
speaker with a certain efficacy unto the hearers, and this oftentimes with so great
a power, that oftentimes they change not only the hearers, but also other bodies,
and things that have no life. (1: 69)
William Covino notes that the magician and the rhetor “are often the same figure
throughout Western intellectual history” (1994: 19), and that the magician and the rhetor
share an interest in “the process of inducing belief and creating community with
reference to the dynamics of a rhetorical situation” (1994: 11, emphasis in original). Prior
to the Enlightenment, “natural magic (which includes astrology, medicine, and alchemy)
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is a rhetorical practice” and “[D]istinctions between the natural and social, corporeal and
incorporeal, signifiers and signifieds, subjects and objects” do not operate with the same
certainty that they do in the modern Western world (Covino 1994: 14).

Rhetoric’s power to seize control of consciousness, overwhelm conscience, and
incite unruly behavior was widely acknowledged by ancient and modern philosophers,
many of who feared its potential for abuse. In order to promote the ethical use of rhetoric,
Plato invented a tripartite ontological narrative that separated the mind, body, and soul,
and urged his students to suppress their physical desires with rigorous mental discipline
for the betterment of their souls (Phaedrus). Plato established the basic ontological model
that has been reinforced in different epistemes by Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and
John Locke. These philosophers privileged transcendent ideals over and against material
objects, and were suspicious of rhetoric because, they believed, it could be used to divert
people away from truth and towards moral and physical debasement. In the 20th century,
theorists such as Ludwig Wittengenstein, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault attacked
ideals such as the Platonic soul, the Cartesian ego, and Kantian categorical imperatives
by showing that such notions are all socio-linguistic constructs with neither material
presence nor universal applicability. However, by making the claim that both
metaphysical speculations and interpretations of physical reality are language games
rather than truths, they “succeeded merely in reversing the hierarchy”—they removed the
Ideal and replaced it with Language, while “effacing the material,” including the body
(Condit 1999: 328). The 20th century “linguistic turn” in the humanities restored
rhetoric’s prominence in Western philosophical and critical discourse, but in the process,
rhetoric became unhinged from its pre-modern corporeal moorings, while remaining
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entangled with a theory of mind rooted in Platonic Idealism and Enlightenment
rationality.
However, not all modern Western critics believed these mind-body divisions were
self-evident. Kenneth Burke, arguably the most influential rhetorician of the 20th century,
wrote extensively about the interconnected and interdependent nature of body, language,
and environment, a relationship that formed the basis of what he called “metabiology.”
According to Burke, we should not reduce human motives to biological imperatives (as,
for instance, evolutionary psychologists might recommend), but nor should we arrogantly
assume that our capacity to use language marks us as beings who transcend nature,
because the point of view from which we perceive and discuss nature is itself a part of
nature (Thames 25). If we did not have the natural bodily equipment required to see,
think about, and articulate our impressions of nature, we would not be able to talk
ourselves into the idea that we are somehow extra-natural. Rhetoric is simultaneously a
foundational aspect of our biological condition, and the tool we use to direct our
physiological impulses towards one outcome or another. We can use rhetoric to achieve a
degree of mastery over these impulses, but we cannot deny that they exist, and that they
exert influence on our thought and behavior.
Although cognitive neuroscience was still in its infancy at the time Burke was
writing, he nevertheless intuited a connection between the brain, rhetorical practices, and
agency, and understood that this was compatible with the sophistic/mystic tradition.3 For
illustration, we can look to his speculations concerning the mystic trance, a neurological
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

While the roots of neuroscience stretch back to the 1600s, before 1980, there was little interaction
between neuroscience and cognitive science. Cognitive neuroscience—the scientific study of the neural
substrates underlying psychology and cognition—was not firmly established as a field of study until the
late 20th century. This is the subfield of neuroscience most relevant to rhetorical studies.
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state that seems to suggest neither fully passive nor active decision-making faculties
(Burke 1969a: 294). In the mystic trance, the subject “loses the self” to substantive
external forces which blur the line between symbolic and material inputs (visual images,
verbal incantation, music, drugs), and which subsequently call into question distinctions
between autonomy and possession, agency and obedience. Burke maintains that, in terms
of body rhythms and susceptibility to persuasion, the drug addict and the poetry lover are
quite similar: “in becoming receptive to so much, he becomes receptive to still more”
(1968: 141). Burke’s work suggests “both drugs and poetry can be figured as
transformative substances, both induce affective change, and both tap into bodily
rhythms, creating and increasing receptivity” (Hawhee 2004:18). This prefigures late 20th
century developments in neuroscience, and hints at fertile areas of convergence between
the brain sciences and rhetorical studies that have yet to be fully explored.
Burke helps us to see that the correlation of “mind” to matter need not entail the
reduction of human potential to evolutionary imperatives, nor does it eliminate the
possibility that we can use language to change that which we find undesirable about the
social world and ourselves. Indeed, evacuating the Cartesian ghost from the machine does
not turn the human into a mindless computer made of flesh, an amoral and self-serving
zombie, or any other metaphorical expression of sublimated existential dread. We may
instead think of the mind-as-matter as raw material fashioned into a work of art by the
cooperative, intertwined hands of nature, society, and the self.
Since the 17th century, when it was proposed as a corrective to mystical theories
of the body and soul, neuroscience was predicated on an understanding of the brain as
something of a physiological machine, with reasonably stable functions hardwired into its

!

+!

!

material that operated according to universal laws independent of cultural experience.
The idea that nature was like “a vast mechanism, and that our organs were machine-like,
replaced the two-thousand-year-old Greek idea that viewed nature as a vast living
organism, and our bodily organs as anything but inanimate mechanisms” (Doidge 12).
One of the chief proponents of this idea was Rene Descartes, who argued that the brain
and the nervous system worked like a pump, and that our nerves were tubes that ran from
our limbs to our brains and back. While the hydraulic metaphor was substituted in
subsequent epochs with metaphors foregrounding the dominant technologies of the day
(the nervous system is like a telegraph; the nervous system is a computer), the underlying
model of the brain-as-machine remained firmly in place until nearly the end of the 20th
century. Of course, machines can’t regenerate or reconfigure their own parts. When a
machine is broken, humans have to remove or replace faulty components, or abandon the
machine altogether.
The machine metaphor, when applied to the human brain, produced the common
wisdom that “after childhood the brain changed only when it began the long process of
decline; that when the brain cells failed to develop properly, or were injured, or died, they
could not be replaced. Nor could the brain ever alter its structure and find a new way to
function if part of it was damaged” (Doidge xviii). Given this theory of the unchanging
brain, neuroscientists adopted an attitude of neurological nihilism: they assumed that
people born with brain limitations, or who sustained brain damage, would suffer from
these conditions, without hope for change, for the rest of their lives. This scientific
conclusion had profound effects on all areas of Western social and intellectual life. If
their brains determined people’s dispositions and abilities, and if their brains were
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incapable of being improved or repaired, then it followed that human nature was fixed
and unalterable as well.
However, in recent years, the mechanistic model of the brain has given way to a
plastic model that emphasizes the malleability of neural systems, which have been shown
to be capable of radical physical reorganization after confrontations with traumatic
injuries and experiences, or indeed, with the phenomena of everyday life, including
rhetorical activity. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, pioneering neuroscientists first
demonstrated that “the brain changed its very structure with each activity it performed,
perfecting its circuits so it was better suited to the task at hand. If certain parts ‘failed,’
then other parts could sometimes take over” (Doidge xviii-xix). The key to the discovery
was a change in neuroscientists’ research focus. For decades they had looked for answers
in the cells of the brain. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century, they began to see
that the key to understanding thought and behavior could be found in the electrical
patterns that travel though the neural cells. These electrical patterns “are the universal
language ‘spoken’ inside the brain—there are no visual images, sounds, smells, or
feelings moving inside our neurons” (Doidge 18). This perspective allowed
neuroscientists to see that changes in the “language” of the nervous system created
changes in the physical material that makes up the different parts of the brain. The brain
is to a large degree constructed by events that occur in its internal linguistic system, a
system that responds to the external events of the natural and social world.
Everything we think, see, hear, taste, and touch is represented in the brain on a
virtual map, generated by the synaptic pathways that join neural cells in a vast, densely
packed network. These synaptic pathways connect the respective parts of the brain that
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control our auditory, visual, tactile, and emotional responses to external stimuli.
Whenever we encounter a particular stimulus, the pathways that represent its various
elements—including how we visualize it, emotionally feel about it, and what kinetic
response we believe is appropriate to it—are “lit up” by electrical currents. With each and
every reiteration of that particular electrical pattern, the synaptic network that represents
the external stimulus becomes stronger and deeper, and consequently, our “certainty” in
regards to the stimulus increases.
For example, every time we see water and touch it and feel wetness, the electrical
pattern that joins these visual and tactile centers in our brain and forms our synaptic
network for “water” is re-energized, and we renew our confidence that water is looks and
feels a certain way. We must here understand “certainty” not only to suggest abstract
knowledge or beliefs in the mind, but also those manners of knowledge manifested in the
body and in automatic physical responses. An experienced sailor learns to be cognitively
certain that the earth is round, and makes navigational decisions based on this knowledge,
but by the same token, her body, over time, becomes certain as to how to properly walk
on the careening deck of sailboat caught in choppy waters, and it too makes decisions,
though these judgment are not immediately available to our sailor’s conscious mind.
However, should a sailor find herself landlocked for several years, she will most likely
lose her ability to walk gracefully on a bucking yacht. Our synaptic networks need to be
continually reinforced, or else they die out, and new networks take their place. The steady
surface of flat earth will train the sailor’s brain to unconsciously expect her next step to
fall on a predictable plane, and her body will act accordingly.
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While cognitive and corporeal knowledge may arrive to us via different orders of
experience, in neurological terms, they are born and nurtured by the same physiological
processes and systems. Our sailor, upon being taken off the high seas, will not only be
required to alter her corporeal habits of locomotion; she might also need to refashion her
sense of identity, modulate her emotional behavior, and rearrange the guiding metaphors
through which she interprets social encounters. These changed habits of mind, like her
changed habits of motion, will also be manifested in material changes in her synaptic
networks. Neuroscientists are increasingly interested in the ways that language alters the
synaptic structures of the brain just as our interactions with the physical world do, and are
probing the implications for things like political judgment, identity-formation, literacy,
and religious conviction.4
With the discovery of the brain’s plasticity, we are called upon to reconceptualize
the relation between the body, the self, and the social world. Neuroplasticity suggests that
individual subjectivity is not wholly predetermined by biological factors, but neither is it
a matter of free play and pure performativity. Subjectivity “takes place” in the balance
between the physiological traces, inscribed on the brain, of what one has been, and the
possibility of what one can become based on the environment with which one is
confronted and the decisions one makes. This suggests a greater degree of agency then is
afforded to the individual by strict bio-determinists and structural materialists, but it must
be understood that neuroplasticity renders our brains “not only more resourceful but also
more vulnerable to outside influence,” because once a “particular plastic change occurs in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

Approachable works on neuroplasticity include Damasio (1994, 1999), Merzenich (1996), Ramachandran
(1999, 2011), Greenfield (1999), LeDoux (2002), Schwarz and Begley (2002), Ackerman (2004), Doidge
(2007).
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the brain and becomes well established, it can prevent other changes from occurring”
(Doidge xx). Habituated patterns of thought and behavior cause repeated activations of
certain neural circuits. Every time a circuit is activated, it becomes more deeply
entrenched, and more resistant to change. Once established, internal neuronal structures
“shape the perception and experience of the external world to their own form” (Wexler
144). This can help explain “private” matters like the substance addict’s resistance to
sobriety, and “public” concerns such as the intransigence of ideology. Intriguingly, it also
suggests that, in neurological terms, these phenomena are closely related to each other.
Social constructionism, as a theory of meaning-making, has a material corollary
in brain tissue, as experience in the social world creates new synaptic pathways,
strengthens some existing pathways, and weakens others based on the repetition or
cessation of cognitive activity. Some social conditions make possible the development of
richly textured frontal cortices in people, and thus, the ability to engage in richly textured
and thoughtful social interactions and symbolic expressions. On the other hand, social
conditions that produce physical deprivation and promote intellectual simplicity tend to
inhibit people’s neurological development. The forms of political organization that create
such conditions are reproduced not solely through the perpetual rational appeal of the
ideas on which they are premised, but also because they inhibit the possibility of change
by effacing the brain’s ability to critique present circumstances and conceive of
alternative modes of living. Social constructionist criticism can tell us a lot about the
ways linguistic practices constitute the content of consciousness, but it often fails to
account for the recalcitrance of certain patterns of social behavior, often of an emotional
or “irrational” nature, that seem to defy theoretical explanation, and seem resistant to
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rhetorical intervention in the form of “better” ideas. Neuroplasticity can supplement
rhetorical criticism by offering insight into the physiological processes by which
destructive ideas become self-sustaining, and it can help us devise more sophisticated
rhetorical approaches to the task of promoting social healing. It can be a boon to the field,
if we rhetoricians accept our “positive self-image is to be gained not by staking ‘our’
special knowledge (culture/symbols) against ‘their’ special knowledge (natural scientific
facts about physics and biology) but rather by ‘our’ ability to master/integrate both
culture and biology, integrating them to account for the phenomena we care about—
people and the world from which they emerge and that we dramatically shape.”5
Those who seek to deny humans’ biological origins often do so in the name of
disavowing desires and practices which violate the rhetorically constructed—and
therefore politically-invested and self-interested—parameters of permissible thought and
action in a particular community. This is the case for both the relatively insular world of
academic criticism, and for the larger political world, where the consequences potentially
culminate in bloodshed. For Burke, this insight informs the proper goal of critical work.
In Counter-Statement, he claims that “in so far as an age is bent, a writer establishes
equilibrium by leaning,” either as his age leans or in the opposite direction (vii). In an era
that is too disposed towards materiality, the critic should trumpet symbolicity, and vice
versa. Neither the symbolist nor the materialist critical orientation is in any essential way

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Condit, Celeste. Pathos, for US. Unpublished manuscript, available online at
http://ccondit.myweb.uga.edu/attic/.
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more “true” than the other, though one may becomes more academically trendy and
acquire the temporary luster of what satirist Stephen Colbert has called “truthiness.”6
The following dissertation proceeds in the spirit of Burke’s call for a productively
contrarian critical orientation. In our present age, mainstream American rhetorical studies
has been partitioned from, and largely constituted against, the general domain of the
biological, and more specifically, the neurobiological. It is my position that rhetorical
critics who vehemently dismiss neurology, physiology, and biochemistry as antithetical
to the rhetorical tradition are accidentally misreading or willfully ignoring some of the
key ideas in that tradition in order to consolidate and stabilize a field of study that is,
traditionally, flexible in its response to historical contingency, and unruly in its
intellectual ambitions. It has becomes fashionable for humanist critics to decry the
colonization of the humanities by the neurosciences, but, as I will demonstrate, the
neurosciences are just beginning to catch up to what many important rhetoricians have
been consistently arguing for more than two thousand years: symbols move matter, and
this is vitally important for any serious discussion of politics and culture.7

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I employ this term playfully, but pointedly. It was originally coined in 2005 by Colbert to denote "truth
that comes from the gut, not books.” Truthiness was chosen as the 2006 “Word of the Year” by the
American Dialect Society, which defines it as "the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be
true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true.” In the present context, I use it to suggest the point at
which a critical orientation becomes uncritically accepted as de rigueur.
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CHAPTER 2
CRITICAL METHODOLOGY
This dissertation will offer a critical perspective on rhetorical criticism itself. By
way of explanation, it may help to review the differences between rhetorical criticism and
critical rhetoric, as I understand these terms. Rhetorical criticism, as it is traditionally
conceived, can be a self-referential endeavor: criticism for criticism’s sake. As Edwin
Black declared, “criticism is what critics do”—it need not lead to other kinds of
knowledge, and can (at least claim to be) ideologically disinterested (4). Its primary
purpose is to catalogue elements of a rhetorical text’s structural design (for instance, a
speech’s use of particular tropes) and to speculate upon the authorial intentions that
undergird these stylistic choices. In terms of methodology, rhetorical critics perform
close readings of individual or closely related texts. By contrast, critical rhetoric is
motivated by a desire to contribute to social movements and effect material change, and
is akin to fields within other disciplinary traditions, such as critical pedagogy, critical
cultural studies, and critical performance studies. Critical rhetoricians do not merely
describe the internal mechanisms that make a text work, aesthetically; they also identify
what sort of work it is doing, politically. The critical rhetorician chooses her theoretical
approach based on the political goals she wishes to accomplish through her critique. For
example, a feminist critic may perform a psychoanalytic reading of the rhetoric of war
propaganda in order to reveal the misogynistic impulses that often go unnoticed by the
public. The critic’s goal, in this case, is not simply to explain why the propagandist made
certain choices when he was constructing his text—she also wishes to persuade her
reader to accept or reject the claims made by the propaganda, and in so doing, she
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produces a counter-text of her own, with the understanding that it too will be critiqued,
and will inspire the production of still more texts.
Michael McGee, one of the first wave of scholars who established critical rhetoric
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, distinguished it from the traditional rhetoric criticism
of Edwin Black by claiming that “rhetoric is what rhetoricians do”—that is, rhetorical
critics are different from other kinds of critics because they are primarily concerned with
producing (instead of just analyzing) rhetoric (McGee 1990: 279).8 Critical rhetoric can
never be value-neutral. It is productive criticism, insofar as “it intentionally produces a
strategic interpretation or structure of meanings, which privileges selective interests (but
not necessarily exclusive individuals or groups) in specific circumstances” (Ivie). The
key supposition of critical rhetoric is that rhetorical production is a defining property of
criticism itself. Put simply, one cannot speak non-rhetorically about rhetoric, so it is
better to acknowledge and embrace this rather than make spurious claims to objectivity.
Jim Kuypers, one of the most outspoken opponents of critical rhetoric, perceives
in this movement the onset of the “tyranny of political correctness,” and “the hard
marching, rhythmically thumping black boots of critical theory.” He argues that the
proper role of the critic is to undertake an “objective reconstruction of the situation”
presented by rhetorical texts (Kuypers). Kuypers claims that critical rhetoric produces
sterile, formulaic criticism, because criticism is judged only by the ideological effects it
generates, and therefore rhetoricians are compelled to only make arguments that cohere
with the fashionable politics of the day.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8

Important early contributions to critical rhetoric include McGee (1982, 1990), Wander (1984), McKerrow
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Despite Kuyper’s recourse to an epistemology of objectivity that has been largely
discredited, we should not too easily dismiss his underlying concerns. He articulates a
neo-Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric “as a thing contained within the territory of
politics and domesticated by this confinement” (Leff 53). Neo-Aristotelians maintain that
rhetorical criticism is an important part of cultural life, but it should have a clearly
defined object and style, otherwise, it loses that which makes it distinctive from other
forms of discourse. If, as critical rhetoric suggests, all rhetorical activity is political,
including both cultural texts and the criticism of those texts, then there is no sphere of
discourse that lies outside of politics: we are all critics, and we are all politically
motivated, whether we acknowledge it or not. According to the neo-Aristotelians, this
represents an existential threat to the discipline because it calls into question rhetoric’s
status as a sovereign intellectual field. If everyone is doing rhetoric all of the time, than
why do we need specialists called “rhetoricians”?
Critical rhetoricians would answer that rhetoricians are necessary because
someone needs to make people aware that they are situated within discourse, and that the
truths they hold to be self-evident are in fact rhetorically constructed, historically
contingent, and politically-implicated. These critics conceive rhetoric as “a power that
ranges across [the] entire domain of human discourse, containing whatever matter it
encounters” (Leff 53). This understanding of rhetoric’s scope echoes that of the ancient
Sophists. While not every one of the first wave of critical rhetoricians explicitly identified
his or her project with neo-Sophistry—Michel Foucault was a more common shared
reference point—their work was animated by the sophistic view that concepts such as
“reality” and “truth” are rhetorical constructs that are always already imbued with social
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power. The critic’s job is to recognize this inescapable condition, to admit to his or her
vested interest is advocating a particular perspective, and to use criticism to redirect
currents of power/discourse in socially responsible ways.
The split between the Aristotelian and Sophistic critical traditions is not about
what rhetoric is; rather, it is about what rhetoricians should or should not claim to do.
Neo-Aristotelians endorse an analytic mode of criticism that locates itself outside of the
political discourse it takes as its primary object of study, while neo-Sophists maintain that
criticism is itself a political discourse, and refuse to shy away from partisanship.
Although they differ in their understanding of proper disciplinary boundaries and
practices, both neo-Aristotelians and neo-Sophists agree that criticism changes the way
people think about texts. The former group is interested in the use of criticism to judge
excellence in a narrowly defined realm of rhetorical practice, while the latter group is
dedicated to the use of criticism as a tool for political advocacy and intervention.
Critical rhetoricians believe rhetoric can and should change the material world,
but there are diverging opinions as to how rhetoric, a seemingly immaterial force, can
move matter. For instance, Marxist rhetorical critics maintain that rhetoric can focus the
revolutionary energies required to reorganize the economic system that determines the
distribution of material resources, and groups privileged within the existing system can
extinguish dissent by controlling the dissemination of rhetoric.9 Poststructuralist
rhetorical critics claim that discursive practices determine the symbolic meanings
attributed to different kinds of material bodies, but refuse to locate a singular source of
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power in the realm of the economic.10 They understand power as a free-floating, everpresent, immaterial force, the flows of which are always in flux, and always up for grabs.
Despite disagreements about the degree to which we should emphasize economic or
linguistic determinants, both camps share a belief that, ultimately, “rhetoric is not
substantive, since it is a form of action that generates or manages material without ever
resting in a material embodiment” (Leff 53).
Critical rhetoric has not significantly altered its conception of rhetoric’s
materiality and embodiment since it was first theorized in the 1980s. Twenty years ago,
Maurice Charland published a landmark essay called “Rehabilitating Rhetoric:
Confronting Blindspots in Discourse and Social Theory,” in which he argued that
“rhetoricians must shed insularity and engage grand debates…and critically examine the
assumptions of their own practice” (465). At the time, the discipline was experiencing
anxiety because the ascendency of cultural studies threatened its premiere status within
communication studies. During such episodes of perceived crisis, rhetoricians must
choose between a conservative return to guiding principles—which is to say, a renewed
insistence on clearly demarcated disciplinary boundaries and discipline-specific critical
practices—or a progressive openness to dialogues with other fields of study and forms of
knowledge. In the 1980s/1990s, they chose the latter option, rejecting the limited
ambitions of traditional rhetorical criticism and inaugurating a much more expansive
critical rhetoric which was deeply informed by cultural and social theory.
In the 21st century, rhetorical scholars are again called upon to decide where the
field stands in a changing academic milieu. Advancements in the neurosciences are
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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opening up new questions about language, the body, and society that are being vigorously
debated by virtually every discipline within the humanities. Thus far, the few rhetoricians
who explicitly engage neuroscience have, for the most part, assumed a conservative
stance towards it, retreating into a peculiar form of rhetorical criticism that espouses the
neo-sophistic attitude towards language and epistemology, but employs it for neoAristotelian purposes: to justify the sovereignty, and superiority, of “the rhetorical
tradition,” over and against the emergence of hybrid approaches to humanistic inquiry.
Just as an earlier generation of rhetorical critics railed against the critical rhetoricians’
claim that critical objectivity was an antiquated and politically dangerous fantasy, so too
contemporary rhetoricians such as Daniel Gross, Jordynn Jack, and others reject, or
simply ignore, the notion that discourse is physically embodied in the brain, or that prelinguistic neurological processes exert significant influence on subjectivity, agency, and
judgment.
In the next section, I will survey some of the objections contemporary rhetoricians
have lodged against the incorporation of neuroscientific knowledge into rhetorical
studies, and then identify some areas where the research concerns of rhetoricians and
cultural critics are aligned with those of neuroscientists. My purpose is to begin the
process of building pipelines between different disciplinary traditions, a project I will
pursue with greater specificity and detail in later chapters that focus on addiction, agency,
and violence. First, however, I think it is important to provide the reader with a sense of
the conversation currently taking place within rhetorical studies about the proper role of
the brain and body in critical discourse. I want to establish the potential points of
resistance before I move forward with my own recommendations regarding the direction
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the field should take. If at times I diverge from the traditional form that a dissertation
literature review tends to take, it is an intentional departure. I attempt to sketch out a
conversation, rather than to catalogue information, because in my view, the problem is
not that rhetoricians lack awareness of neuroscience; it is that they have adopted a
narrative about the nature of the rhetorical tradition that shuts down cross-disciplinary
dialogue before it has a chance to begin. The following section is my attempt to represent
that narrative, and suggest correctives to its current trajectory.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
At its worst, anxiety about the encroachment of outside disciplines into rhetoric’s
home territory results in just the sort of reactionary criticism that Kuypers anticipated.
For example, Susan Jarratt is skeptical of a corporeal turn in rhetorical criticism, and
writes that she is “hard pressed to envision” how such practices “will enable us to use
histories of rhetoric to address the truly disastrous global situations we currently face”
(218). Jeanne Fahnestock acknowledges that language is “an area of overlapping
concern” for rhetoricians and neuroscientists, but she claims that the “specific answers
that cognitive scientist or neuroscientists come up with are not likely to be interesting to
rhetoricians,” and concludes that rhetoric scholars “need not and should not imitate
cognitive neuroscientists. As humanists, they should continue to concentrate on
historically situated texts and the political, social, and cultural events and trends they
embody” (160, 175). Jordynn Jack, editor of the Rhetoric Society Quarterly’s 2010
special issue called “NeuroRhetorics,” cautions rhetoricians “who may be attracted to
neuroscientific research that uses imaging tools (such as fMRI) to draw inferences about
rhetorical concepts” to be beware of “analytical pitfalls.” She counsels us to “play close
attention” to neuroscientific terms, “being sure to tease out what these terms mean and to
the potential suasory impact of such terms” (Jack 2010: 20); to consider “how topoi
function as rhetorical choices” (Jack 2010: 23); and to “carefully read” popular accounts
of neuroscience “with a rhetorical lens” (Jack 2010: 27). In other words, she reminds
rhetorical critics to be rhetorical critics, but does not cite a single example of rhetorical
criticism that failed to do the things she mentions.
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In lieu of offending parties, Jack projects guilt onto straw men: she invents a
parodic “neurorhetorician” named “Dr. Aspasia Cranium” who reduces the power of
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech to brain scans, peddles “Silver Tongue
(Unleash Your Rhetorical Power)” DVDs and video games on infomercials, and bestows
Bachelor of Neurorhetoric certificates on gullible customers. Throughout her essay, she
repeatedly uses speculative constructions such as “we might be tempted to” and “we
might be attracted to” in order to justify her preemptive set of prohibitions (2010: 27).
While the special issue of RSQ could have been a showcase of, and launching pad for,
compelling new neurorhetorical scholarship, Jack unfortunately uses her editorial
position to draw the discipline back from the brink of breakthrough, and points to nonexistent enemies as the reason for retreat.
The rhetoric of her introductory article’s title—“This is Your Brain on Rhetoric:
Empathy and Reason in Neuroscience Studies”—is telling of the intellectual
conservatism that underpins her approach to neurorhetoric. Its nod towards the iconic
Reagan-era “Just Say No” anti-drug public service announcements (“This is your brain
on drugs—any questions?”) hints that the article might contain fresh insights into the link
between drugs and rhetoric that has previously been explored by heavyweights such as
Gorgias, Burke, and Derrida, but this is not the purpose of Jack’s project. 11 Her real aim
is to prompt curious rhetoricians to “just say no” to neuroscience by warning them,
before they commence furtive experimentation, of the dangers it represents to the health
of field. Jack claims that we must “unpack” the assumptions underlying neuroscientific
studies by analyzing their use of rhetorical concepts such as emotion, reason, or empathy,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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but ultimately, she simply reiterates the well-worn claim, almost universally accepted
within rhetorical studies, that scientific discourses are invested with social power (as are
all discourses).
Several rhetoric scholars have already echoed Jack’s call for disciplinary
isolationism and conservatism in matters pertaining to the brain. In a 2012 article called
“Priming Terministic Inquiry: Toward a Methodology of Neurorhetoric,” Chris Mays and
Julie Jung write that Jack’s article “provides directions for conducting neurorhetorical
research that mirror the kind of cross-disciplinary exchange we both advocate and model
in our article” (57). Mays and Jung “propose a neurorhetoric that takes as its subject
discursive networks constitutive of contemporary neuroscience,” one which emphasizes
“the rhetoricity of emerging research in brain science” in order to work against
“inducements to claim such research as foundational (42). Mays and Jung call into
question research in the humanities and social sciences that applies neuroscientific
insights to explain how political speech shapes political attitudes. One of their targets is
George Lakoff’s The Political Mind. Lakoff claims that “[L]anguage is a tool, an
instrument—but it is the surface, not the soul, of the brain. I want us to look beneath
language. New curtains won’t save your house if the foundation is cracking” (15). In
another work, Philosophy in the Flesh, co-written with Steven Johnson, Lakoff makes the
fairly uncontroversial claim that certain guiding metaphors, such as the future is “in front
of us” and past is “behind us,” are for the most part universally acquired early in life and
embodied in neural pathways. Lakoff’s position, they argue, is “inimical to assumptions
that inform rhetorical inquiry” (Mays and Jung 47). They write, “not only does Lakoff
and Johnson’s promotion of ‘embodied’ childhood experience as central to metaphor
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formation deemphasize the cultural nature of metaphoric understanding, their theory also
effectively demotes (from a rhetorical point of view) language from epistemic to
epiphenomenal” (Mays and Jung 47). According to the authors, because a “positivistic”
outlook on knowledge is “roundly disputed” in “rhetorical circles,” such research should
not inform the development of rhetorical theory.

Mays and Jung’s argument is problematic on many levels. While decrying the air
of authority that scientific knowledge confers on research in the humanities that employs
it, the authors simultaneously claim authority over the rhetorical tradition, as if this were
a stable and impermeable body. As I will demonstrate, the idea that metaphoric
understanding is purely “cultural,” or that language is thoroughly “epistemic,” are by no
means definitively settled within the community of rhetoric scholars. Furthermore, while
it is without question necessary to emphasize the rhetoricity of scientific arguments as we
import them to our field, if we are to be true to the critical spirit which inspires such
work, we must also rigorously interrogate the rhetoricity of “the assumptions that inform
rhetorical inquiry” so that we do not inadvertently rest on a foundation of antifoundationalism. While it is true that, as Mays and Jung claim, “we cannot and will not
ever know completely what terms mean” (56), this is not reason to cease the operations
by which we continuously remake the field of rhetorical studies by challenging
theoretical orthodoxies as soon as they threaten to cement into dogma.

Daniel M. Gross employs a nearly identical approach to Jack, Mays, and Jung in
his well-received book The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to
Modern Brain Science. His central thesis is that neuroscientific discourse cannot be
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“reliably purged of race, gender, age, cultural bias, and so on” (Gross 31); therefore,
according to Gross, the entire endeavor is fatally flawed. He writes that neuroscientists
“are not studying the social brain with an adequate understanding of what it means to be
social, and they are certainly not improving society” (Gross 35). Gross maintains that
subjective experiences “have an essential social component and are best treated with
social analysis of the sort developed in the rhetorical tradition rather than “scientific
analysis that must reduce social phenomenon in certain crucial ways so as to function
properly as science” (28, emphasis in original). His disapproval extends from
neuroscientists, to the scholars in American rhetorical studies who “rarely appeal
adequately to the rhetorical tradition,” to “leading humanists” who have “emboldened
brain scientists to expand their theories to a (dramatically impoverished) social world, at
the expense of a more nuanced, humanistic perspective of the sort initiated by Aristotle
and assumed, to great advantage, in a wide range of early modern literature” (Gross 9,
29).
Gross’s seemingly unintentional parroting of neo-conservative rhetoric is
troubling, but also suggestive of the emotional coordinates which orient most
conservative thought. He claims that the social world is “impoverished,” and fantasizes
that neuroscientists, “emboldened” by critics who “inadequately” adhere to his preferred
model of the rhetorical tradition, have initiated an imperialistic expansion into rhetoric’s
sovereign territory. Gross writes that “one shudders to think” what a society that draws
from the neurobiology of emotion to formulate policies capable of, in Antonio Damasio’s
words, “reducing human distress and enhancing human flourishing,” might look like (35).
Gross’s publisher, the University of Chicago Press, advertises that his book “rescues the
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study of the passions from science and returns it to the humanities and the art of
rhetoric.” This sort of language seems quite intentionally designed to intensify the
anxiety that attends to cross-disciplinary encounters, for the purpose of maintaining
secure disciplinary boundaries. It is also a representative example of what Condit calls
“the form of critique that has come to dominate rhetorical studies,” which she claims “is
rhetorically inept for bringing about the positive social change it claims to seek; such
critique has been blind to its primary emotional driver—which is self-congratulatory
moral outrage” (Pathos, for Us 26).
Despite their claim for the importance of the rhetorical tradition, Gross and Jack
neglect a key contribution of Kenneth Burke, namely his call for comic correctives to
tragic frames (Burke1984b: 166-175). Their vision for rhetorical studies is
quintessentially tragic, in the most thoroughgoing Burkean sense of the term. Tragic
rhetoric promotes the illusion that a community was once pure and whole, claims this
idyllic state has been sullied by the encroachment of a threatening Other, and justifies the
rejection or expulsion of that Other as necessary for the restoration of order. Such
rhetoric prompts group cohesion through a shared sense of victimage and a shared goal of
redemption. In times of crisis and change, human societies often revert to tragic thinking,
and it is perhaps not surprising that the same should be true in the community of
rhetorical scholars. However, there are a number of rhetoricians who have tried, with
varying degrees of success, to break through the disciplinary divide.
Although Burke gingerly probed at the neurological roots of human
communication, the first sustained discussion of the subject can be found in Richard
Gregg’s overlooked Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in the Foundation of
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Rhetoric. Gregg argues, “Any discussion of human behavior must square with what is
known about the neurophysiology of the brain” (26). His central thesis is that we can
locate a universal perspective on human knowledge by identifying the neurological
processes common to all human communication. He calls these processes the six
principles of symbolic inducement: boundary formation, rhythm, association,
classification, abstraction, and hierarchy. These internal operations have corollaries in the
domains of symbol production (such as music notation, mental images, or language) and
social interaction (such as political or interpersonal communication). According to Gregg,
symbolization “refers to all that the human brain and mind does” (137). Since rhetoric is
the inducement of belief or action through the use of symbols, then all experience that
produces knowledge is characterized by rhetoric (Gregg 137). We still might question
why the language of symbolism and rhetoric provides a preferable account of how
experience is instantiated in the body than does the vernacular of science. As Walter
Carleton notes, Gregg’s case for rhetorical knowledge “rests, quite simply, on an analogy
between physical knowing processes, conceptual/verbal knowing processes, and sociocultural knowing processes. The key to the analogy…is his observation that all these
processes work in similar ways” (236). Why engage in the language game of rhetoric
rather than another game to which it is comparable?
Among contemporary rhetorical scholars, Celeste Condit has arguably been the
most adept at addressing this question. She is among the first to locate the intersection of
language and social environment in the corporeal body. Condit notes that experiences
arrive to the human mind through code systems, which means they must be interpreted
using cultural knowledge (2000: 21). At the same time, we are not blank slates to be
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wholly determined by the coding systems into which we are born. Genetics and aspects
of the physical environment also have a hand in shaping human potential. She argues that
“we need to study both nature and nurture, and how they interact” if we are to move
beyond the limitations imposed by a scholarly tradition that pits science versus the
humanities in an antagonistic competition for epistemological supremacy (Condit 2000:
8). There is no simple way to compare and contrast the degree to which various symbolic,
biological, and environmental factors exert determinative influence upon humans,
because the degree to which one becomes more or less influential than another will vary
depending on circumstances: genetic limitations may be overridden in environments
which provide the resources necessary to do so, while the same genetic make-up may
prove debilitating in a less resource-rich context. Likewise, communication can be
inhibited or facilitated by different corporeal states and social conditions.
The larger implication of Condit’s work is that a “robust paradigm for
communication study cannot seek to reduce all variables to one type of variable, but
rather must devise ways of incorporating variables that operate in radically different
ways…This will require that we continue to develop paradigms and methods that operate
at and integrate multiple levels of analysis from the individual to the social to the
biological” (2000: 23). Condit shows us that rhetoric is conditioned both by external
factors in the material world, and by internal physiological states. Most importantly, she
argues convincingly that these two vectors of influence are co-implicative. For critics,
this means that if we are to be intellectually responsible, as opposed to merely politically
expedient, we must not ignore areas of human knowledge that lie outside of our
disciplinary comfort zone.
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Thus far, most rhetoricians have been slow to follow Condit’s engagement with
biology and physiology, despite frequent declarations that the field must come to terms
with “corporeality.”12 They are eager to embrace the body within the fold of rhetorical
studies, yet reticent to stray too far from a focus on externalized, public representations of
internal states.13 The interior body’s role in conditioning the production of rhetoric
remains for the most part unexamined. For instance, Raymie McKerrow, in “Corporeality
and Cultural Rhetoric: A Site for Rhetoric’s Future,” claims that “an understanding of
rhetoric as corporeal is not a method of doing or seeing rhetoric, but rather an attitude one
takes towards the rhetorical act” (1998: 320). His aim is to change the standard of
judgments made towards rhetorical acts by legitimizing those forms of rhetoric, such as
expressive emotionality, that are commonly devalued in public culture and rhetorical
studies because of their association with irrationality and, by extension, with femininity.
McKerrow writes that a “focus on an embodied rhetoricity…encompasses affective as
well as purely cognitive dimensions of the human person—an emphasis on how affective
expression is given voice need not be separate from the body from which it emanates”
(1998: 323). McKerrow is interested in how we come to judge emotional displays in
others, and he ultimately calls for greater empathy for those who employ emotion
(“embodied rhetoric”) rather than reason (“administrative rhetoric”) to make public
arguments. The focus here is on the social body, broadly conceived, and not the
biological individual, and as such it remains unclear as to how individual subjects are to
conceive of their own affective experiences as politically relevant in a cultural context
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that generally associates the public airing of “private” emotions with mental weakness or
a lack of seriousness. McKerrow shifts the onus of responsibility to the critic, who is
asked to widen the purview of what expressive rhetorical styles he or she deems
acceptable, and away from the rhetor, who is implicitly encouraged to indulge in
whatever expressive style feels natural, despite the effect this might have on the reception
of his or her message.
McKerrow’s political concerns are admirable, but his proposal does not account
for the ways cultural phenomena produce the internal affective intensities that result in
outward displays of emotion, nor does he address the ways in which affective experience
is converted to political currency by institutions of administrative power. For instance,
while his essay mainly points to women, ethnic minorities, and progressive politicians as
examples of people whose voices have been marginalized by the administrative rhetorical
tradition, patriarchal or conservative voices are conspicuous in their absence, though
these groups have been masterful in marshaling affect in the service of power,
particularly in the mass media (conservative radio and television punditry) and in politics
(the manipulation of national tragedies such as 9/11 as motivation for war). McKerrow’s
use of the term “corporeal” seems to promise an investigation into the role somatic
experience plays in the production of rhetoric, but instead it coaches us on how to
interpret the somatic experiences of others, and thereby reinstalls mind-body dualism
even as it calls for its overthrow: we are the self-aware minds responding to the
emotionally expressive body of the other.
Nevertheless, McKerrow’s essay helped to legitimize investigations of the
affective dimension of rhetoric, and emboldened critics to engage the topic with greater
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breadth and depth. In recent years, the study of emotion has emerged as the most
promising point of convergence between public and embodied rhetorics.14 In general,
contemporary rhetoricians who engage emotion argue that the negative connotations
associated with emotional rhetoric are undesirable, insofar as they privilege a white,
male, heterosexual rhetorical tradition, and devalue other rhetorical traditions that are
more open to emotion as a legitimate discursive mode. The argument that we need to be
more tolerant of these marginalized rhetorical styles has served as the fulcrum for the
critical and theoretical movement that seeks to return rhetorical studies to the body. Most
rhetoricians agree that the value of emotional rhetoric lies in its excessiveness—it
overflows the boundaries of reason and calls attention to the limitations of dualistic
constructions such as mind/body, truth/falsity, and self/other. The assumption that
follows from this is that once people see that these binaries are man-made rather than
natural, they will reject them, and commence the work of building a more egalitarian
social order.
Much of the work that examines emotion, rhetoric, and political action deals with
expressions of anguish and rage that follow from atrocities such as the Kent State
shooting and the lynching of Emmitt Till. However, when we look at other physiological
responses such as laughter, which tends to erupt spontaneously and refuses to adhere to
moral imperative or political ideology, we are forced to confront an often overlooked or
unspoken aspect of embodied rhetoric.15 As Butterworth notes, “embodied arguments do
not always or necessarily lead to progressive outcomes” (248). Herein lies the problem
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with the rhetoric of the body, as it has thus far been conceived in rhetorical criticism. To
translate the corporeal body into the representational “body” is to imprison it in language,
which is, of course, always an act invested with power. Therefore, the argument that we
must set the body free from such constraints by adjusting our interpretive attitudes
towards outward expressions of emotionality is not a particularly radical gesture, it is a
realignment of already existing imprisoning linguistic structures. It is a reinforcement of
the very divisions between us and them, mind and body, that is purports to critique, in
which we are identified, and thus already constituted, as the rational agents bearing
witness to a foreign Otherness. In much the same way that calls for “tolerance”
presuppose a fundamental separation between the one who tolerates and the other who is
to be tolerated, a rhetorical theory of the body that is premised on a split between private
thought and public action is destined to maintain the separation of embodiment and
rhetoricity it supposedly wants to abolish. As Condit notes, a theory of emotion “that
ignores human bodies is nothing but a theory of ideology or style dressed up as affect. A
theory of emotion that ignores the social level, not only cannot attend to issues of ‘the
public’ but also, ignores the repetitive forces that lead specific bodies to be prompted to
specific emotions in specific patterns through space-time.”16
If rhetoric scholars hope to find a way out of this epistemological and ontological
dilemma, we might begin by re-examining how we understand the word “emotion.” The
legacy of Aristotelian rhetoric has led critics to associate emotions brought about by
rhetoric with alterations in conscious acts of deliberative judgment. But this overlooks the
internal, preconscious processes that happen between the moment a message is received
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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by the subject, and the moment when the sensations that message has aroused compel the
subject to produce a thought or message of his or her own. Following Massumi, we might
call the raw, initial impulse affect. Affect “broadly refers to states of being, rather than to
their manifestation or interpretation as emotion” (Hemmings 551). Affect, according to
Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, is
the name we give to those forces—visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally
other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can
serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can
likewise suspend us (as if neutral) across a barely registering accretion of forcerelations, or that can leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.
(1)
This definition zones in on the motivational qualities of affect, and in so doing identifies
a component of the rhetorical process that often passes without comment, namely, the
energy or force that occupies a transitional space between the reception of rhetoric and its
conversion into thought. Massumi writes that affect is a “prepersonal intensity
corresponding to the passage from one experiential state to another and implying an
augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (1987: xvi). Affect is
essentially “meaningless,” though influential, until it is translated into language, at which
point it is converted into a feeling. Eric Shouse explains that a feeling is “a sensation that
has been checked against previous experiences and labeled. It is personal and
biographical because every person has a distinct set of previous sensations from which to
draw when interpreting and labeling their feelings.” Finally, according to Massumi, we
come to emotion, which is “qualified intensity” or “intensity owned and recognized”; it
emerges through “the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which from
that point onward is defined as personal” (2002: 28). Massumi describes emotions as
having “narrativized” content shaped through cultural, social, and political contexts (Rice
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201). Charles Altieri explains that emotions, as opposed to feelings, involve “the
construction of attitudes that typically establish a particular cause and so situate the agent
within a narrative field” (qtd. in Frank 515). If feelings locate the individual within his or
her own personal history, emotions position that subjective status within the comparative
field of the wider culture.
Emotion is the culturally specific framework though which universally
experienced affective intensities must pass as affect is given expression. For instance,
nearly all humans experience the affect of fear, but whether that fear is outwardly
manifested through sobbing or fury depends upon culturally determined and personally
developed criteria of appropriateness. Lawrence Grossberg explains, “emotion is the
articulation of affect and ideology. Emotion is the ideological attempt to make sense of
some affective productions” (316). Unlike feelings, the display of emotion can be either
genuine or faked: I may bodily experience an affective impulse that compels my body to
flee from threat, but because I am situated within an ideological context that demands the
performance of hegemonic masculinity, I can demonstrate an emotional orientation of
steely implacability. The possibility of willed deception indicates that emotions are the
result of judgments made by the emoting subject, but affect is the catalyst that brings
emotion into being. Emotions are rhetoric’s public face, the most visible portion of the
rhetorical circuit, but they are only one element in a dynamic that internally joins body,
mind, and the social world. Turning our attention from emotion to affect lets us begin the
process of getting at that which has heretofore remained largely unnamed, because it is,
by definition, unrepresentable: it is a force that precedes, and motivates, the translations
of somatic impulses into language. It is a means to think about how “the ‘outside’ realms
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of the pre-/extra-/para-linguistic intersect with the ‘lower’ or proximal senses (such as
touch, taste, smell, rhythm and motion-sense, or alternately/ultimately, the automatic
nervous system)” (Gregg and Seigworth 8). Ben Anderson comments, “the key political
and ethical task for a cultural politics of affect is to disclose and thereafter open up points
of potential” (2010: 162) on what Raymond Williams calls the “very edge of semantic
availability” (1977: 134).
If we widen the parameters of what constitutes the social or the cultural to
encompass the affective dimension of human experience, we need to recalibrate the
principles that guide our critical practice. Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s landmark
book Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, and Performance takes issue with some of the
reigning orthodoxies of critical theory, including the prioritization of language and
symbolization for interpretation, and the foregrounding of binary pairings such as
nature/culture. They are especially skeptical of those theorists who unquestioningly
reiterate social constructionist theories, and who only deal with affect “in the sense of
rounding up affect and herding it into the big tent of what is already understood to
constitute the body of Theory” (Sedgwick and Frank 109). Theory, as described by the
authors, is imbued with a mind/body dualism that values human cognitive/linguistic
capabilities over and against the visceral arousal that takes place in the body. This
prompts social constructionist theorists to assume that “it’s the distance of any theory
from a biological…basis that alone can make the possibility of doing any justice to
difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative
force, and to the possibility of change” (Sedgwick and Frank 114). According to
Sedgwick and Frank, the problem with a purely cognitive/linguistic critical approach of
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the sort most often utilized by cultural theorists is that “relentless attention to the
structures of truth and knowledge obscures our experience of those structures”
(Hemmings 553). Massumi, like Sedgwick and Frank, argues that the dogmatic
acceptance of linguistic determinism creates a state of affairs in cultural theory in which
“critical thinking” has become reduced to identifying points on a stable map of the
always already known (Massumi 2002: 12).

Contemporary cultural critics spend too much time applying well-worn,
dichotomous theories of domination and subversion to cultural texts, and too little time
investigating the lived texture of these conditions. As such, critics tend to produce
diagnoses of structural problems, rather than creative prescriptions that might be applied
by individuals to their interpersonal, affective relations with each other. Frank
comments, “in limiting the varieties of interpretation that become possible to hypermoralized and simplified version of critique (the identification of a text as hegemonic or
subversive), other performative possibilities and goals for criticism get lost” (512).
Unless we recognize that language is just one link in a chain of interrelated social and
physiological events that produce thought and action, our critical practice is severely
limited. Massumi writes that such approaches are “incomplete if they operate only on the
semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined…What they lose, precisely, is
the expression event—in favor of structure” (2002: 26-7). Structural critical paradigms
tend to place people in opposition to one another in configurations of dominance and
subjugation, whereas affect theories understand human relationships as a contagious, and
contiguous, circuit of feeling and response, in which expressions of intensity are
transferred to others and then double back, increasing the original intensity. This changes
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the nature of how we understand the flows and maintenance of social power. As Sarah
Ahmed emphasizes in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, “belief and adherence to
particular structures are affectively invested in, rather than cognitively weighed” (Rice
203). According to these affect theorists, our relation to ideology is not primarily
intellectual, it is embodied, and affect offers a “way forward” because “affect’s difference
from social structures…means it possesses, in itself, the capacity to restructure social
meaning” (Hemmings 550). This is important because it adds complexity to cultural
criticism that tends to inexorably move towards reductive economic explanations for
cultural phenomena. It helps us to recognize that “the reality of social existence, and of
lived reality, is always more complicated, filled with multiplicities and contradictions,
resistance and compromises” (Grossberg 329). However, it is difficult to think and talk
about such relations because “there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to
affect” (Massumi 27).
As a corrective to perceived oversights in contemporary cultural criticism,
Massumi, along with Sedgwick and Frank, sketch out the beginnings of what has recently
come to be known as “affect theory,” or the “affective turn.”17 In this emerging critical
orientation, affects are positioned “in the pre-linguistic space between a stimulus and
reaction, and between reaction and consciousness. The turn to affect is thereby a turn to
that ‘non-reflective’ bodily space before thought, cognition, and representation—a space
of visceral processing” (Papoulias and Callard 34), and a challenge to “any notion of
cognitive primacy (Edbauer 28). The corporeal dynamism suggested by affect theory
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collapses mind/body distinctions by highlighting the ways in which the social and
physiological environments are mutually transformative in a materially substantive sense.
Affect theories “offer tools for specifying relations between the aesthetic and the
political, and between the psychic and the social, that are not only linguistic” (Frank 523)
Affect is positioned as a mediatory force that joins these planes in a holistic circuit of
cause and effect.
Affect theories stress the physiological and social planes with varying degrees of
specificity and emphasis, though they are loosely united around the circuitous nature of
affective life. Theresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect is perhaps the most bodily of
the major works in affect theory. She argues that common social experiences, such as
walking into a room and “sensing” nervous tension, are neither imaginary nor
supernatural, but are in fact indications that social and physiological energies co-mingle
in complex and important ways. We transmit affects between each other’s bodies in a
“process whereby one person’s or one group’s nervous and hormonal systems are brought
into alignment with another’s” (Brennan 9). Like much work in cultural theory, she
explores the ways in which the boundaries of subjectivity are permeable, contingent, and
always in flux. What makes her work unique is that she means this quite literally. As
human bodies release and imbibe hormones, they physically and biologically mesh with
each other and our environment: “there is no secure distinction between the ‘individual’
and the ‘environment’” (Brennan 6). Affective encounters between bodies alter our
anatomical composition, and thus, sociality is not merely a matter of interpersonal
communication or structural relations, it is also a matter of physiological exchange that
occurs through affective encounters.
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While Brennan focuses on how affect is transmitted between bodies, other affect
theorists explore the circuitous relationship between bodies and technology. Beginning at
least with the use of language, humans have used technologies both to train our brains
and to distribute our cognition across other technical artifacts outside of our bodies.
According to philosopher Andy Clark, human minds are inherently plastic, and through
such everyday practices as language learning, the mind develops its cognitive powers in
conjunction with its development of tools. He contends that humans are “by nature,
products of a more complex and heterogeous developmental matrix in which culture,
technology, and biology are pretty well inextricably intermingled…tools and culture are
indeed as much determiners of our nature as products of it” (86). Therefore, how we
interact with our media technologies might be understood as an affective feedback loop.
In every historical epoch, new technologies prompt new habits of mind and body that
bring with them affective investments, which in turn transfigure both people’s neural
networks and their interactions with each other. Richard Grusin explains that
certain affects become stronger and more muscular in different cultural and
historical contexts, while others might atrophy or grow weak from disuse.
Consequently, we might then seek out media and other technologies and tools and
social, technical, or cultural environments in which we can continue to develop
and extend certain kinds of affective states or combinations and sequences of
affective states and which would then heighten or refine or attune those states and
capabilities as well (9).
Such attention to the intertwined nature of history and the body helps clarify the ways in
which changes in technology not only alters our relations to labor and leisure, but also
transforms our capacity to perceive, think about, and feel these relations. For example,
Pruchnic and Lacey note that “the presentation of subjective experience in media such as
cinema, television, and early (‘read only’) Web formats, much like literary works, gained
its representational power through mimicking common processes of human experience
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and recollection. The popularity of such attempts, however...has the effect of additionally
altering the ‘natural’ memory processes of their audiences” (2011: 7).
Of course, there is no guarantee that the affective states we choose to repeatedly
pursue and therefore reinforce will necessarily be conducive to more egalitarian social
and political conditions, and this is one of the problems Hemmings locates in much affect
theory. She argues Sedgwick and Massumi foreground “the optimism of affective
freedom” while associating the negative aspects of affective processing as part of “the
pessimism of social determinism” that affect theory is supposed to free us from (551).
One of these negative aspects is the fact that the “delights of consumerism, feelings of
belonging attending fascism or fundamentalism, to suggest just several contexts, are
affective responses that reinforce rather than challenge the dominant order” (Hemmings
551). Furthermore, Sedgwick and Massumi offer little in the way of explanation as to
how we are prompted to enter into some affective circuits rather than others. For
example, why do some of us feel invigorated by the fascist spectacle, while others feel a
sense of threat? For affective freedom to equal critical freedom, Sedgwick must insist that
affect attaches randomly to any object; she does not adequately account for the ways in
which powerful institutions make some affective attachments more likely to occur than
others (Hemmings 560). This is one gap in affect theory that critical rhetorical theory
may help to fill by identifying how the art of persuasion is employed to draw people
towards particular articulations of affects and objects.
Some critics identify a similar problem in Massumi’s work. While Massumi
claims that current critical interpretative practices tend to lead critics to impose a
predetermined meaning on text—if your only tool is Marxist critique, you’re bound to
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find class struggle everywhere—he is less insightful when it comes to explaining how we
are to identify and address the social forces that compel the affective relationship and
imbue it with power. For Massumi the autonomy of affect places it outside the reach of
critical interpretation (Hemmings 562). The language Massumi uses to describe affect—
“inassimilable,” “outside expectation and adaption” (2002: 85), “in excess of any
narrative or function line” (2002: 87), “irreducible excess” (2002: 87)—contributes to the
practical problem of how to enlist affect theory for critical purposes. Grossberg identifies
this problem in Massumi’s affect theory as a “leap from a set of ontological concepts to a
description of an empirical and affective context” (314). Grossberg asserts that in order to
bridge the gulf between an ontology of affect and its concrete deployment in specific
cultural contexts, we must ask: “what are the machinic apparatuses or regimes of
discourse that are constituting the ways in which we live our lives?” (314). Here again we
find a problem for which critical rhetorical theory might provide a solution.
Pruchnic notes that because affect is often framed as “ultimately irreducible and
‘unrepresentable,’” it makes the critical edge “more what we might code ‘aesthetic’ than
rhetorical, or more focused on the description of affects and affective processes rather
than their possible manipulation” (2008: 167). The challenge that remains for rhetorical
and cultural critics is to conceive of a way to marshal the insights of affect theory into a
politically—and not just theoretically—useful critical practice. As we will see, there have
been some steps in that direction, most of which find promise in the research emerging
from the neurosciences about the brain’s plasticity.
Much affect theory research “has revolved around the complex parsing of cultural
and subjective ‘triggers’ for affective experience in relation to the material functions and
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response mechanisms of the endocrine and nervous systems” (Pruchnic 2008: 160). For
instance, Connelly notes that in one form of rhetorical cultural activity, talk therapy,
“specific tactics are purposely applied by others, or the actors themselves, to body/brain
relays below conscious regulation,” and doing so promotes physiological changes in the
neural circuitry (2002: 11). Whether it is practiced by psychoanalysts, shamans, or
politicians, rhetoric can be characterized as a symbolic substance strategically
administered to trigger neurochemical reactions, which produce “affective dispositions
that operate below the threshold of representation and intellectual regulation alone”
(Connolly 2002: 132). These affective dispositions then prompt the brain to fit them
within linguistic structures that are rhetorically constituted through cultural experience.
The philosopher Mark Hansen locates emancipatory potential within the context
of what he describes as “the current consensus in neuroscientific research that thinking is
constructive and emergent and that it encompasses richly embodied processes of
autopoietic self-organization” (593). Hansen argues that affectivity represents our best
chance “to escape the pull of our embodied habits and our encultured engagement with
that world: affectivity—in its transmission of intensity from one body to another—is able
to undo our corporeal habits and embodied memory, and penetrate the ideological hexis
(the pull of bodily habits) through which bodies are turned into subjects” (qtd. in
Papoulias 34) Consciousness of our own internal neural processes allows us to decouple
an affective intensity from the linguistic thought pattern to which it is usually articulated,
or which produces it. This requires rigorous mental effort and is, quite literally, a form of
physical training: Burkean comic criticism concretized in strategically strengthened or
weakened neural networks.
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As the psychiatrist and brain researcher Norman Doidge points out, “The idea that
the brain is like a muscle that grows with exercise is not just a metaphor”: “postmortem
examinations have shown that education increases the number of branches among
neurons. An increased number of branches drives the neurons farther apart, leading to an
increase in the volume and thickness of the brain (43). If we fail to intercede by way of
self-conscious self-regulation, we increase our vulnerability to habits of thought and
behavior that, over time, can become nearly impossible to break. This is because
plasticity is competitive; “If we stop exercising our mental skills, we do not just forget
them: the brain map for those skills is turned over to the skills we practice instead”
(Doidge 58). The competitive nature of neural plasticity creates a paradox, insofar as it
“the same neuroplastic properties that allow us to change our brains and produce more
flexible behaviors can also allow us to produce more rigid ones,” because “neural
circuits, once established, tend to become self-sustaining” (Doidge 242). That is, each
time the plastic brain acquires culture and uses it repeatedly, there is an opportunity cost:
the brain loses some neural structure, in the process, because plasticity is competitive
(Doidge 298). Cultural differences are so persistent because when our native culture is
learned and wired into our brains, it becomes “second nature,” seemingly as “natural” as
many of the instincts we were born with (Doidge 299). Furthermore, after early
adulthood, our brain’s plasticity diminishes, and the cultural orientations we’ve acquired
in our developing years become more intransigent as we age. As a consequence, “the
individual largely acts to alter the external world to match an increasingly inflexible inner
world” (Wexler 143).

!

'(!

!

However, this is not to say we are not without agency in the matter of our mind,
so to speak; while cultural habits can, over the course of a lifetime, become so
strengthened at the synaptic level as to seem permanent features of our being, there are
methods being developed within neuroscience that might offer clues for how critical
rhetoricians may begin to think about practical interventions which work in conjunction
with those strategies which target social structures. For example, in his pioneering
research with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, research psychiatrist
Jeffrey Schwartz developed a method of drug-free cognitive behavioral therapy that
teaches patients to “regard the intrusion of OCD symptoms into consciousness as the
manifestation of a ‘false brain message,’ training them to select willfully alternative
actions when experiencing obsessions and compulsions”; this allows them to relieve
OCD symptoms and “bring about systematic changes in metabolic activity in the OCD
circuit” (Schwartz and Begley 292). Thus, by concentrating awareness on a cognitive
habit, people were able to alter the brain activity that gave rise to it. The PET scans of the
OCD patients shows that “a change in the valuation a person ascribes to those
electrochemical signals [that represent a thought in the neural circuits] can not only alter
them in the moment but lead to such enduring changes in cerebral metabolic activity that
the brain’s circuits are essentially remodeled” (Schwartz and Begley 292).
These results indicate that there is a mechanism “by which the mind might
affect—indeed, in a very real sense, reclaim—the brain. That mechanism would allow
volition to be real and causally efficacious, not the ‘user illusion’ that determinists call it
would allow volition to act on the material brain by means of an active and purposeful
choice about how to react to…conscious experience” (Schwartz and Begley 295). Within
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neuroscientific literature, there is a mounting body of evidence that suggests that mental
force affects the brain by “altering the wave functions of the atoms that make up the
brain’s ions, neurotransmitters, and synaptic vesicles. By a direct action of mind, the
brain is thus made to behave differently” (Schwartz and Begley 318). The power of
cognitive-behavioral therapy to alter brain circuits in people who suffer from conditions
like depression or OCD implies that similar rhetorical interventions should be able to
change the circuitry that underlies other aspects of personality, behavior, and thought.
In order to begin the process of intervening into neuronal operations, individuals
and collectivities must learn how these operations influence their thought, and
consciously adopt techniques of deliberate self-management that run counter to the
dominant ethos of American consumer capitalism: “Just Do It.” Nike’s famous slogan
pithily encapsulates the widespread glorification of the self-wiled affective dimension of
social life. Most Americans do not like to be told to distrust their instincts, or their souls.
They do, however, profess a strong interest in care of the self; Nike’s catchphrase
successfully marries the impulse for self-improvement to the thrill of self-abandonment,
an articulation that is, arguably, at the core of the capitalist ethos. Intervening in this
dynamic may require critics to tactically mobilize the rhetoric of self-improvement and
self-care for political purposes. Neurorhetorical criticism hinges on the argument that
individual neuronal conditioning is simultaneously a cause and effect of socioeconomic
and sociopolitical conditions. By the same logic, interventions into structural problems
must take into consideration the affective lives of individuals, because rational
argumentation cannot occur or have impact unless people are receptive to it, and a social
formation fueled on emotion, action, and certainty discourages the self-control, empathy,
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and embrace of ambiguity that deliberative democracy requires. A useful critical theory
of affect will seek to formulate rhetorical strategies with which to persuade people to
bring their affective experience within the fold of their thought for reasons other than
self-preservation alone. It is incumbent upon critical rhetoricians to articulate selfknowledge of one’s own brain, its emotional triggers and vulnerabilities, to an awareness
and distrust of the workings of power, which increasingly rely on rhetoric that
reconfigures brains via appeals to affect.
Affect forms a crucial link between the research interests of rhetorical critics,
media and cultural theorists, and neuroscientists. Jeff Pruchnic is the first rhetorical
scholar to address the significance of neuroplasticity and affect for rhetorical theory. In
his under-cited “Neurorhetorics: Cybernetics, Psychotropics, and the Materiality of
Persuasion,” he reviews mid-20th century research into cybernetics and psychotropic
drugs in order to think through “the intersections between the alteration of our
physiological capacities and the more traditional forces of subjective persuasion
associated with the domains of rhetoric” (2008a: 169). This work is particularly useful
because it explicitly challenges critical theory that rigidly insists on a strict separation of
cultural and biological vectors of determination. Pruchnic notes, “cultural experiences
themselves have a way of leaving a material mark on our nervous system” (2008a: 195).
While Pruchnic is careful not to reduce the constitutive importance of cultural
phenomena, he does submit that with the rise of virtual reality as a ubiquitous part of
daily life, our affective capacities and neurological responses take on greater significance,
because new media is especially geared towards producing intense bodily experiences in
isolated individuals, who usually interact with online technologies in private spaces rather
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than public venues. He concludes that insofar as “persuasion is increasingly taking on
such forms, one of the primary challenges for ethical and rhetorical theory may be to
configure neurological and affective forces as vectors of persuasion” (Pruchnic 2008a:
197). Pruchnic’s article clears a path for future rhetorical explorations of affect and
neuroscience, but he is concerned primarily with increasing recognition of neurorhetoric
as a relevant area for future research, rather than theorizing and applying it as a critical
method. I will demonstrate that neurorhetoric can be a valuable critical tool for
rhetoricians who wish to intervene in abuses of social power.
Political activists and social critics often feel frustrated when people stubbornly
refuse to adopt alternative ways of thinking which appear, by all rational measures, more
logically coherent than the “irrational” beliefs the people hold. Critical rhetoricians often
frame this as a structural problem—they believe that changes in the economic and/or
linguistic system will result in widespread changes in consciousness. Even worse, it is
sometimes treated Platonically as a symptom of sophistry run amok, the assumption
being that if the people had access to “better” information, they would naturally think and
act the “right” way.18 Affect theory and neuroscience might allow rhetoricians to instead
consider attitudinal intransigence as a (neurochemical) drug problem, and to
acknowledge that we are all—professional critics and laypeople alike—liable to become
addicted to our entrenched perspectives.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

Lakoff’s The Political Mind is striking in this regard. Though he forefronts the importance of the plastic
brain in political persuasion, he nevertheless implies that humans are naturally more inclined to progressive
ethics and morality than they are to conservative or authoritarian models of the same, and suggests that if
progressives employ the correct narratives, people will organically come around to their side.

!

',!

!

The ancient Greeks understood rhetoric as a pharmakon, an ambiguous substance
that could either poison or cure. With this in mind, Stephen Gencarella argues that
contemporary rhetoricians should adopt the role of “social physicians,” and “attend to
discouraging the arts that poison and promoting those that cure, recognizing that any
critical rhetoric performed with such an agenda would necessitate discussion of how it
conceives poisons and medicines” (2010: 251). The critical neurorhetoric that I am
proposing understands rhetoric both literally and figuratively as a drug that can be
poisonous or regenerative, and one that acts as its own antidote. In the following
chapters, I will draw from critical rhetoric and neuroscience to advance a model of the
critic-as-physician, but amend it with words of wisdom culled from a healer, Jesus Christ,
and a dealer, Frank Lopez in Scarface, respectively: physician, heal thyself (but don’t get
high on your own supply).

I find Gencarella’s claim a salutary prescription for what ails the field, for the
medicinal metaphor he employs draws our attention to the bodily effects of the arts of
persuasion. In Chapter Four, “Political Junkies: Affective Politics and Addictive
Rhetoric,” I substantiate Gencarella’s metaphor with recourse to scientific knowledge
concerning the neurochemistry of emotion and addiction. This chapter was motivated by
my interest in the recalcitrance of ideology: why don’t people change their minds when
they are presented with information that offers rational refutations of their entrenched
belief systems? Burke has offered a permutation of the proposition I put forward—that
we can become addicted to symbolic structures— in his writings on “piety,” but Burke
did not account for the neurobiology of affect and addiction, and thus he ultimately
insists that habits are constituted in discourse. Reliance on Burkean theory has prompted
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many rhetorical critics to feel secure in their belief that the introduction of new discursive
frames will prompt people to rethink their ideological habits. I do not share their
confidence, and I read Burkean piety through neuroscientific concepts such as Antonio
Damasio’s “somatic markers” and Susan Greenfield’s insights concerning neuronal
communication to show that ideological messages delivered through emotionally charged
rhetoric give the brain access to neurochemical caches that it finds addicting. The brain,
physiologically constituted through addiction, filters social-symbolic inputs through a
screen that separates that which satisfies its cravings, and that which does not. This has
political implications, because rhetoric that is formatted to meet the needs of the junkie
brain will be more influential than rhetoric designed to appeal to a subject’s rational,
intellectual faculties. I argue that critical work that focuses on replacing bad ideas with
better ideas via rhetorical activity is often destined to be in vain unless it involves the
body as well as the mind. Fascist regimes and addiction recovery groups intuit this, and I
recommend that rhetoricians look to Alcoholic’s Anonymous as a model for critical and
pedagogical practices that seek to help people overcome addiction to ideology.
In “Political Junkies,” I suggest that agency is neither centered in the conscious
mind, nor is it a singular quality—there is not “one agent per body.” Rather, the brain and
body can make decisions independently of the will of the thinking subject This is why
addicts so often struggle with relapse: what the subject thinks and what the brain-body
wants are often at odds, and the latter constellation of agencies is capable of overriding
cognitive agency. I explore the dispersal of agency in greater detail in Chapter Five,
“Vital Signs: Consubstantiality and Corporeal Agencies.” My point of departure is
Burke’s theory of identification, which he insists is “a symbolic act that...remains
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available for conscious critique and reasoned adjustment” (Davis 2008: 124). Within
critical rhetoric, the notion that we can empower people with the ability to willfully dearticulate the identifications that bind them to ideological structures by equipping them
with “critical consciousness” is attributable in large part to Burkean approaches to
cultural criticism, combined with a humanistic optimism about the possibility of human
emancipation that survived the ascendency of post-humanistic thought in the field, such
as that represented by Derrida, Foucault, and Butler. Agency, according to many
humanist rhetoricians, is bound up with the subject’s ability to say “no” to power. In this
chapter, I question whether humanist theories of agency can be sustained if there are
many instances when the mind says “no,” but the body says “yes.” To illustrate, I discuss
V.S. Ramachandran’s innovative treatment of people who suffer from phantom limb
syndrome. His methods circumvent the conscious mind and “speak” directly to the brain.
Based on the neurological principles that undergird Ramachandran’s work, I argue that
critical rhetoricians should pay greater attention to the agencies of brain and body that
often pass without recognition in rhetorical studies. I urge critics to engage with the
“New Vitalism,” an emerging philosophical and critical orientation that helps us rethink
agency “not as an essential characteristic of the rational subject, a deity or some vital
force, but as those contingent capacities for reflexivity, creative disclosure, and
transformation that emerge...within the folds and reversals of material/meaningful flesh”
(Coole 113).

Understanding agency as “contingent capacities” emphasizes their precarious
nature: the agencies of the body are vulnerable to manipulation by cultural and rhetorical
forces that often remain hidden from the light of critical inquiry. In Chapter Six, “An
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Uncritical Condition: Rhetorical Violence and ‘Brain Trauma,’” I call attention to these
vulnerabilities. I argue that the traditional distinction between rhetoric and physical force
cannot be maintained in light of what we now know about the effects violent rhetorics
have on the brain and body. Rhetoricians tend to focus their criticism on the damage that
vitriolic speech can do to a subject’s sense of self; the sense of self is usually considered
a socially constructed narrative structure, housed in the psyche, that subjects call upon to
impose order and meaning on experience. If we understand identity only as a symbolic
construct, it follows that violent rhetoric cannot physically wound a person; it can only
function as a precursor to, or inspiration for, physical acts that may produce physical
wounds. For humanists, the moment of agency can occur in the temporal gap between the
reception of rhetoric, and the physical act it engenders. It is in this moment that a subject
either decides to reject the meaning of the message directed towards him, or respond to it
with violence. I contend that theories which frame agency as a singular mental event—a
critical moment of judgment—fail to account for the pre-conscious neurophysiological
operations that determine whether or not a subject is capable of engaging in critical
thought. These operations can be disrupted by symbolic forms of trauma that have
material, bodily effects that are invisible to the naked eye, but that nevertheless directly
affect a subject’s ability to make critical cognitive judgments. I propose that the primary
scene of violence, then, often occurs before the outward acts of aggression that so often
garner the disapproval and concern of critics and commentators. Lynette Hunter notes
that, among other things, rhetoric can be violence if “someone is systematically denied
access to particular information,” if “ideology constitutes the representations of a subject
to ensure the inadequacy of that representation,” and if “there is a different power relation
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between two people or groups, in terms of their access to knowledge, political, economic,
cultural, social structures that the powerful keep obscure/renders obscure, by say not
informing someone of their rights” (6-7). In a similar vein, I make the case that when
searching for the parties “responsible” for violence, we should look towards institutional
power rather than individual judgments. My contribution is a theory of violence that
allows activists and critics to substantiate claims that power oppresses through symbolic
violence by demonstrating that symbolic violence is not a substitute for physical
coercion; at the level of neurology, symbolic violence is physical violence.
I conclude this dissertation with some recommendations for possible future
applications of critical neurorhetoric. Critical neurorhetoric can update and add depth to
rhetorical theories of the body and embodiment, but it can also be employed as a
pedagogical practice. I argue that rhetoric and composition instructors should focus less
on teaching students to perform textual analyses of cultural products, and more on
guiding students through the process of analyzing their own affective responses as texts
that have been produced by their immersion in social practices. The advantage, I believe,
is that students can become aware of the their lack agential self-control, when that term is
understood as one that encompasses both intellectual and visceral registers of response.
Critical neurorhetoric insists that cognition is but one of many sites of rhetorical
influence and production; when we recognize the limits of our power to refuse the
dictates of rhetoric, we can begin to formulate strategies and tactics which may allow us
to envision and pursue new ways of being.
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL JUNKIES: AFFECTIVE POLITICS AND ADDICTIVE RHETORIC
Rhetorical critics traditionally begin their investigations with the unspoken
assumption that subjects are persuaded by the ideational quality of an argument, and
critical evaluations are focused on determining the reasons why particular arguments are
meaningful to context-bound audiences. Yet one context that often passes without
comment is that of the neural-makeup of the message-receivers. This is due to a longstanding tendency within rhetorical studies to draw distinctions between externalized,
public, and cognitive modes of communication such as speaking and reading, and
internal, physiological, unconscious operations that occur outside of or prior to an agent’s
intellectual apprehension. The former category is often taken to be the proper site of
rhetorical inquiry, whereas the latter is understood as the province of psychologists and
scientists. Contemporary rhetoricians have been hesitant to engage with the pre-conscious
and unconscious realm for fear of lapsing into the sort of reductionism exemplified by
behaviorism, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and the like. However, in fending
off one type of reductionism, many rhetorical and cultural theorists “fall into another:
they lapse into a reductionism that ignores how biology is mixed into thinking and culture
and how other aspects of nature are folded into both” (Connolly 2002: 3).
In “The Philosophical Basis of Rhetoric,” Henry W. Johnstone Jr. draws a
distinction between “the persuasion that is the legitimate concern of rhetoric and the
persuasion that is not” by asserting that “it is natural to draw the line in terms of the
evocation of consciousness for purposes of communication” (25). A persuasive process
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such as “subliminal stimulation” deliberately “avoids consciousness” and persuades by
“causing a state of consciousness rather than evoking one” (Johnstone Jr. 25). Johnstone
works from the presumption, commonly held among rhetoric scholars, that traditional
forms of rhetoric, such as oratory or literature, fundamentally operate in the mind
differently than less artful forms of persuasion, such as “coercion at gunpoint” or
“brainwashing” (25). Such a view “assumes we can separate the un- or sub-conscious
from the conscious, the intentional from the unintentional, the explicit from the implicit,
the discursive from the non-discursive” (Gregg 51). These delineations “will not do”
because “[I]nsofar as anything has meaning for us, it will have meaning in accord with
the principle” of brain operations (Gregg 51). All of our interactions with the world,
whether they are intentional or accidental, willed into being or foisted upon us, alter the
wiring of our brains, and our identities “largely develop from cognitive and affective
activities that are only marginally within conscious control” (Thiele 281). Moreover,
these affective and neurological activities make significant contributions to the processes
of identification and judgment that form the bedrock of rhetorical studies.
By focusing primarily on the public exchange of symbols, and the ways these
transactions reshape the social and political landscape, rhetoricians often miss the
intermediary step that takes place in the body’s interior, between the moment a visual or
linguistic cue is apprehended by a subject, and the point at which that cue is registered in
conscious thought. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes:
By the time you get ‘delivery’ of consciousness for a given object, things have
been ticking away in the machinery of your brain for what would seem like an
eternity to a molecule—if molecules could think. We are always hopelessly late
for consciousness and because we all suffer from the same tardiness no one
notices it. (1999: 127)
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Although we are not aware of this half-second gap between reception and cognitive
apprehension, what occurs in this pre-reflective space has profound implications for how
we interpret and act on that which we perceive. Critical work that ignores this space will
have trouble keeping pace with powerful political and economic institutions that have
fine-tuned rhetorical techniques which aim specifically to circumnavigate the intellect
and target those regions of the human that are most vulnerable to suggestion. These
institutions know that if you want to change people’s minds, you have appeal to their
emotions.
The political media system has long ceased to attempt to provide the public with
reasonably unbiased information, or to act as a forum for civil debate. Instead, with few
exceptions, it has become divided into partisan camps. Each camp tends to disseminate
narratives that will satisfy the expectations of its ideologically invested audience, and
does so in a performative style characterized by displays of indignation and outrage,
creating what satirist Jon Stewart incisively calls a “cyclonic perpetual emotion
machine.” Based on what science tells us about the ways in which affect diminishes
abstract reasoning, entrenches memory, and influences judgment, we might expect that an
emotionally charged media environment will have widespread effects on people’s
capacity to thoughtfully engage in a deliberative democracy. We might therefore also
expect the science of rhetoric to be a source of great interest to rhetoricians, but so far,
this has not been the case.
The field of rhetorical studies persists in largely restricting its criticism only to
those aspects of experience that people can consciously recognize within themselves and
perceive in others. That which cannot be publicly observed and articulated is often
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considered “pre-rhetorical-and-unfounded” (Cherwitz qtd. in Gregg 12). Bodies and
bodily processes, especially those related to affect and the preconscious or unconscious,
are frequently considered “antithetical to rhetoric’s disciplinary touchstones: argument,
persuasion, and reason” (Hawhee 2009: 177). This attitude props up a fantasy that
politics and society “could, or should consist of deliberation alone,” and encourages
critical work that treats “subliminal influences as if they were reducible to modes of
manipulation or behavioral management to be overcome in a rational and deliberative
society” (Connolly 2002: 17). The establishment of a more deliberative, democratic
society is, I believe, a worthwhile macropolitical goal, but it is a goal whose achievement
cannot be willed into being by good intentions alone. If we are to establish a more
democratic and deliberative society, we must first attend to the micropolitics of the brain
and body. This entails paying close attention to the forces that promote or inhibit each
individual’s capacity to think critically and creatively, and to conceive of alternative
modes of living.
For rhetorical critics, this requires recognition of the compositional aspects of the
brain-body-culture matrix that work in a feedback loop with the representational and
symbolic aspects of culture. By compositional, I mean the way in which “thinking helps
to shape and consolidate brain connections, corporeal dispositions, habits, and
sensibilities” (Connolly 2002: 1). It is commonplace within rhetorical studies that rhetoric
is “constitutive”; that is, rhetors address and attempt to “call into being” a people by
providing them with a narrative with which they can identify as a collectivity. In so
doing, “individual acts and experiences” become “identified with a ‘community,’” a term
that “mask or negates tensions and differences between member in any society”
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(Charland 1987: 140). While rhetoricians have exhaustively elaborated upon the many
way identities and ideologies come to be imaginatively embodied by social groups, much
less critical writing has targeted the processes by which identities and ideologies come to
be physiologically embodied by individuals.
While some theorists have gestured in this general direction—we might here
recall Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus,” and Kenneth Burke’s ideas concerning
“consubstantiality” and “piety”—very few have ventured beyond an understanding of
“embodied” as referring to a set of outwardly observable behaviors, or to particular
cognitively-held attitudes and orientations. Much cultural and rhetorical criticism has
focused on social transformation by way of discursive substitution: the guiding
presumption is that if we exchange one set of terms and ideas for another, alterations in
thought and action will follow. This overlooks the barriers, deeply embedded in corporeal
tissue and synaptic networks, which might prevent people from accepting linguistic
substitutions. The purpose of this essay is to draw from affect theory and recent
neuroscience in order to bring to light some of the hidden forces which inhibit critical
thinking, consolidate identity formation, and make it especially difficult to change
people’s minds.
Affect and the Brain
From the perspective of neurobiology, the origins of rhetorical influence can be
located in neurological processes that trigger the release of naturally occurring chemicals
in the brain when individuals are confronted with exciting stimuli, causing prelinguistic
experiences of affective intensity which are then translated into conscious thought. As
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thoughts are linguistically represented in consciousness, and re-represented in public
rhetorical performances, physiological modifications occur in the brain that play an
important role in determining the subject’s capacity to accept, evaluate, and create other
rhetorical propositions.
Neuroscientist Michael Merzenich explains that our brain “is modified on a
substantial scale, physically and functionally” each time we learn a new skill, develop a
new ability, rehearse an idea, or invoke a memory (qtd. in Doidge 298). The neural
circuits that represent these things, once established, tend to become self-sustaining: each
time they are activated, they become stronger, and the ideas and attitudes they represent
become more prominent as interpretive schema. They create particular dispositions that
guide thought and action by attaching emotional significance to cultural objects and
phenomena. Damasio calls these dispositions “somatic markers.” A somatic marker is a
“culturally mobilized, corporeal disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary
orientations to perception and judgment scale down the material factored into cost-benefit
analyses, principled judgments, and reflective experiments” (Connolly 2002: 35).
Somatic markers automatically draw from our affective memories of past experiences to
help us quickly make sense of the present. At an unconscious level of calculation, they
winnow down the possible reactions we may have to new contingencies. If in the past we
had very bad experiences with dogs, or grew up in a household in which dogs were
routinely defamed, the next time we encounter a dog on the street, we will automatically
tense up and feel panic. After a few seconds we may be able to consciously will ourselves
to stand our ground and intellectually quell our anti-dog prejudice, but the brain and body
will make the preliminary judgment, against which the conscious mind must appeal.
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Affect is ubiquitous; all thoughts are invested to a greater or lesser degree with
affect, because the regions of the brain most responsible for cognition (the prefrontal
cortex) and those most responsible for the generation of affect (the amygdala and the
limbic system) are intertwined and inextricable from each other, and with every other
brain function.19 The very idea of “dispassionate judgment” is oxymoronic, as Nietzsche
foretold. However, some acts of judgment are more clear-minded than others, and we can
intervene in, or redirect, our own neurochemical processes so as to regulate the extent to
which we are in the thrall of affective impulses that are outside of our intellectual
governance. Before we explore how rhetorical techniques might play a role in that effort,
we should first consider how certain kinds of affectively-charged stimuli trigger
particular neuronal conditions, which in turn set the parameters of what is thinkable.
Neuroscientists theorize that elevated affective states are evolutionary survival
and procreative mechanisms that produce simpler, more efficient patterns of brain
functioning by temporarily reducing the levels of neuronal connectivity between different
brain regions, so that the agent’s attention is singularly focused on the immediate event.
In a state of pleasure, or anger, or fear, our cognitive depth and breadth is dramatically
reduced, and we are therefore incapable of sustained or complex critical thought—we are
inclined to act on the impulses of the moment, without regard to long-term consequences,
because in our evolutionary past, the extra time it takes to weigh consequences could
mean the difference between life and death. Neuroscientist Susan Greenfield explains,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It is virtually impossible to fully capture in words the complexity of neural relays and feedback loops.
Consider this quote from neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux concerning the brain’s response to threat as an
indication of this complexity: “When the amygdala detects danger, it sends messages to the pituitary gland,
and the result is the release of a hormone called ACTH. ACTH flows through the blood to the adrenal
gland to cause the release of steroid hormone. In addition to reaching target sites in he body, the steroid
hormone flows through the blood into the brain, where it binds to the receptors in the hippocampus,
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and other regions” (2008: 280).
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“In evolutionary terms, we can view emotions as processes where one is highly
interactive with the environment. If you are interactive with the environment, then you
are focusing on your senses, and the more you are focusing on your senses, the less you
are accessing the mind. The more you do this, the more you are letting go of the self”
(49).
Each variety of emotion prompts the brain and body to prepare to respond to
events in a different manner. Drawing from what psychologists call the “action
tendencies” of emotions, Condit explains that “there are rough clusters or ‘suites’ of body
responses that include particular biochemical reactions and these clusters include
different predispositions toward vague trajectories of action–aggression, withdrawal,
sociality, self-focus” (“Action! How Emotions Move the Body”). Critical rhetoricians
should consider this noteworthy, because in order “to predict how a text will matter in a
social formation, one has to attend to the specific types of bodily arousal (‘emotions’)
that discourse encourages” (“Action! How Emotions Move the Body”). Anger, for
example, is an emotion that is confrontational and collectivizing. A rhetor who wants to
rally a nation to war would be wise to employ rhetoric designed to evoke anger, rather
than rhetoric intended to make people feel afraid, because anger triggers a very different
action tendency (tribal aggression), than does fear.
In contrast to anger, fear anchors us in the present, and focuses our thoughts on
our individual needs. The title of an article in a social psychology journal pithily captures
the difference between the two affective dispositions: “Anger Wants a Fight and Fear
Wants ‘Them’ to Go Away” (Skitka et al). Furthermore, as research by Daniel A. Miller
and colleagues has shown, fear is a powerful inhibitor of collective action. Fear is most
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effective when a rhetor aims to compel complacency or paralysis in an audience.
When the brain is focused on stimuli that arouses anger or fear, its circuits work
to “keep attention focused on the threatening situation” at the expense of higher order
cognitive functions such as self-reflexive thought, because “in order for the amygdala to
respond” to threat, “the prefrontal region has to be shut down” (LeDoux 2002: 228, 217).
The brain ceases activation of any region that is not immediately needed to fend off or
flee from the problem at hand. Threat response involves a “hostile takeover of
consciousness by emotion” (LeDoux 2002: 226). It is difficult to think clearly under
conditions of threat because the brain regions responsible for reflective, critical thought
temporarily take a back seat to the primordial brain areas that control flight or flight
responses.
Practices and rituals that make us feel pleasure, such as sexual coupling, dances,
and political rallies, all involve a sublimation of individuality caused by the dampening of
general neuronal communication, coupled with the intensification of the activity of a few
specific neural networks. The flood of neurotransmitters that produces pleasure puts brain
cells on alert, making them more receptive to signals from other neurons. Consequently,
our receptivity to sensual interactions with the environment and other people is increased,
but our cognitive capacity is reduced. This is why in moments of intense pleasure, such
as ecstatic trance or orgasm, the flood of stimulation largely cancels out self-reflexivity.
A rhetor who wants to strengthen communal bonds by fostering intragroup intimacy will
probably want to use a rhetoric of pleasure.
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Anger, fear, and pleasure all induce a state of “mindlessness,” because they all
involve a reduction and concentration of communication between neurons. We become
childlike and less sophisticated in our thinking while under the influence of affective
intensity because in our brains, as in a child’s brain, there is “only a modest degree of
connectivity between neurons. Although lines of communication might be potentially
available in the adult brain, they can be temporarily out of service, like telephone lines
that actually are in place but are simply not being used” (Greenfield 79). As a result, we
become “upset or excited by minor, meaningless events, and very vulnerable to
suggestions and to literal images, without the ability to buffer experiences with reason”
(Greenfield 88). An emotional audience is an audience neurologically formatted to be
uniquely attuned to rhetoric, and receptive to persuasion.
Humans almost universally crave a state of mindlessness—diminished neuronal
connectivity, whether achieved through the efficient administration of anger (footage of
enemy combatants desecrating American bodies, locker room pep talks), fear (horror
movies, roller coasters, haunted houses), or pleasure (pornography, dancing, recreational
drugs) is compelling, and attractive, because it focuses us in the here and now, and in so
doing, reduces anxiety about, and the imperative to plan for, the future. As the lyrics to
decades’ worth of pop songs attest, we all long to “lose ourselves,” or “get out of our
minds” from time to time. We get there by shutting down the lines of communication
between neurons, and concentrating activity in just a few remaining open circuits.
Greenfield explains that the “more we feel, the less we are, literally, ourselves—the less
we are encumbered by previous, idiosyncratic associations that personalize the brain into
the mind” (14).
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Mindlessness may be achieved through the administration of
symbolic/representational inducements, such as images or speech, or via material/somatic
means, such as narcotics or ritualized movements. The form the input takes has little
bearing upon the brain-body’s reaction to it. The brain-body translates all incoming
stimuli into neurochemicals, and, likewise, all outgoing expressions begin as
neurochemical operations. This includes rhetoric. Rhetorical messages “arrive via
physical means, and are associated with complex webs of connotations (positive and
negative affects), which are also physically instantiated” (Condit 2000: 19). When
rhetoric enters the body through the eyes or ears, it catalyzes chemical reactions in the
brain that impact our capacity to think about what we see or hear. Emotionally charged
rhetoric is particularly potent because it unleashes neurochemical caches that subdue the
critical sentries posted in the prefrontal cortex.
These same neurochemical processes also make emotionally charged rhetorical
encounters especially memorable, and influential. LeDoux informs us that “because
more brain systems are typically active during emotional than nonemotional states, and
the intensity of arousal is greater, the opportunity for coordinated learning across brain
systems is greater during emotional states. By coordinating parallel plasticity throughout
the brain, emotional states promote the development and unification of the self” (2002:
322). We are more apt to remember events that happen in states of high affective arousal
because it is evolutionarily advantageous to learn very quickly which situations are
dangerous and to be avoided, and which are beneficial to survival and to be sought again.
Therefore, our brains have adapted the ability to immediately store this information, and
automatically reach for it when confronted with similar stimuli in the future. This
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explains why emotional events become almost permanently seared in our memory, while
we struggle to recall the mundane interactions of everyday life. It follows, then, that
rhetoric delivered in highly emotional contexts will be more transformative than
rhetorical exchanges conducted with dispassionate civility.
To review: emotional rhetoric is appealing because it offers mindlessness,
persuasive because mindlessness deadens skepticism and critical thought, and
constitutive because emotion ushers rhetorical messages past the fickle working memory,
directly into long-term memory.20 Thus ensconced, it continues to shape perception and
interpretation of experience long after the initial rhetorical event has passed.
Addictive Politics
Rhetoric scholars are apt to employ linguistic schema such as Burke’s terministic
screens, rather than affective-corporeal theories such as Damasio’s somatic markers, to
explain how our perceptions of objects and events are conditioned by cultural experience.
However, when put in conversation, the two theories can enrich each other, because
language is encoded in biological scripts in the plastic brain. Terministic screens are
mental operations that select aspects of reality that fit into the ideological worldview one
has adopted, and deflect aspects of reality that contradict it (Burke 1966: 45). An
understanding of the relationship between affect, memory, and language helps to explain
why the brain selects one set of terministic screens over other possible screens.
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My use of the term “constitutive” here subtly differs from the way it is employed by Charland (1987) and
other critical rhetoricians. Constitutive rhetoric traditionally refers to the way subjects are interpellated into
ideological formations through the rhetorical narratives with which they identify. I am claiming that
emotional rhetoric is especially constitutive because it breaks down subjects’ potential resistance to these
ideological narratives.
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While we may be intellectually cognizant of the possibility of multiple
perspectives on reality, we do not consciously weigh each perspective’s viability every
time we encounter a new event or object, and then choose which one we wish to hold up
to the influx of experience. Instead, our brain chooses for us according to internalized
somatic markers, and delimits the parameters of the field of cognitive thought on which
we will subsequently play. When confronted with words or symbols that have become
deeply entrenched through repetition or emotion, reflexive memory takes over, draws on
intuitions, and bypasses brain regions responsible for reason and critical thought. Science
writer Chris Mooney explains how this influences political thought:
Memory, as embodied in the brain, is conceived of as a network, made up of
nodes and linkages between them, and what occurs after an emotional reaction is
called spreading activation. As you begin to call a subject to mind (like Sarah
Palin) from your long-term memory, nodes associated with that subject
(“woman,” “Republican,” “Bristol,” “death panels,” “Paul Revere”) are activated
in a fanlike pattern—like a fire that races across a landscape but only burns a
small fraction of the trees. And subconscious and automatic emotion starts the
burn. It therefore determines what the conscious mind has available to work
with—to argue with.
The brain makes this determination based on which conclusion will deliver a jolt of
neurochemical stimulation, or, in other words, which will immediately produce a
satisfying affective outcome. Bruce Wexler writes, “Consonance between internal and
external structure is experienced as pleasurable, while dissonance is an unpleasant source
of psychophysiological tension” (144). The brain will often construct perceptions and
interpretations of events that reinforce its preconceived notions, because doing triggers
the release of neurochemicals it craves. This is often at odds with intellectual concerns,
such as ethics, reason, or logic. We must here recall that what is “satisfying” to the brain
is not synonymous with what makes us “happy” or “joyous,” nor is it necessarily
connected to securing a happy future. Rather, it is the pure physiological arousal that
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comes from a flood of neurotransmitters such as dopamine, an arousal manifested in a
mental state of reduced cognition—mindlessness.
With repeated exposure to a politics of mindlessness, the brain is reconstituted,
via somatic markers, in such as a way as to automatically “screen out” alternative models
of political discourse. This may explain why the emotional political rhetoric emanating
from media outposts such as The O’Reilly Factor, Hannity, The Rush Limbaugh Show,
Countdown with Keith Olbermann, and The Ed Show garner higher ratings and exert
greater influence on the culture than more deliberative, thoughtful programs like The Jim
Lehrer NewsHour and Charlie Rose.
One of the more “striking and unsettling conclusions derived from research into
physiological and affective functioning in relation to politics” is that “automatic or even
‘machinic’ processes” in the brain and body “drive the majority of political behavior”
(Pruchnic 2008: 171). For example, neurological studies of political partisanship indicate
that the greater immersion one has in the political media, the less critical one becomes.
Furthermore, after repeated exposure to affectively charged political rhetoric, the brain
becomes addicted to the state of simplistic thinking, or mindlessness, that it achieves via
the neurochemical flows this rhetoric induces. In order to feed its addiction, the brain
actively rejects information that might prompt it to change its ways.
In a series of brain scans of political partisans who were asked to consider
“obviously” contradictory statements by the politicians they supported, Dr. Drew Westen
found that partisans’ brains reverted to the comfort zone of long-held biases—they could
easily identify the contradictions in the statements made by the opposition’s candidate, or
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by neutral figures such as actors, but when it came to politicians they supported, they
failed to perceive the contradiction. This result held true with both Republicans and
Democrats. What was most surprising, though, was that these acts of willful ignorance
gave people a neurochemical buzz. Westen writes
Once partisans had found a way to reason to false conclusions, not only did neural
circuits involved in negative emotions turn off, but circuits involved in positive
emotions turned on. The partisan brain didn’t seem satisfied in just feeling better.
It worked overtime to feel good, activating reward circuits that give partisans a
jolt of positive reinforcement for their biased “reasoning.” These reward circuits
overlap substantially with those activated when drug addicts get their “fix,” giving
new meaning to the term political junkie. (xiv, emphasis in original)
The “political junkie” is colloquial designation that, if taken literally instead of
figuratively, offers insight into the ways in which ideological beliefs become embodied
and intransigent.21 For the addict, the appeal of the substance to which he is addicted
comes from the substance’s capacity to reduce cognition and critical thinking—this
appears to be true whether the substance in question is speed or speech. As addiction
deepens, the addict’s ability and willingness to be “talked out of” his compulsive
behavior declines. An outside observer of the addict’s situation may inform him that
certain drugs or ideas are bad for him, and present him with facts, figures, and case
studies that testify to the veracity of this argument, but such efforts are likely to be in
vain, because the addict does not suffer from confusion, he is in the thrall of certainty,
and his certainty is reinforced each time he is exposed to the substance.
Habituated engagement with any substance, be it material or symbolic, can
produce a state of addiction in which the user loses the critical capacity to make reasoned
judgments concerning all matters related to the substance. The addict eventually develops
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For another, similar neuroscientific exploration of “political junkies,” see Iacoboni (2008).
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a tolerance to the high it produces, and consequently he requires increasingly elevated
levels of stimulation in order to maintain equilibrium, and experiences disorientation and
agitation if the substance is withdrawn. Doidge explains that tolerance “can develop in
happy lovers as they get used to each other” just as it develops in a drug user. This is
because all addictions, be they to symbolic substances or material substances, are
established by the brain’s ever-increasing hunger for the neurotransmitter dopamine, and
“[D]opamine likes novelty” (Doidge 116). This means that the stakes must be constantly
raised in order to stave off withdrawal—the addict needs more intense quantities or
qualities of the substance. If the substance in question is emotional political rhetoric, the
craving may be satisfied by increasingly hyperbolic and incendiary expressions of terror
and rage. Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck, both recovering drug addicts, refashion
themselves as drug dealers, ingeniously adept at feeding the cravings of conservative
political junkies.
The neurochemistry of dopamine fuels the system in our brain that is related to
appetitive excitement, the sort of stimulation we feel when we imagine something that we
desire. This affective tension evoked by the appetitive system is different from the feeling
triggered by the satisfaction of desire, such as we experience after sex or a good meal.
The neurochemistry of satisfaction is based on endorphins, which are chemically related
to opiates such as heroin and morphine. Endorphins produce a peaceful, euphoric state;
they mark the cessation of desire.
Verbal and visual symbols that are strategically employed in such a way as to
specifically induce the appetitive excitation associated with anticipatory desire are the
common vernacular of a consumer society. We routinely see such symbols in political
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and commercial marketing. These symbols highlight the disjuncture between what we
are, and what we desire to be, while positing an elusive but theoretically attainable object
as the thing that will satisfy our exciting longing.
The rhetorical forms that deliver the sought-after rush are those which construct a
cathartic structure in which homeostatic equilibrium is (paradoxically, and
problematically) “achieved” by its own perpetual deferral. Addiction to political rhetoric,
like drug addiction, is premised on desire that cannot be definitively consummated, so
that the thrill of the pursuit becomes an end in itself, and overwhelms the supposed
purpose of democratic discourse: the relatively peaceable negotiation and resolution of
partisan differences. If we were to be playfully reductive, we might say that an ideal
democracy would run on endorphins, but the democracy we have is addicted to
dopamine. Because bipartisan resolution would promise a cessation of the high delivered
by the excess affect that characterizes conflict, the perception of conflict must be
assiduously maintained through the rhetorical construction of new divisions if corporate
media outlets and political institutions wish to keep their customers “happy,” which is to
say, euphorically unhappy, and craving more.
The Drugs of Rhetoric
Those who fear its influence often treat rhetoric as a dangerous drug. Perhaps
there is good reason for this. Rhetoric, like certain pharmacological substances, induces
physiological events in the brain that determine our susceptibility to suggestion and our
capacity for critical thought. Suggesting a connection between language and drugs,
deconstructionist philosopher Avital Ronell “points out that when we borrow the words
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of others to make ourselves understood, we enter a realm of what we could call ‘Beingon-language’” (Davis 74). Ronell argues that “[T]here is no Being that is not possessed,
thrown, animated by one ‘drug’ or another” (Davis 75). This provocative claim becomes
more concrete if we ground it in the insights of neuroscience, which tell us that all social
and environmental stimuli are translated into neurochemicals when apprehended by
human subjects. If we accept that we cannot think ourselves onto an epistemological
plane that exists outside of rhetoric (for thought itself is rhetorical), than we might
consider as well that we cannot rhetoricize ourselves outside of the realm of drugs (for
our capacity to perceive, think about, and produce rhetoric depends upon the
neurochemical reactions which occur within our brains).
Arguably, the appeal of any rhetorical encounter, be it oratory or literature, is its
capacity to transport us out of the world of rationality, and into plane of existence usually
characterized with the diaphanous language of “the soul,” “the imagination,” or
“inspiration.” Rhetoricians often attribute this aspect of rhetoric's power to phantasia, the
capacity through which images of stimuli past, passing, or to come are generated and
made present (Kennerly). When rhetoric promises a movement away from the body and
its desires, such an “uplifting” speech or “transcendent” performance, it often carries a
positive valence. However, when literary or oratorical language excites the body, instead
of the soul or the mind, and stokes desire in ways that threaten the dominant moral order,
it is often treated juridically as drug (Ronell 55).
Ronell offers as example the case of James Joyce’s sexually explicit and at times
scatological novel Ulysses, which was “distilled down to its essence as a drug” in the
collective imagination of the American public that feared the effects its frank depiction of
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natural bodily processes would have on vulnerable minds (55). Ulysses was allowed to
enter the United States only when a court of law determined it was an “emetic formula”
rather than an “aphrodisiac philter” (Ronell 55)—that is, when it decided the novel’s
imagery was more likely to induce readers to feel disgusted by, instead of attracted to, the
human body’s desires and functions. Similar legal determinations were made in reference
to William S. Burroughs’ Naked Lunch and Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, other
literary works that confront without moral condemnation the primal aspects of human
corporeal life. These cases lead Ronell to conclude that “[L]iterature is most exposed
when it stops representing, that is, when it ceases veiling itself with the excess that we
commonly call meaning” (56). When language is stripped of its meaning function, we see
that it serves us very much like a drug, causing physical pleasure or pain, inciting desires
for sex or violence or empathy that we didn’t know we possessed, and that we might
disavow in the public realm.
For instance, film theorist Linda Williams’s work on the “body genres” of horror,
pornography, and melodrama identifies forms of visual rhetoric designed to induce bodily
states rather than evoke meaning. According to Williams, “the success of these genres is
often measured by the degree to which the audience sensation mimics what is seen on the
screen” (704-705). The “body” in “body genres” refers to both the physiological
mechanism of response in the spectator’s body, and to the representational spectacle of
the terrified, aroused, or anguished bodies depicted on the screen. These genres are
widely considered “low art,” or even morally dangerous, because they circumvent the
spectator’s critical mind—presumed to be the seat of moral conscience and judgment—
and operate directly on the affective body, compelling physical reactions that the
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spectator has not cognitively authorized, and thereby calling into question the locus of the
spectator’s agency.
Both pharmacological and rhetorical intoxicants “thematize the dissociation of
autonomy and responsibility” (Ronell 59); they shed light on the fallacy of agency by
revealing the limits of our control over our own thoughts and actions. These substances
act as “a radically nomadic parasite let loose from the will of language” (Ronell 52). A
scapegoated substance—be it “obscene” literature, socialist ideology, or marijuana—is
often framed as the cause, rather than the effect, of “dangerous” desires. Attending to this
moralistic discourse is a widespread conviction that the subtraction of the substance from
society would eradicate people’s desire for the state of mindless communion or
identification with Otherness that the substance provides to them. But the historical
record indicates this is never the case. Humans are addicted to mindlessness and
communion, and relentlessly seek out substances and experiences that will help them to
achieve those states.
Moral and political authorities are not opposed to all form of mindless
intoxication, only those forms of it that do not promote the preservation of their power.
As Ronell points out, “anything can serve the function of a drug” (53); in American
society, if one is addicted to labor, or to religion, one is congratulated for his or her work
ethic, or spirituality. If, however, one is addicted to sexual pleasure or marijuana, he or
she may be socially ostracized or imprisoned. “Drugs” is a floating signifier that can be
attached to anything which is to be marked for regulation or prohibition.22 At the same
time, that which escapes classification as a drug may still have drug effects, and addictive
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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qualities. Ronell writes, “Detached from the strictly determined referent, addiction
can…hanker after a mystified communion of community, a mythology of ‘Volk’ or even
economy, which is why one is also susceptible to becoming intoxicated with any regime
of reunification” (42). Here is where the neurology of addiction intersects with rhetoric
and ideology. If emotional rhetoric is an addictive drug that sets off brain operations that
result in a reduction of neuronal connectivity, thus creating an unsophisticated, child-like
mental state in those under its influence, it follows that rhetoric junkies will be more
uncritically receptive to authoritarian figures and hierarchical forms of social
organization.
Klaus Theweleit’s classic two-volume study of 20th century German fascism,
Male Fantasies, provides valuable insight into the affective dynamics of political
rhetoric. Theweleit writes, “it was through speeches” that the fascist movement was
disseminated, “thus an analysis of the situation of the speech is crucial if we are to
understand the expansion of popular support for Nazism” (118). Theweleit undertakes an
exhaustive review of fascist soldiers’ writing, and notices that “[H]ardly a single novel or
biography by any of the soldier fascists fails to detail some experience of conversion
through oratory” (119). What’s remarkable is that these men “write exclusively of the
speech’s effect on their emotions,” rather than the ideas or specific words expressed in
the speeches” (120). Of all the autobiographies Theweleit surveys, virtually none of the
writers “considers it important to report what the leader has actually said”; instead, the
writers describe being “carried away by inspiration” (121).
Consider the language Joseph Goebbels uses in his novel Michael to describe the
experience of a fascist public speech. The main protagonist reports, “I had no knowledge
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of what was happening inside me”; “I was driven”; “almost out of my mind”;
“intoxicated”; “What happened then, I cannot say” (qtd. in Theweleit 122). Descriptions
of political speeches in German fascist literature almost invariably take place first on a
pre- or extra-linguistic affective plane, and only secondarily is the ineffable experience
articulated to conscious thought about ideological structures. Identifications between the
subject and the speaker “can be achieved only in opposition to consciousness. Whenever
thresholds are crossed—the ubiquitous thresholds of prohibitions across the body,
thresholds of defense and control, thresholds of fear before the regions of the unknown—
the transition takes place in a state of trance, intoxication, or miracle” (Theweleit 127).
The fascists about whom Theweleit writes aren’t gradually acquiring a new language
with which to frame reality; they are undergoing an ontological transformation rooted in
the body and nurtured by affect.
The fascist speech was not said to provide information that spectators found
intellectually convincing; it was said to touch the “soul” of the mass. Theweleit notes that
soul “is a term often mentioned in connection with the situation of oratory,” and cautions
that it “should not be seen as synonymous with the report, the narrative, or the
discussion…Soul seems to have something to do with the act of speaking; the activity is
more important than the message the speech conveys” (118). Indeed, the speeches rarely
contained much in the way of substantial content at all: “Although the rhetorical stance of
the fascist orator is one of substantiated argument, he makes no explicit effort to
substantiate anything—he simply makes assertions” (Theweleit 128). The effectiveness
of fascist rhetoric is premised on affect, not ideas. Theweleit writes that
the success of the ritual is secured precisely by an absence of substance.
‘Unification,’ ‘contact,’ ‘conception,’ or ‘illumination’ can occur only if attention
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is deflected from spoken content: the assembled crowd does not assemble in order
to think or be enlightened (nor is this what the fascist reader desires when he
opens a book…indeed, does any reader?). (129)
If, as Theweleit suggests, in most cases people are not primarily seeking enlightenment
or edification in rhetorical encounters, then what motivates them to engage with speakers,
performers, writers, and other kinds of rhetoricians?
It could be the lure of the physiological high of communal identification,
encapsulated in rhetoric, and distributed by charismatic leaders. Attention to the bio-logic
of the body opens up nuanced ways of understanding and evaluating political rhetoric
that traditional forms of rhetorical inquiry, such as textual and social analysis, fail to
consider. For example, in The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to
Modern Brain Science, an extended polemic against the “reductive psychophysiology of
emotion” in the “sciences of mind and brain,” Daniel Gross raises the specter of German
fascism, and asks, rhetorically, “When a damaged brain isn’t the case, what produces
poor judgments of character such as the judgment made by the vast majority of Germans
in 1933 that Adolf Hitler was a trustworthy leader and Jews untrustworthy?” (35). Gross
contends that the “constitutive power of emotions depends upon uneven distribution” of
“social passions” (5). Gross argues that emotions such as anger are “irreducibly social,”
insofar as they only come about when subjects perceive conditions of “asymmetrical
power” (3). To Gross, the answer to the question of fascism’s hold on Germans minds is
self-evident: Nazi leaders used scapegoat narratives to persuade the German citizenry that
Jews were to blame for their problems, and these narratives subsequently channeled the
people’s affective energies into concentrated action. Language is the terrain of
ideological struggle; changes in vernacular currencies will bring about changes in
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attitudes and actions. The brain, in this model, exerts no influence on thought, and is not
altered by thoughts; it merely stores thoughts. The internal physiological and affective
dynamics that produce emotion are, for Gross, outside the purview of rhetorical criticism.
Because Gross repudiates biological inputs out of hand, he cannot conceive of the
possibility that mindlessly enthralling rhetoric and rituals had literally “damaged”
German brains by way of neuroplastic alterations in neuronal circuits that impeded
critical thought and ethical judgment.
Doidge writes that human beings can add on new neurocognitive structures “if
their daily lives can be totally controlled, and they can be conditioned by rewards
and...punishment and subjected to massed practice, where they are forced to repeat or
mentally rehearse various ideological statements” (306). While Doidge had fascist
regimes in mind, variations of the rituals that such regimes employ are also practiced in
contemporary America, under the guise of patriotism (the compulsion to stand up and
bow the head when confronted with the American flag, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
National Anthem; the scorn and violence directed towards those question patriotic
practices), and consumerism (the ubiquity of advertisements on television, public spaces,
the airwaves, clothing, the internet; the social prestige attributed to conspicuous
consumption of brand-name goods, and the social scorn visited upon those who cannot
consume conspicuously). The neurochemical-fueled rituals in which we routinely and
repeatedly participate physically change our brains, and the social cost of not
participating in these rituals is greater than most of us are willing to pay.
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Burke on Addiction and Belief
Most contemporary rhetoricians prefer to analyze political rhetoric and rituals
through the critical lens of social constructionism, and they often enlist the rhetorical
theory of Kenneth Burke to do so. However, Burke was not a pure constructionist. In
fact, it would not be a stretch to say that he laid the theoretical groundwork for a critical
neurorhetoric. Burke pursued the link between bodily rituals and political beliefs
throughout his career, periodically amending his views in concert with new developments
in science and politics.
In Counter-Statement, his first book of theory, Burke was primarily interested in
aesthetic intoxication—the artist’s manipulation of “blood, brains, heart, and bowels” by
inducing affective responses in an audience (1968: 36). The key development in CounterStatement is Burke’s concern with the persuasive power of repetition. His specific focus
is on forms of language and expression, such as the trope, that are unified by their
structure rather than their content, and that share structural affinities with biological
processes (Pruchnic 2006: 284). Burke observes, “the rhythm of a page, in setting up a
corresponding rhythm in the body, creates marked degrees of expectancy, or
acquiescence” (1968: 140). This can be a pleasurable experience, as when we “lose
ourselves” in the syncopated beats of a pop song, but herein also lies an element of
danger because, as Burke notes, the listener, “in becoming receptive to so
much...becomes receptive to still more” (1968: 141). We are liable to “fall into a state of
general surrender” which makes us “more likely to accept without resistance the rest of
the poet’s material” (1968: 141). This is a state familiar to all of us who find ourselves
thinking, whether we want to or not, of a corporate logo upon hearing but a few bars of a
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catchy commercial jingle. Burke concludes, “in all rhythmic experiences one’s ‘muscular
imagination’ is touched” (141).
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Bureau of Social Hygiene hired Burke to
research drugs and drug culture, and to ghost write a propagandistic book called
Dangerous Drugs. Debra Hawhee maintains that Burke’s drug research equipped him to
notice that, when viewed in terms “of bodily rhythms and susceptibility, drug users and
readers of poetry bear striking similarities. Burke’s description of the rhythmic reader—
‘in becoming receptive to so much, he becomes receptive to still more’—might as easily
be applied to a tremoring coke addict” (2004: 18). Burke’s work on drugs showed him
that “habits and beliefs created through sustained repetition are tenacious, relentless, and,
most of all, impervious to reason” (Hawhee 2004: 18). Burke’s most concentrated
treatment of the connection between drugs, rhetoric, and ritual can be found in
Permanence and Change, where he develops his concept of “piety.” Burke describes
piety as “the sense of what properly goes with what” (1984a: 74), and these pious
linkages extend “through all the texture of our lives” (1984a: 75). While piety is
traditionally used in religious contexts to describe habits of thought and behavior that are
indications of a subject’s unwavering adherence to a spiritual belief system, Burke
extends piety to encompass everyday habituated practices; he claims that even gang
members observe standards of piety, such as the “correct way of commenting upon
passing women, the etiquette of spitting” (1984a: 77). Piety begins as a set of culturally
constructed behaviors and expectations identified with a particular social identity, but
through ritualized, habitual practices, it becomes deeply embodied, and unconscious, to
the point of seeming “natural”—Burke calls piety “the yearning to conform with the
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‘sources of one’s being’”(1984a: 69). The source of being, for Burke, is neither reducible
to nature nor nurture; rather, that which nurtures us, culturally, also constitutes us,
corporeally. And, by the same token, the ways we move our bodies about influence the
ways we think about the world and ourselves.
Rather than understanding the bodily actions as reflectors of belief, we see that
bodily actions are generators of belief. In many ways, this recalls 17th century French
philosopher Blaise Pascal’s assertion that true belief in God can come only through
somatic ritual. Pascal argued that when people who did not originally believe in God
“behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on,”
they were led to believe “quite naturally” (1966: 152). Over time, pious acting correlates
to pious thinking, so that one’s choices in the face of conflict seem to be self-evident, and
critical thinking becomes antithetical to one’s sense of what properly goes with what. It is
not that one makes “bad choices,” but rather, that the matter of choice itself irrelevant:
the pious subject knows in advance of the question what the “correct” answer is. Whether
or not our personal moral or ethical standards square with those of the pious subject, we
should not, according to Burke, interpret the subject’s decisions as a matter of bad
conscience, for they are “guided by a scrupulous sense of the appropriate which, once we
dismiss our personal locus of judgment, would seem to bear the marks of great
conscientiousness” (77). Brain-bodies become “hooked” on, or addicted to, certain
emotional and physical styles of being, and acting otherwise would engender cognitive
dissonance in the agent.
In a formulation that pre-dates and predicts Damasio’s theory of somatic markers,
Burke points out that “[E]ach temporal event is new, and cannot recur. We find our way
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through this everchanging universe by certain blunt schemes of generalization,
conceptualization, or verbalization—but words have limited validity” (1984a: 92). Words
are “limited” because our primary schema of orientation is affective, and the affective is
rooted in the brain and body rather than the mind. Burke argues that the “discussion of
the relationship between meaning and affect should also consider at great length the
mind-body parallelisms suggested by such sciences as endocrinology” (1984a: n.150). He
cites “some research which [he] did in drug addiction” that leads him to suggest an
“interaction between intellectual interpretations and the secretions of the ‘body’s drug
factories’ (the endocrines and their neural channels)” (1984: n.150). Burke uses
neuroendocrinology “to suggest that internal processes can form interpretations: chemical
can shape or regulate meaning” (Hawhee 2009: 85). Specifically, it prompts him to
realize that “meanings and stimuli merge—and you may assume that, if a certain stimulus
has rightly or wrongly a danger-character, a danger-response will result” (Burke 1984a:
150). Burke suggests that this insight changes the critic’s proper approach: “We do not
persuade a man to avoid danger. We can only persuade him that a given situation is
dangerous and that he is using the wrong means of avoiding it. Danger-stimulus and fearresponse are one—and to remove the latter you must redefine the first” (1984a: 150).
Here Burke hints at a possible rhetorical intervention in automatic affective
responses to stimuli that have been imbued with fearful associations. “Conversion
downwards”—a reduction in scale of the powerful object of one’s excitement—works as
an antidote to piety because it pulls the curtain on the wizard behind the operations which
have inspired such awe and reverence, and in so doing prompts one to reevaluate his or
her orientations. This is an intervention not only into people’s ideas; it is simultaneously
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an effort to redirect “bodily impulses and flows of energy—a chemical sort of rhetoric”
(Hawhee 2009: 87). The insights Burke acquired through his research into drugs and
neuroendocrinology influenced his critical practice—he understood that rhetorical
criticism works best when it reveals the machinations that produce belief, because when
one is aware of the tricks of the trade, the illusion is dramatically undercut, and space is
opened up wherein people can practice a healthy skepticism towards power. Merely
debunking the rationale behind specific rhetorical propositions has limited viability
because people don’t make rational judgments; they are as much compelled by affect as
they are by logic.
By emphasizing the power of endless repetition, Burke intuits the neurological
processes that inhibit the critical faculties of the prefrontal brain regions, and make
certain kinds of knowledge ontological rather than epistemological because they remold
one’s sense of reality at the pre-linguistic level of neural organization. He writes that
repetitive thoughts and actions—the pious, “repeated doing of the ‘right’ thing...molds
our actions to the farthest reaches of the communicative,” for this is a “complex schema
of what-goes-with-what, carried through all the subtleties of manner and attitudes”
(1984a: 269). Hawhee draw our attention to how “repetitions of actions is conjoined with
a ‘knowledge’ of what is ‘right.’ Bodily repetition and knowledge of propriety are so
reciprocal as to become almost identical” (2004: 23). This is how habits are formed,
whether those habits are pharmacological or political in nature. Indeed, to the brain, there
is little if any difference between these two vectors of experience—the brain does not
recognize the distinction between materiality and symbolicity that circulates through the
minds of many cultural and rhetorical theorists.
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Within a Burkean framework, “rhetoric is the bridge” between the material and
symbolic realms, and “the best rhetoric will blend the physical and the linguistic”
(Engnell 1). Furthermore, the critic or artist acts as a “medicine man,” administering
symbolic remedies to address biological and social problems. Carly Woods observes, “If
literature can work with bodily rhythms, it also may have the power to correct those ills
that throw off biological harmony. Just as medicine cures the diseases that plague the
body, literature may have a curative function, bodily and socially. For Burke, the symbol
is medicine for the social ill.” Burke maintained that the social critic’s chief responsibility
was not to argue for what is “right,” but rather, to stay aggressively vigilant against
efficiency in matters of thought and action, and in so doing “attend to the hypertrophy of
style or piety in order to ‘counter’ the onset of ecological imbalance, or worse,
divisiveness” (Hawhee 2004: 24).
Burke prompts us to recognize that rhetoric acts like an addictive drug, because it
makes people seemingly unable to cogitate their way out of their predicaments. This is
true of both everyday citizens and professional critics. As Burke noted during his early
research on drug addicts, “we are all drug fiends in a sense, deriving our impetus from
drugs naturally produced in the body” (qtd. in Jack 2004: 461). At best, the responsible
rhetorician can draw attention to the mechanisms by which the political subject becomes
addicted to ideology, and offer rhetorical resources for overcoming that addiction. In the
final section, I will outline some rhetorical techne that recognize and respond to the
exigencies of our emotion-saturated political media.
Rhetorical Recovery
In contemporary American political media, “deliberative spaces do not really
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originate with a kairotic exigence that sparks multiple voices responding to each other”;
rather, it comprises “numerous articulations between images, discourses, and feelings”
(Rice 209). Attempts to critically engage this state of affairs using the traditional tools of
rhetorical criticism, which focus primarily on the cognitive processes by which people
formulate, evaluate, and decide to act on linguistic propositions, seem increasingly
insufficient in an age in which affect, rather than ideas, are the preferred currency of
political culture. As Jenny Edbauer Rice notes, “If affect is something produced through
interactions between bodies, then public deliberation probably also produces something
that does not coincide with the telos of civic judgment” (210). A theoretical structure
with which to analyze and critique the affective and neurological components of massmediated political deliberation has yet to emerge from rhetorical studies.
Most critical rhetoricians are content to offer macropolitical analyses of political
phenomena, delivered in the form of ideological critiques of cultural texts. The
underlying assumption of much critical work that deals with political discourse is that if
citizens understand the (often profit related) motives that drive political rhetoric, the fog
of affect that clouds their thought will lift, they will make reasoned choices about
political figures and institutions, and will vote out of office those who do not have their
best interests in mind. Articulated to this attitude is the notion that people will naturally
work towards a more just, egalitarian order once they see that malign institutions have
emotionally manipulated them. Condit characterizes this as the hope “that if we could
only grab the steering wheel and broadcast ‘our’ (more egalitarian, just, caring) rhetorics,
people would act the way ‘we’ think they should” (pathosworkshop.com).
However, we cannot remove emotion from politics, or from our interpretation of
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politics. Ideological criticism may be intellectually satisfying, but it is not always
effective as a driver of political change because people are not motivated by intellectual
ideas alone. There is a difference between knowing what one ought to do, logically, and
recognizing what one is able to do, emotionally and behaviorally. This conundrum will
be familiar to those of us who have mentally rehearsed terrible visions of the cancer ward
while lighting up another cigarette, or lectured undergraduates about class disparity while
striving to send our children to a private school in the “nice” part of town. We are
neurologically addicted to our affective relations with the people, objects, and substances
that comprise the fabric of our reality. Ideological criticism is often ineffective in
practical terms because it is premised on denying people that which they affectively
desire on the basis of an abstract conceptual framework of ideals. When the rational mind
is set against the affective body, the latter usually wins by “persuading” the former to
give it what it wants.
Burke declares that there “is no ‘no’ in the psychology of attention. The full
strategy for saying ‘don’t do that’ is ‘do do this’” (1984b: 22). While he was writing
about pedagogical theory, he was also intuiting something about how the brain works.
When a substance to which the brain is addicted is withdrawn, it overrides the rational
mind, and induces the mind to “reason” its way to conclusions that will enable it to
maintain the status quo. We saw evidence of this in Westen’s study of political junkies:
“when data clashed with desire, the political brain would somehow ‘reason’ its way to
desired conclusions,” and it would reward itself for those faulty judgments with a
celebratory spritz of dopamine, an action that works to reinforce the thought in memory
(xi).
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We cannot trust our own minds to think clearly about the matters we care about
most. Because these matters produce high levels of affective arousal in us, and because
we think about them so much, our attitudes towards them are particularly intransigent.
Our internal rhetor of consciousness, hopped up on neurochemicals, is prone to
sermonizing in blind faith about the people and ideas we cherish. The result is often
uncritical adherence to ideological structures, and unwavering allegiance to charismatic
figures.
Philosophers have long sought to formulate techniques to fight this tendency.
Nietzsche called such techniques “self-artistry”; Foucault referred to them as “tactics of
the self”; and Deleuze termed it “micropolitics.” However, as Connolly notes,
contemporary theorists of ideology, “with their inordinate confidence in argument and
deliberation, pretty much jettison this dimension of ethical life” (2004: 107). He argues
In a world in which institutional discipline has become extensive and intensive,
such tactics can function as countermeasures to build more independence and
thoughtful responsiveness into ethico-political sensibilities. You might, thus, act
tactically and experimentally upon yourself to fold more presumptive receptivity
and forbearance into your responses to pluralizing movements in the domains of
gender, sensual affiliation, ethnic identification, religion/irreligion, or market
rationality that challenge your visceral presumption to embody the universal
standard against which that diversity is to be measured. (2004: 107)
Micropolitical tactics of self-regulation involve intervening in the processes by which
affect comes to dominate thought by willfully shifting the flows of neurochemical
activity away from the lower order brain regions responsible for emotion, and towards the
prefrontal regions that handle consciousness and cognition. Humans are uniquely
equipped to exercise these powers of self-control. Critical thinking may be defined as the
distinctly human capacity to willfully use symbolic resources to interrupt, evaluate, and
possibly intervene in affective compulsions. Burke explains that although all organisms
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are critics in the sense that they interpret the signs about them, the experimental,
the speculative technique made available by speech would seem to single out the
human species as the only one possessing an equipment for going beyond the
criticism of experience to a criticism of criticism. We not only interpret the
character of events (manifesting in our responses all the gradations of fear,
apprehension, misgiving, expectation, assurance for which there are rough
behavioristic counterparts in animals)—we may also interpret our interpretations.
(1984a: 6)
Put another way, humans differ from other organisms because language gives us the
ability to experience a distinction between the body’s primal compulsion to act in
response to external stimuli, and the mind’s capacity to decide whether or not that action
is appropriate given the context of the event. Language is that which potentially stands
between primitive herd behavior, on one hand, and ethical, critical consciousness, on the
other. Rhetoric is the act of channeling language in ways that either promote or prohibit
critical thought. We might then say a critical rhetoric, in the Burkean sense, prompts us to
interpret our interpretations, and not only our intellectual interpretations of texts and
objects, but also our internal affective impulses—our body’s interpretation of events. The
deliberate application of techniques of self-mastery to one’s own entrenched affective
impulses makes it theoretically possible to break up pious linkages, and interrogate the
ideological structures that undergird these articulations.
Burke encourages us to become active interlocutors with the chemical rhetoric
that compels us towards hypertrophied “ruts of experience.” As a corrective to piety born
of addiction to rhetoric, Burke proposes comic self-examination which should enable
people to be observers of themselves, while acting" in order to achieve “maximum
consciousness” (1984b: 171). The hope is that a person “would transcend himself by
noting his own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and the
non-rational” (1984b: 171). Burke uses the terms “irrational” and “non-rational” without
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moral judgment; he is not encouraging us to eliminate these affective forces, or
subordinating them to the rational. He recognizes they are simply a natural part of human
being, just as a tree’s “decision” to put out leaves in the spring and drop them in the
autumn is cause for neither praise nor condemnation (1984b: 171). Burke argues that we
should not be “induced to seek elaborate techniques for their excision—instead we
merely, as rational men, ‘watch’ them, to guard ourselves against cases where they work
badly” (1984b: 171). The point of the comic corrective is to remain vigilant against the
sedimentation of (irrational, non-rational, and rational) attitudes into ruts of experience
that misguide us towards arrogance and certainty.
The comic corrective, then, works as a methodology to engage with the self at the
level of affect. From a neurological perspective, the process of comic self-examination is
more important than its ideational content. Piety is manifested in neuronal circuitry. With
every firing of a circuit, the neurons involved become more tightly “locked in a
physiological embrace,” a process that is “analogous to the way that traveling the same
dirt road over and over leaves ruts that make it easier to stay in the track in subsequent
trips” (Schwartz and Begley 108). The way to avoid getting stuck in a rut on the road is
to seize control of the wheel and force the vehicle to take a divergent path. Brain activity
works in a very similar way—calling up a comic counter-statement when confronted with
an emotional rush (the body’s chemical rhetoric) breaks up efficient patterns of thought
and prevents the brain from indulging its in-built desire for the status quo.
Neuropsychologists and psychiatrists routinely recommend techniques similar to
those proposed by Burke for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette’s
syndrome, and depression. For instance, neuroscientist John Teasdale calls his approach
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“mindfulness-based cognitive therapy.” His research suggests, “emotional processing
should focus primarily on changing emotional responses to internal affective events and
thoughts, so that these responses are short-lived and self-limiting, rather than the first
stages of an escalating process” (qtd. in Schwartz and Begley 247). Teasdale’s success in
using self-administered rhetorical techniques to help patients work through
neuropsychological disorders “offers dramatic examples of how the ways someone thinks
about thoughts can effect plastic changes in the brain” (Schwartz and Begley 250).
Psychiatrist Jeffrey Schwartz has similarly experienced success treating OCD patients by
teaching them to recognize and “revalue” the brain messages telling them to engage in
obsessive behaviors. He concludes that “a change in the valuation a person ascribes to a
bunch of those electrochemical signals can not only alter them in the moment but lead to
such enduring changes in cerebral metabolic activity that the brain’s circuits are
essentially remodeled” (Schwartz and Begley 292). Whether we speak in terms of
mindfulness or revaluation or comic correction, a critical analysis of one’s own affective
impulses is a form of self-directed neuroplasticity that acts on the physical brain by
selectively activating one neuronal circuit over another.
All of these techniques introduce inefficiency into neuronal processes organized
around somatic markers. We’ll recall that somatic markers operate below the threshold of
reflection, and assist “deliberation by highlighting some options (either dangerous or
favorable), and eliminating them rapidly from subsequent consideration” (Damasio 2000:
175). Somatic markers “make decisions easier and faster for human beings whose
chamber of consciousness is slow in pace and limited in capacity” (Connolly 2004: 35).
However, there are some contexts in which quick and easy is not preferable to slow and
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deliberate. Democratic deliberation for instance, works best when participants are
allowed the time and the mental capacity to consider multiple perspectives and to
evaluate the potential long-term consequences different courses of action might produce.
Burke aligned efficiency with the anti-democratic impulses of capitalism:
“Efficiency,” to borrow a trope from the stock exchange, is excellent for those
who approach social problems with the mentality of the “in and out” trader. It is
far less valuable for those interested in a “long-pull investment.” Otherwise
stated: It violates “ecological balance,” stressing some one ingredient rather than
maintaining all ingredients by the subtler requirements of “symbiosis.” (1984b:
250)
Contemporary American culture is organized around the ideology of efficiency, and with
that comes the lionization of certainty as the operative mode of engagement with
contingency. The political media are especially enthralled with charismatic figures who
demonstrate unerring faith in their own ideological and moral orientations, and petition
audiences to form passionate collectivities around particular constellations of values.
Exposure to this can be, literally, intoxicating, and over time, addictive. In a state of
addiction, intoxication can only be maintained if the dosage of the substance is steadily
intensified so as to stay ahead of the encroaching tolerance; dopamine addiction demands
novelty, and that which one found exciting and provocative last week will seem mundane
and stultifying next month. So we change the channel, in search of something new to
render us “mindless” with anger, fear, or euphoria.
How do we break out of this cycle? The neurorhetorical treatments currently
being administered by therapists offer intriguing insights, but these practices are to this
point mainly confined to hospitals and mental health facilities, and they require direct
interactions between highly paid scientific experts and individual patients. Therefore,
they are useful only as a starting point for critical rhetoricians interested in the problems
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of national or international politics. By the same token, the Burkean comic corrective,
while a theoretically useful and ethically sound concept, often fails to deliver practical
results, perhaps because brains have been constituted by the constant reiteration of
antagonistic narratives in our culture so as to be resistant to alternative frames that call
for humility, self-effacement, and charity towards one’s antagonists.
Additionally, psychotherapeutic “talking cures,” whether they are applied by the
self or by a trained specialist, are relatively ineffective in treating addiction. The reason
for this, according to research psychiatrist George Vaillant, is that “the hold that drug
addiction has on human beings does not rest in our cortex,” it lies “in what has been
called our reptile brain,” the brain regions that control primordial affective response
mechanisms (432). Addiction of any kind reduces plasticity in the prefrontal cortex,
“making it harder for neurons to communicate with each other,” and as a result, the
cortex “cannot effectively warn of the dangers of bad habits” (Koener). Without the
critical sentry of the cortex in working order, the reptilian regions are free to behave as
they please. Thus, the “loss of plasticity of neuronal response...renders abstinence beyond
the reach of willpower” and “beyond the reach of psychoanalytic insight” (Vaillant 432).
This is why, arguably, neither ideological criticism nor orthodox psychoanalytic theories
of motivation are up to the task of changing political behavior, especially political
behavior that is, as I have suggested, attributable to neurological addiction: merely
bringing hidden structures to the light of consciousness is not sufficient. In order to
change the minds, we must change brains, and to change brains, we must speak not only
to and about the intellect, but also to and about the affective body.
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How might critics, as social physicians, theorize healing rhetorics to counter the
mass addiction to mindlessness that endangers democracy? We might begin by looking at
cases in which neurorhetoric has been operationalized to promote individual and social
healing on a wide scale. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), for example, names a set of
neurorhetorical practices that has proven wildly effective, for reasons medical and social
scientific researchers only vaguely understand. Curiously, for an organization that exerts
such widespread cultural influence—some 1.2 million Americans currently belong to one
of AA’s 55,000 meeting groups (Koener)—little attention has been paid to it within
rhetorical studies.23 Neuroscientists, on the other hand, have begun to recognize that
“some of the most important brain systems impaired in addiction are those in the
prefrontal cortex that regulate social cognition, self-monitoring, moral behavior and other
processes that the AA-type approach seems to target” (Schnabel 25). Nora Volkow,
director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse in Bethesda, Maryland, claims, "A lot of
the treatment programs out there are targeting these systems without necessarily knowing
that they are doing it" (qtd. in Schnabel 25).
AA, I believe, demonstrates how therapeutic techniques of the self can bridge the
gap between private and communal concerns; AA circumnavigates the problem of
narcissism that attends to much therapy culture, without demanding that participants
forego care of the self entirely. Bringing the individual within the fold of cultural
criticism is not a particularly fashionable gesture within rhetorical studies. For instance,
Dana Cloud dismisses the “rhetoric of therapy,” and argues that the twofold function of
the rhetoric of therapy is to exhort conformity with the prevailing social order, and to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Exceptions include Ford (1989) and Jensen (2000), though both of these projects examine the narrative
structures of AA literature and practices, rather than their affective components.
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encourage identification with therapeutic values: individualism, familialism, self-help,
and self-absorption (Cloud 2-3). Cloud maintains that troubled people would best be
served by turning their attention away from their immediate problems, and towards
hegemonic structures of racism, classism, homophobia, sexism, and capitalism.
One wonders how receptive individuals who are struggling with depression,
addiction, or abusive relationships will be to Cloud’s prescription. This sort of argument
is more compelling in intellectual theory than in embodied practice, and speaks to the
effacement of phenomenological experience that characterizes, and enervates, much
critical rhetorical theory. Recalling Burke’s belief that critical practice should work
towards balance and symbiosis, we might look to models of democratic community that
encourage equilibrium between care of the self and care of the collective, instead of
demanding that people just say no to their individual feelings and desires.
The founder of AA, Bill Wilson, drew heavily from William James’s The
Varieties of Religious Experience when he was writing Alcoholics Anonymous, AA’s
organizing text, the core of which is the famous “12 Steps.” Journalist Brendan Koerner
reports that Wilson “was deeply affected by an observation that James made regarding
alcoholism: that the only cure for the addiction is ‘religiomania.’ The steps were thus
designed to induce intense commitment, because Wilson wanted his system to be every
bit as habit-forming as booze.” By drawing on James, one of the first modern theorists of
affect, Wilson managed to “tap into mechanisms that counter the complex psychological
and neurological processes through which addiction wreaks havoc” (Koerner).
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AA is fundamentally premised on the idea that you “cannot easily give up a habit
without having something else to do...bad habits need substitutes” (Vaillant 432).
Alcoholics are not only addicted to alcohol; the drinking is but the center of a
congregation of social and sensory affective attachments—comradeship with fellow
drinkers, the security of the barroom, the smells and sounds and tastes of the drinking
life—that are severed when the alcoholic makes the decision to quit. The dopamineaddicted brain still hungers for these pleasurable stimuli, and when the rational mind,
headquartered in the prefrontal cortex, tries to leave the lifestyle, something akin to a
civil war breaks out in the neuronal circuits. In this fight, the rational mind, weakened by
years of abuse, is at a severe disadvantage. While the brain is mending, “AA functions as
a temporary replacement—a prefrontal cortex made up of a cast of fellow drunks in a
church basement, rather than neurons and synapses” (Koener). In other words, the AA
group serves as an external surrogate for a critical consciousness that cannot function
properly because physiological damage has been done to the brain region that typically
engages in reflexive thought.
The well-known confessional aspect of AA meetings, by which participants stand
before the group and tell their stories of addiction and struggle, lacks the exhibitionistic,
moralistic and disciplinary qualities that epitomize much of the confessional public
address we find in mass media, from the “confession room” cutaways in reality TV
shows, to the disgraced politician’s self-flagellation before the camera. The intended
purpose of the confessional in AA is neither to entertain, nor to achieve redemption
through shame, but rather to willingly appeal for external supervision from the group.
External supervision “appears necessary because in prospective studies conscious
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motivation to stop drinking at admission” to treatment centers “is not associated with
outcome” (Vaillant 432). External supervision, in this case, is unrelated to discipline—
there are no punitive consequences should a participant relapse. Instead, it is part of the
process by which one admits and accepts that he or she is powerless over the addictive
substance. When we translate powerlessness into neurorhetorical terms, we understand
that this means that the addict cannot trust the rhetoric produced by his or her own
conscious mind. The narrator of consciousness has an agenda, and will craft a narrative
that will persuade the subject to seek the substance that the brain-body desires.
Engagements of the kind that occur at AA confessional addresses prompt
participants to recognize the instability of their sense of self-contained, autonomous
subjectivity. People are permeated by the group—boundaries between mind and body,
self and other, are rendered ambiguous, but a space is still maintained for the individual
to care for him or her self. When members stand before the group and share their stories,
they gain new levels of self-awareness—that is, they become aware that their securelyheld identities are fictions composed of language that they did not will into being, but
rather, were created by an authorial function of the brain and body that originates below
the threshold of conscious regulation. And consciously engaging in this geological
exploration of the layers of self helps to “reinvigorate the prefrontal cortex” by restoring
plasticity (Koerner). Complex cognition, such as that which is required when one engages
in self-analytical thought, counters the dangerously efficient neuronal activity that
accompanies the unreflective self-certainty that characterizes the thinking of an addict,
because it redirects neurochemical flows away from the well-worn neuronal circuits
associated with addiction, and in so doing begins to carve out new circuits. Neurons that
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haven’t communicated in years are invited to “speak” to each other again, and the more
that they do so, the closer that relationship becomes. Strong new bonds between neurons
correspond to new avenues of creative and critical thought for the subject.
AA stresses the futility of attempting to engage this process on your own.
Members of the AA community are asked to seek guidance from other participants, and
to address a higher power. This is Step Eleven, which reads: “Sought through prayer and
meditation to improve conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only
for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out.” The organization often
comes under attack because of its requirement that participants pray to a higher power;
Vaillant notes, “the rhetoric and emotional language of the spirituality of AA” often
“leads journalists and social scientists to understandably fear that AA is a religion or a
cult” (434).
We must be careful to draw out the differences between cultic forms of
spirituality and the deployment of spiritual rhetoric of “Step Eleven.” From the vantage
of a critical neurorhetoric, the imperative to address a higher power acts as a substitute
for the addictive substance because it is mediated by limbic circuitry, the chains of
synaptic connections that modulate fear and desire. Communication with others, even
imaginary higher powers, evokes a strong affective response, and thus delivers a
neurochemical high that imbues it with emotional impact, while at the same time
exercising those parts of the brain which enable critical thought. Michael McCullough, a
research psychologist who specializes in religion, states that “certain forms of prayer and
meditation are pinpointing precisely those [prefrontal] areas of the brain that people rely
on to control attention, to control negative emotion and resolve mental conflict” (qtd. in
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Schnabel 26). Spirituality takes on a pernicious ideological quality when the answers to
one’s prayers are predetermined by moral guidelines encoded in unassailable texts. In
such cases, the one who prays is comparing his or her thoughts and actions against a
prescribed set of prohibitions, for the purpose of determining one’s success towards the
goal of achieving an ideal of perfection. A democratic spiritual community such as AA,
by contrast, rigorously refuses to come to any conclusion as to what constitutes the
communal ideal by prohibiting exclusionary discourse. Members of AA are encouraged
to pray for the power to remain uncertain as to who, exactly, is in charge (of their minds,
of their group, and of the world), because certainty breeds mindlessness, and
mindlessness is the root of addiction. This is a prayer for pluralism in the political sense
(to refrain from judgment against other members of the community), the philosophical
sense (to acknowledge multiple levels of Being within oneself), and the neurobiological
sense (to recognize competing vectors of influence originating from different regions of
the brain). The goal, then, is not a tragic Christian effort to achieve transcendence
through purification, but rather, a comic Burkean one: to have the presence of mind to
never forget that we are all “huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an
abyss” (1984a: 272).
I do not intend the preceding paragraphs as a definitive study of the rhetoric of
Alcoholics Anonymous. While that is a site of inquiry I intend to excavate in the future,
my present purpose is merely to briefly demonstrate what a neurorhetorical analysis of a
prominent cultural institution might look like, and to petition the reader to consider how
the rituals and practices of Alcoholics Anonymous might be repurposed for critical
rhetorical endeavors. For instance, I want us to reflect upon how we might use the
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principles of addiction recovery to serve a pedagogical function in courses designed to
help students intervene in the ideological habits of mind and body to which they (and we)
are addicted. We might also consider how neurorhetorical critical tactics might work in
conjunction with the ideological or semiotic critiques many of us ask our students to
perform on cultural texts.
If modern politics is characterized as an addictive practice, it is incumbent upon
critics to formulate programs that can help political junkies break their addictions. This
does not entail that subjects strive to ascend to a state of purification because, as I’ve
indicated, we are always already addicted to affective investments in ideational
structures. The liability that inheres in most addiction treatment programs is that they are
themselves addictive structures. We might therefore evaluate the ethical qualities of
treatments programs according to the degree to which they foreground and selfreflexively interrogate their motives and aspirations with regards to politics. For example,
if in our roles as teachers we wished to responsibly employ some of the methods found in
Alcoholics Anonymous in college courses devoted to critical thinking, we would need to
be constantly on guard against the impulse to engage in a pedagogy of mimesis, whereby
students would be called upon to practice what we preach.
Instead, instructors might “confess” their ideological addictions, discuss how this
feels, how it prompts us towards to particular readings of cultural phenomenon, and tell
the story of how their life experiences have prompted them to adopt and maintain a
particular political worldview. Students would be required to perform a similar
confessional act, in an environment free from judgment or retribution. We cannot
presume that students would want to change, but inducing change through force of one’s
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own ideological certainty should not be a motivating desire if we are truly committed to
cultivating the attitudinal orientations best suited for democratic citizenship.
Alternatively, we might attempt to instill in our students and in ourselves a healthy
distrust of ingrained habits that are manifested in patterns of thought and affective
response. In other words, we might playfully cultivate a productive critical paranoia that
leaves us constantly on edge, skeptical of the messages being sent to us by our own
brains and bodies, and dogged in our pursuit of the centers of power that installed these
communication networks within us. In so doing, we may find that power has no
localizable center—it is imposed both from without, though institutional ideological
apparatuses, and from within, through circuits of neuronal activity that usually operate
behind a veil of consciousness. To become, and remain, conscious of the social and
neuronal operations that produce consciousness is the first step on the path towards
intervening in those operations, and to follow that path requires the recognition that there
is no final destination: there is not a point in which we are free of addiction, but we can
choose the terms of our captivity through unceasing struggle against internal and external
rhetorics that proclaim that the way things are now is the way they will always be.
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CHAPTER 5
VITAL SIGNS: CONSUBSTANTIALITY AND CORPOREAL RHETORIC
The modern idea of the sovereign, self-transparent subject was central to
rhetorical studies for most of the discipline’s history. The discipline was founded as the
study of public speaking and persuasion, and its practitioners presumed that a speaking
subject could stand outside of culture and make decisions as to how to strategically use
language to persuade his audience. In addition, rhetoricians took for granted the existence
of listening subjects in the audience who could bracket their emotions and rationally
judge the merits of the arguments being made by the speaker, and intentionally act on
those arguments they judged to be most worthy. In the postmodern era, this conception of
the subject was displaced by thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan, for whom
“the subject emerges as an effect, as something constructed rather than constructing”
(McKerrow 1993: 56). One cannot willfully think oneself into autonomous subjectivity
because the stuff of thought is the language of the culture. Thus, one is always already a
subject because one is always already subjected to the power dynamics that inhere in
language. According to postmodern and post-structural theorists, you do not speak
language; language speaks through you. As such, your sense of subjectivity and free will
is illusory, a dream composed of words that are not your own.
Much has been written about the “death of the subject” brought about by the
postmodern linguistic turn in the humanities. Haunting the funeral for the subject was an
anxiety in rhetorical studies and cultural studies about the possibility of agency. An agent
is traditionally understood as “one who through conscious intention or free will causes
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changes in the world” (Cooper 421). Carol Miller notes that “the decentering of the
subject . . . signals a crisis for agency, or perhaps more accurately, for rhetoric, since
traditional rhetoric requires the possibility for influence that agency entails” (143). How
are people to make judgments and commit to change if their thoughts are already scripted
by structures of language and power that precede them? Critical rhetoric, as a subfield of
rhetorical studies, was largely constituted as an emergency response to postmodernism
and post-structuralism’s decentering of subjectivity and the attendant anxiety about
agency. Thomas Rickerts notes that the fragmentation of the subject was a key concern in
rhetorical studies throughout the 1990s because it “was held to jeopardize political and
rhetorical agency” (10). Rhetorical agency was considered to be “important because it
would give voice to the voiceless, empowering subaltern groups, and thus, presumably,
weakening structures of institutional, corporate, and ideological domination” (Miller
144). However, without agential subjects to whom activist-critics could address their
liberatory rhetoric, the entire purpose of rhetorical studies seemed to be in question.
Critical rhetoricians entered the breach in an attempt to theoretically rescue agency by
extracting it from deconstructionist oblivion.
One way critical rhetoricians attempted to intervene was to draw a distinction
between subjectivity and agency. While the former suggests a way of being in the world,
the latter indicates a way of acting in that world. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell defines agency
as “the capacity to act... to have the competence to speak or write in a way that will be
recognized or heeded by others in one’s community” (7). She writes that agency is
“ambiguous, open to reversal” (7). That is, oppressive social forces that quash one’s
capacity to think or act of one’s own volition can take one’s agency away. This definition
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solidifies agency as a substantial quality—it gives critics something to save. To become
an active agent doesn’t require one to refuse the language and culture to which one is
subject—this would be a futile effort, for the very terms by which one contemplated
one’s refusal would themselves be a symptom of the language provided by the culture.
Rather, the subject who desires agency must choose what kind of subject he or she wishes
to be, by selecting and pursuing a particular moral and ethical trajectory from within the
range of options afforded within the discursive community.
According to most first-wave critical rhetoricians, because people’s subjectivities
are constituted in discourse, the possibility exists that they could be re-constituted by
discourse if they are made aware of the power relations that determine the discursive
frames that delimit their thought. Agency comes about when people are “empowered” to
become self-reflexive towards the language they use to represent the world to themselves
and others. In his germinal essay, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Raymie
McKerrow argues that this requires the subject to willfully practice “permanent
criticism—a self-reflexive critique that turns back on itself even as it promotes a
realignment in the forces that construct social relations” (1989: 91). The task of critical
rhetoricians, then, is to equip people with the critical tools they’ll need to recognize,
reflect upon, and potentially reject the power relations that are naturalized through the
normative discursive practices and symbolic rituals of everyday life.
In the 1990s, critical rhetoricians made the case that agency is not something you
simply have by virtue of being human; rather, it is something you do, a conscious
rhetorical performance of self chosen from among the various models of selfhood made
available by the culture. However, there was a gap in this model of agency; as McKerrow
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points out, the critical rhetoric project “leaves one wondering about the ‘who’ that is
engaging in the performance as rhetor or critic” (1993: 52). Some willful entity has to
recognize and heed the call to critical reflexivity and agency; if not a self-aware subject,
than what?
McKerrow considers the possibility, raised by some critics, that the body can act
independent of the mind, and that this opens up space for a liberatory political practice. In
particular, he cites performance theorist Randy Martin, who wishes to push beyond the
cognitive model of agential performance by highlighting situations in which the body
“overflows” socially constructed inhibitions and “acts alone, without mind” (McKerrow
1993: 53). Martin offers dance as a political performance as a scenario in which “a
message of despair or exhilaration comes less from the sense of a commanding
consciousness, than from the activity of the body acting on its own” (qtd. in McKerrow
1993: 54). Martin declares that “[W]ithin our society, the mind is the thing that watches,
but also that which is watched” and that “the state, the source of social control, is a state
of mind” (2). When we get “out of our minds,” as we do in the throes of ecstatic rituals
and performances, we are also slipping out of ideological constraints.
McKerrow is skeptical of Martin’s claim that the “mindless” body can will its
own act. He asks, if this is the case, “can the possibility of a subject acting on its own be
far away?” (1993: 54). McKerrow ultimately rejects the notion that the body can have a
will of its own, for if he grants the body agency, then he must also grant that perhaps
critically empowered subjects cannot always actively, or consciously, make choices from
within the social field. An agential body acting separately from a subjugated mind would
suggest that there are other factors at work in political emancipation than words and
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ideas. The critical rhetoric that McKerrow has in mind is tied together with critical
thinking, which he believes necessarily precedes the possibility of agential action.
Critical rhetoricians are hesitant to admit the body and brain into theories of agency and
emancipation because corporeality introduces areas of difference between people that
cannot be easily explained away as socially constructed illusions: does aging, mental
illness, neurological trauma, pharmacological intake, genetic predisposition, or habitual
participation in physical ritual influence the degree to which subjects are able to arrive at
critical agency? If any of these questions were answered affirmatively, it would have
significant consequences for critical rhetoric’s political mission, as the critical rhetoric
project is founded on the humanist premise that all subjects of ideology have the potential
to become agents of ideological change, after the subjects are granted the capacity for
critical thinking by critical rhetoricians, educators, or activists.
Agential Possession
Ambivalence about the pre-linguistic body’s role as a determinative factor in
matters pertaining to agency is a hallmark of contemporary rhetorical and critical theory,
and those critics who express interest in granting the body greater significance are often
met with skepticism. For instance, in a 2006 Rhetoric Society Quarterly special issue on
“the body,” Susan Jarrett responds to Debra Hawhee’s claim that “we have been too
absorbed in the life of the mind,” and that we should “attend to the extra-discursive, the
nonrational or the extra-rational,” by arguing that enthusiasm for the agential body “in the
absence of an accompanying discourse—a metadiscourse that is the hallmark of teaching,
saying how one does the thing one does—runs the risk of reaffirming what was once
called a vitalist theory of writing…The challenge for those shifting the emphasis to
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bodily arts is to keep language in play” (218). Jarrett worries that if we abandon the
“citizen-subject” by focusing on the ways in which bodily rituals and performances
influence our attitudes and motivations, we will lose the political imperative for critical,
rational deliberation.
Another contemporary rhetorical critic, Jordynn Jack, directly addresses what she
perceives to be the danger of incorporating the brain in critical rhetorical theory. Jack
cautions rhetoricians to refuse to accept the “metaphor of the brain as text” because the
“correlate of this metaphor tends to be the suggestion that scientists can therefore ‘read
minds’…as though scientists could literally read a transcript of someone’s thoughts rather
than interpret visual images or data” (2008: 24). The problem with recognizing a brain
that produces texts, Jack claims, is that we might be tempted to “anthropomorphize the
brain, making it an active agent” (2008: 25). If the brain is an active agent, then it follows
that the thinking subject could just be an effect of that brain’s agential actions. It appears
that Jack’s anxiety stems from her humanist political investments in a subject who is
either self-aware, or can be made self-aware, and can therefore either decide or be
persuaded to commit to social change.
Most contemporary rhetoricians accept some form of the argument that
subjectivity is not autonomous or transcendent, and agree to a greater or lesser extent that
socio-historical forces construct subjects. The raison d’être of critical rhetoricians is to
imbue these subjects with the animating spark of critical consciousness. One of the
dominant metaphors in scholarly writing about agency is “possession”: subjects of
ideology may lack agency, but they can learn from teachers of rhetoric how to think and
act critically, at which time they will come to possess agency. Christian Lundberg and
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Joshua Gunn claim that “understanding agency as a possession is central to reproducing
the humanist model of the intentional agent who owns the capacity to make agential
choices” (89). This conception of subjectivity and agency is, in essence, a reiteration of
“mind over matter,” a Romantic belief in the human capacity to will change, one which is
ultimately a leap of faith. Indeed, Lundberg and Gunn call the humanist belief in agency
ontotheology, “a humanist gospel that has elevated agency to the status of the godly,
lording over the material and spiritual universe” (84).
Lundberg and Gunn go on to make the provocative claim that we do not need a
theory of agency—all that matters is that people feel like they are in control, and can
translate that feeling into what appears to be self-willed actions. It does not matter where
agency comes from, as long as things get done. Lundberg and Gunn use the Ouija board
as an illustration. When the planchette is moved across the board by a force that seems to
transcend the individual participants, it is clear some one or some thing is acting, though
each participant in the séance disavows being the acting agent. Is the planchette being
moved by a collective unconscious will? Has a ghost quietly joined the party? Are the
participants each consciously exerting force but denying culpability? The answer is
ultimately unknowable. Therefore, Lundberg and Gunn “favor an uncertain posture
towards the flow of agency and agents implied by an open disposition toward the séance,
a posture that embraces a restless and roving insecurity” (86). Whether the origin of
agency is attributable to “language, ideology, perhaps even a spirit” is of no particular
consequence to these rhetoricians. It is the rhetorical results that matter, not the origin of
something called the “rhetorical agent” (Lundberg and Gunn 88). It is clear that people
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can act; we do not require a knowing, intending subject to theorize the effects of people’s
actions.
So why should we belabor the matter of agency any further? Critical rhetorical
theory is invested not only in theoretical speculation, but also in political practice; critical
rhetoricians seek to intervene into rhetorical practices they judge to be detrimental to a
democratic, egalitarian society. Different theoretical foundations generate different
tactical possibilities. It is my conviction that humanist theories of agency current in
critical rhetoric are insufficient to the task of intervening in rhetorical techniques and
technologies that are specifically designed to sidestep critical consciousness and directly
effect material alterations of the brain.
Critical rhetoric, as both a pedagogical practice and a field of scholarship, often
focuses myopically on “raising awareness” as a strategic means to equip subjects of
ideology with agency. The underlying assumption is that when subjects learn how they
are being manipulated by power and language, they will be “empowered” to engage in
creative, subversive, or resistant acts of personal and social transformation. Foucault calls
this “taking care of oneself,” and argues that it is to engage in “true social practice”
(1986: 51). As McKerrow explains, the “subject, as actor, is not the center of all
experience and change; rather, it is constituted as one facet of the possibilities of change
within social relationships. Engaging in actions that properly ‘take care of oneself’ is to
have influence in one’s reordering of social practices” (1993: 60). Social symbolic forces
construct the subject, but the critical choices the subject makes from within the range of
symbolic options available to him determines the constitution of an idiosyncratic self, or
the agent. The critical agent produces variations on the discursive patterns to which he is
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subject, and in so doing, introduces difference and opens the possibility for change,
thereby influencing the shape the social field will take in the future Taking care of the
self, then, is the first step towards taking care of society.
The problem with critical interventions that hope to grant agency to people by
teaching them to cultivate or take “care of the self” is that it is not self-evident that there
is one “self” to which one can attend. While most contemporary accounts of subjectivity
and agency are quick to note that subjects are the effect of flows of power and discourse,
they nevertheless maintain that redirections of power/discourse can create situations in
which an agential self may emerge, and be maintained through assiduous self-care.
However, there are many circumstances in which the conscious regulation of one’s own
cognitive and emotional activity still fails to result in a cohesive agential unification of
the brain and body. If we examine cases in which the thinking self is at odds with his or
her somatic self, we might come to the conclusion that making people cognitively aware
of social problems is not always enough—we can be intellectually aware of what needs to
change, yet nevertheless find ourselves incapable of acting on that knowledge, because
knowledge is not processed, stored, or accessed in just one site within the body.
Critical rhetoric often focuses on the epistemic quality of belief. Epistemic
beliefs “can be altered relatively easily by recourse to new evidence and argument”
(Connolly 2010: 196). But epistemic beliefs, through reiteration, eventually enter another
register of experience, and become “intense, vague existential dispositions in which creed
and affect mix together below the reach of reflective considerations alone” (Connolly
2010: 196). It is here that ideology takes on an ontological or spiritual character—where
it possesses the subject, as it were, rather than merely informing him. The critic cannot
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persuade the spiritualized subject to abandon his belief using logical appeals because
beliefs of this nature are not ideas; they are the ontological foundations on which ideas
rest.
This is the existential condition Althusser was highlighting when he argued that
ideology’s functioning is “inextricable from the intangible yet nondismissable, and
therefore material, psychosomatic mediation involved in subject formation” (Chow 2010:
224, emphasis in original). Rey Chow points out that in formulating his theory of
embodied subjectivity, Althusser drew not only from Lacan’s post-structuralist
psychoanalysis, but also from Blaise Pascal’s recommendation for religious skeptics:
“Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe “ (2010: 225). Althusser
writes that where the individual subject is concerned, the “existence of the ideas of his
belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices
governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological
apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject” (168-69, emphasis in original).
Materialism, as it is invoked in contemporary rhetorical and cultural theory, tends to refer
to economic or superstructural conditions that contribute to, or determine, the content of
consciousness. If we pay attention to the work of neuroscientists and affect theorists, we
see that economic or social materiality necessarily intersects with bio-materiality, for the
ideologically-informed rituals that we automatically practice as a part of everyday social
life change the structures of the brain, and impact our capacity to arrive at the critical
consciousness that rhetoricians identify as the central characteristic of agency.
When we “care for the self,” we are, from a neurological perspective, attending to
but one point in the distributed nervous system: the brain, and more specifically, the
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circuitry by which the prefrontal cortex communicates with lower order brain regions
such as the amygdala and hypothalamus. Focusing only on cortical functions ignores the
communication relays between the brain and body, and thus stops short of helping us to
understand the full range of the proceedings involved in creating the sense of rhetorical
agency that we experience when we feel as if we are “thinking for ourselves.”
Neuroscientist David Eagleman likens these internal communications to a “neural
Parliament with different political parties that are battling it out to steer the ship of state.”
In this metaphor, each party represents a different site in the brain-body circuit, and each
of these sites has a perspective on events that is sometimes at odds with the perspectives
of other sites. Elizabeth Wilson explains that at various points throughout the body
there are local eddies that collect, transform, dampen down, distribute, duplicate,
and magnify the innervations they receive. These neurological assemblages form
a series of “mini-brains”—sites of psychological intensity—that arrest and divert
axial traffic. The notion of psychological action at a distance (“disorders in higher
brain centers”) misjudges the radically distributed and communicative nature of
the body’s nervous systems. (2004: 41)
In order to change those beliefs that have moved from the epistemic to the ontological
plane, a rhetor must commune with more than people’s cognitive selves—he or she must
also speak to other agents of the body that collectively make up the internal audience of
rhetoric.
In the next section, I’ll turn to a case study that illustrates Baruch Spinoza’s claim
that “the human body is composed of very many individual bodies of different nature,
and so it can be affected by one and the same body in many different ways” (115). We do
not possess a singular agency, because many distinct agents physically possess us, each
with its own desires and dispositions. We should not give singular priority or grant undue
power to the most conceptually sophisticated among them—those associated with
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conscious judgment and linguistic expression—because in the physiological body, as in
the body politic, the most thoughtful and articulate agents do not always wield the most
power.
The Internal Audience
In a famous study conducted in the early 1990s, the pioneering neuroscientist V.S.
Ramachandran found that he could change the physical composition—and therefore the
behavior—of a living human brain just by telling it a story. What made this more
remarkable is that the conscious subject in whose skull that brain rested did not believe
Ramachandran’s story was true, and still does not to this day. Nevertheless, this narrative
encounter changed the way the subject perceived and acted in the world. Ramachandran
used a carefully crafted rhetoric to circumvent the subject’s rational, intellectual faculties,
and induced action in the subject’s body without a corresponding ideational change in the
mind. He accomplished this by speaking a language the brain could understand.
Within contemporary rhetorical theory, it is widely accepted that in order to
change people’s minds, you must cultivate identifications with them. In a famous
formulation, Burke claims that “[Y]ou persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways
with his” (1969b: 55). The concept of identification was path breaking in rhetorical
studies because it shifted the field’s focus from “rational deliberation, the supplication of
good reasons and so on, to the study of persuasion as identification…expanding the
process into the domain beyond conscious awareness” (Gunn 2008: 140). Identification
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encompasses both the intellectual affiliations we choose to make, and the affective,
desirous attachments we pursue without conscious choice.
Burke explains that people are distinct from each other because they are
composed of different physiological material, yet they are bound together in thought and
action because they have “common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that
make them consubstantial” (1969b: 21). Consubstantiality encompasses the many ways
in which our interests, attitudes, values, experiences, perceptions, and material properties
are shared with others, or could appear to be shared (Burke1969b). According to Burke,
people accept or reject their interdependence based on the degree with which they
identify with each other’s symbol systems. A savvy rhetor can create a sense of
consubstantiality by disseminating narratives or symbols with which divergent subjects
can all identify, and thereby establish a totality that did not previously exist.
Consubstantiality is a concept most often used by rhetoricians to explain how
rhetors bring together groups of people with divergent interests and induce them to act as
“one body.” For example, we might consider the ways in which the post 9/11 Bush
administration employed rhetoric that sought to erase symbolic and affective lines of
division between Democrats and Republicans, and redraw them to demarcate new
divisions between “Americans” and “Muslims.” Underlying this critical use of
consubstantiality is a theory of subjectivity and agency that holds that people either
believe one thing or the other—they can’t hold two competing ideas at once. This
overlooks the possibility that there are multiple agents within each subject, and that the
agent who can recognize and express his or her ideas and motives is not necessarily the
one in charge, or the one to whom the rhetor speaks in order to foster identification.
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Ramachandran’s experiments with victims of phantom limb syndrome, a
traumatic disorder that affects amputees, demonstrates that for consubstantiality to
inaugurate a relationship between people, it must also take effect within them. People
with phantom limbs can see and comprehend that their arm or leg is gone, but they
continue to feel the presence of a “ghost limb” in its place. Phantom limb sufferers
visually and cognitively apprehend that they have lost an appendage, but nevertheless,
they still feel a “ghost limb” in its place, one that itches, cramps, and aches, often to an
excruciating degree.24 This condition occurs because the brain doggedly adheres to a
time-tested narrative (We have an arm) and rejects the revised version offered up by the
eyes (Our arm is gone). The amputee’s conscious mind is caught in the crossfire of this
debate, and consequently, it “avows two contradictory realities simultaneously: the reality
of the limb and the reality of its destruction” (Grosz 72).
For centuries, Western poets, philosophers, physicians, and psychologists had
been baffled and fascinated by phantom limbs. In each epoch, the phenomenon is
explained according to the dominant metaphysical orientation of the time. In the early
modern period, phantom limbs seemed to prove that the (immaterial) mind and (material)
body were distinct entities—Descartes referenced phantom limbs as proof that the soul
was separate from the body that transported it. In the Victorian era it was widely believed
that the logic of materialism could solve what “less advanced” societies took to be purely
spiritual problems. Victorian doctors initially tried to cure the syndrome by shaving off
layers of skin and bone on the remaining stump. When this did not work, they diagnosed
victims with neurotic hysteria, a disorder of the (usually female) mind, or accused them
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24

Grosz notes that the phantom phenomena occurs in almost 100% of amputees, and is not restricted to
amputated arms and legs, but is also triggered by lost penises, breasts, eyes, and facial parts (71).
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of “fraudulent representation,” which is to say, of rhetoric (O’Connor 751). For much of
history, it was difficult to ascertain the prevalence of phantom limb syndrome among
amputees, because patients would be “reluctant to admit pain in a part of the body that is
no longer present for fear of being thought mentally disturbed” (Flor 182). Thus
discredited as psychic disorder, the syndrome was largely ignored by scientists until the
horrific violence of the American Civil War sparked renewed interest because thousands
of otherwise “sane” soldiers wounded in battle reported ghost limbs where their arms and
legs had formerly been. The scientific reevaluation of phantom limb syndrome can be
attributed to the clinical and literary writings of Silas Weir Mitchell, a “doctor of nerves”
in Philadelphia. Weir Mitchell was close friend of, and sometimes benefactor, to Walt
Whitman. Weir Mitchell believed that amputees’ experiences had profound philosophical
implications, because “their sensory ghosts were living proof of Whitman’s poetry: our
matter was entangled with our spirit. When you cut the flesh, you also cut the soul”
(Lehrer 14).
Of course, in contemporary Western society, the language of the “soul” retains
little currency in medical and scientific circles. Most 20th century practitioners of
psychology or medical science chose between opposing sides of the Cartesian mind/body
dichotomy, with psychologists asserting that “supernatural” phenomena such as phantom
limbs were problems of the psyche, and medical doctors and scientists insisting that the
psyche is purely a product of the brain. Psychological explanations were grounded in
psychoanalytic or personality theories of chronic pain that proposed that phantom limb
pain results from pre-amputation psychological disturbance (Hill)—a variation of the
hysterical diagnoses of the Victorian age. Just as surgical interventions did not “cure”
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phantom limb because the problem was not of a strictly bio-material nature, talk therapy
proved ineffective in treating phantom pain because the patients were not denying the
loss of the limb or repressing memories of the traumatic event. We now know that the
syndrome is neither a psychic disturbance, nor a physical trauma. Rather, it is
neurorhetorical problem, created by a breakdown of communication between different
agential entities distributed throughout the brain and body.
We never directly apprehend our bodies; rather, what we experience as “body” is
the end result of a split second communication that takes place between sensory cells on
the body, and patches of nerve cells in the brain that represent specific body zones. The
brain maintains a virtual map of the entire body in neural circuitry located in the sensory
homunculus, a small patch of cells located near the top of the cerebral cortex. The
contours of this map are constantly being reinforced by relays and feedback loops from
different sites of activity dispersed all over the body. These sites send messages to the
brain about the body’s state, and the brain registers the data on its virtual map. When you
hit your arm on an object, or look at it dangling by your side, or hear your hand brush
against the side of your desk, your sensory cells send reports about the event to your
brain, and the brain uses these reports to retrace the virtual body map in connections
between neural cells. Based on the principle of neuroplasticity, every time the body map
is activated, this image of the body becomes more stable, and more phenomenologically
“real” to the subject.
The brain determines if a report is valid based on what it has learned from past
experiences, and then decides if it should commit the body to motion or translate the
impulse into mental thought. After making a judgment call, it sends its verdict back to the
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appropriate body part with instructions on what to do. When you accidentally put your
hand on a hot stovetop, it is not your skin that recoils. The sensory cells on your hand
send a message to the brain about a possible disturbance, and then the brain sends a
message back to the hand telling it to move. The conscious mind arrives relatively late in
the game, registering what happened only after the brain has taken the necessary steps to
prevent damage to the body.
Because this transaction happens incredibly fast, in our lived experience the
correspondence between sensation, perception, and consciousness seems to be almost
immediate. However, seeing (or feeling or hearing or smelling) is not “believing” unless
the brain is convinced that what the eyes or other sensory organs report squares with what
it has learned to expect. If there is a discrepancy between expectation and experience, the
brain can overrule the sensory cells’ arguments and “explain” bewildering information by
recourse to time-tested interpretive frameworks. When an arm is suddenly removed from
the body, its corresponding representation on the body map in the homunculus remains.
When that portion of the body map is stimulated by spillover activity in neighboring
regions of the brain, the brain conjures up the ghost limb. The brain continues to insist
upon the arm’s presence, even as the eyes clearly perceive its absence. For people who
suffer from phantom limb syndrome, the brain makes a faulty judgment about sensory
stimuli because it has wired itself to expect the presence of a limb. In addition, it
sometimes makes a creative executive decision to reorganize itself without consulting the
other agents involved. People who have lost an appendage will feel stimulation of the lost
part when someone touches an unrelated part of the intact body, because the brain
redraws its body map in an effort to make sense of surprising new circumstances.
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Phantom limb syndrome is “a neurological effort to give shape to an otherwise
disorderly set of somatic signs” by imposing “narrative form”(O’Connor 111); it is a way
for “neurology to narrate itself” (O’Connor 112). Turning to the lexicon of rhetorical
theory, we might call phantom limb syndrome a failure to achieve consubstantiality:
though the brain and the body are of the same material substance, they no longer identify
with each other is because the brain is operating according to a plot that the body no
longer recognizes. Phantom limbs neither respond to symbolic treatments such as talk
therapy, nor to materialist treatments such as surgical excision, because such intervention
only address one of the many agents in the brain-body network. Ramachandran
succeeded where others failed because he realized that if you want to persuade a ghost,
you best speak that ghost’s language.
As a Western neuroscientist well versed in non-Western mystic practices,
Ramachandran’s innovation was to refuse to choose between physical and symbol-based
therapies. Ramachandran grew up India and cites as inspiration the yogis he watched
walk barefoot across coals and drive needles through their chins while immersed in
trance (Doidge 195). He locates his neuroscientific explorations in a mystic and poetic
lineage that “retains a place for the imagination and illusion in…the production of pain
and its relief” (Connolly 2002: 10). Ramachandran built a simple mirror-lined box, into
which his patient inserted both his intact limb, and the stump of his severed limb. When
the patient looked into the mirror, he was given the visual impression that his arm had
been restored. Ramachandran could massage the illusory arm, coaxing the painfully
cramped phantom hand to relax its grip and cease tormenting its owner. Physical therapy,
in this case, was a matter of repeatedly telling the brain a story, week after week, until it
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believed it to be true, and adjusted its neural firing patterns accordingly. Of course, the
patient mentally “knew” this was a visual trick, and yet this knowledge was no
impediment. The patient’s brain, in effect, overruled the argument being made by the
patient’s skeptical mind (“I do not have an arm”) because it found Ramachandran’s
argument (“You have an arm: it’s right there in the mirror”) more persuasive.
By paying careful attention to “the language of nerve impulses,” Ramachandran
was able to see that “every act of perception…involves an act of judgment by the brain”
(1999: 66, 77). Pain, and indeed all phenomenological experience, is “an opinion on the
organism’s state” rather than “a mere reflexive response” (Ramachandran qtd in Doidge
192), and the brain “gathers evidence from many sources” before making a decision
(Doidge 192). These decisions eventually become physically substantiated in the brain’s
cells, and with each reiteration, become increasingly resistant to change. Ramachandran’s
experiments with phantom limb patients suggest that the human brain both responds to
and produces a rhetoric of its own. Indeed, it seems to have a subjectivity of its own that
is formed through communicative practices that occur within the body, and that operate
independently of the conscious mind of the subject.
Ramachandran’s work breaks from orthodox psychoanalytic methods that are
premised in drives that mediate between the psychic and the somatic realms, or in
Freud’s terms, between the “soul” and the “body.” According to this theoretical
paradigm, destructive unconscious impulses result when internal over-excitation of
neurons create an excess of stimulation that the brain cannot regulate on its own, and thus
channels this excess into a different place, that of the psyche. The nervous system, in
essence, is attacked by its own excitation, and creates a space with which to catch the
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overflow—the “[P]sychic energy thus takes up where nervous energy leaves off,
functioning, in a sense, as the force of force, which makes possible what is impossible for
the nervous system: to find a means of appeasing or satisfying this constant, urgent,
threatening internal excitation” (Malabou 2012: 31, emphasis in original). Freud argues
that the brain is not equipped to distance itself from excess by representing that excess—
it cannot study its own workings. Instead, it must defer excess to another system
altogether: the psychical apparatus.
The object of the drive that we receive in conscious or unconscious thought is a
representation, a metaphor for the unmanageable nervous energy. We never apprehend
the drive itself, but rather, we experience its emissaries in the form of affective impulses
and mental images, which dance upon the psychic stage of dreams and fantasies. Thus,
psychic energy “is, in a certain sense, the rhetorical detour of nervous energy. Not able to
discharge itself within the nervous system, endogenous excitation is diverted into
roundabout paths, into turns comparable to tropes or figures of discourse” (Malabou
2012: 35). Michael de Certeau similarly claims that “the operations which order
representation by articulation throughout the psychic system are in effect rhetorical:
metaphors, metonymies, synecdoches, paranomasia, etc.” (22-23). The argument that the
psychic system is rhetorical is premised upon the assumption that the brain is not.
Malabou summarizes this position:
Because no symbolic activity exists in the nervous system, psychic energy figures
this very absence in a style that is inherently foreign to the brain, which is without
initiative and does nothing but transmit energy or, as far as possible, maintain it at
a constant level. The unconscious is structured like a language only to the extent
that the brain does not speak. (2012: 35, emphasis in original)
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However, recent neuroscience disputes this supposition. As we saw with Ramachandran’s
work with phantom limbs, there is constant communication between the sensory cells of
the body and the nerve cells in the brain, and within this relay there are always judgments
being made by non-psychic corporeal agents about the state of the total organism. Wilson
observes that his data “gives us a glimpse of the body in conversation with itself” (2004:
98). Indeed, the brain and body network regulates itself by “informing itself about itself”
(Malabou 2012: 37). When faced with dysfunction, such as the loss of a limb, the brain
does not pass along the problem to the psychic plane; rather, it attempts to come to a
solution within its own operations by reorganizing itself materially. What psychoanalysts
call the psyche, and what humanist rhetoricians call the agent, might be better understood
as one component in an integrated and mutually constitutive psychosomatic system.
Ramachandran was able to perform a successful intervention because he
understood that “raising awareness,” as a psychoanalyst or a critical rhetorician might, is
not an appropriate tactic when belief has migrated from the plane of epistemology to that
of ontology, or, if we employ the vernacular of neuroscience, when it has transferred
from the prefrontal cortex (site of conscious, self-reflexive thought) to the sensory
homunculus (site of phenomenological perception) and its relations with the somatic
totality. When beliefs are wound within the dense network of circuits that bind the soma
and psyche, it is short-sighted and ineffective to speak to the cognitive apparatus as if it
were solely in command and capable of willfully reordering perceptions of the world, if
only it knew how—which is to say, if it could reclaim agential power via rhetorical
instruction. Wilson notes that the “vectors of governance” in the body are “fully
disseminated—which is not to say that they are undecidable (an unsystematic array of
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random associations), but rather that they are not delimitable within conventional
parameters of cause and effect, origin and derivation” (2004: 23). The task of the critical
rhetorician, then, is not to stake a claim for the foundational character of agency, but
rather, to practice kairotic wisdom when it comes to deciding what form of agency is in
play in any given rhetorical encounter. James Kinneavy describes kairos as “the
appropriateness of the discourse to the particular circumstances of the time, place,
speaker, and audience involved” (84). Ramachandran exhibited a keen attention to kairos
with his phantom limb patients. The rhetorical tactics he employed for that particular
situation may not be applicable to all situations, but if we hope to engage in productive
criticism, we should seek to expand the critical resources at our disposal, not limit them
in the name of disciplinary tradition.
Silvan Tomkins suggests that cognition has been too narrowly understood as a
“high command mechanism” that would assess and arbitrate other ways of knowing
(Gibbs 200). He makes a case that we should not separate cognition from physiology at
all, and instead argues for “a more democratic system with no special mechanism
completely in charge or, if in charge, able to endure as a special mechanism” (Tomkins
17). Just as political democracy is enervated by the concentration of power and influence
in one body or group positioned atop a hierarchy of importance, so too is critical rhetoric
that speaks only to “the head.”
According to Burke, rhetoric promotes action by inducing different material
bodies to identify with shared forms, and in so doing creates a new symbolic body, the
consubstantial relationship. Consubstantiality is similar to what Massumi calls “felt
relations” that can be shared “at any distance from the sensuous forms they evoke”
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(Massumi qtd. in Gibbs 201). Yet “if language is action at a distance on the forms it
connects, it nevertheless acts directly on the body” (Gibbs 201). Anna Gibbs writes:
Language is in fact highly dependent on the body’s physical capacities for its
effectivity. It is also very selective, concentrating on evoking experience in one
sensory channel at a time: in this respect, it treats the body not as a unified and
indivisible whole, but as an ensemble of potentialities that can—and must—be
selectively activated. The body, then, is not so much a medium as a series of
media... (201).
Rhetoricians routinely critique mass mediated texts for the liberatory or oppressive
political messages concealed within their images, but shy away from the media of the
body. But this should not be the case, as the corporeal body traffics in a communicative
currency very similar to that that is exchanged in the body politic. Both corporeal and
social organizations maintain a vision of a virtual, idealized state of affairs against which
they compare, judge, and attempt to order the actions of their constituents. For a social
formation, this may be a vision of totalitarian order or egalitarian democracy. For a
corporeal formation, this is usually an image of an intact set of body parts governed by an
executive mind quartered in the brain. Inevitably, the contingencies of life disrupt and
contradict the ideal of wholeness and order, and in the ensuing discord we find what
Burke calls the “characteristic invitation to rhetoric” (1969b: 25). In his discussion of
consubstantiality, Burke describes the sort of dissonant relations that call rhetoric into
being:
Insofar as the individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups,
the study of this same individual would fall under the head of Rhetoric. . . . The
Rhetoric must lead us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the
flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering
line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the
War of Nerves, the War. (1969b: 23, emphasis in original)
Burke’s inclusion of the “war of nerves” takes on new resonance if we extend his
understanding of nerves to include both the nervous energy that unites or divides
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collectivities, and the nervous energy that neurons use to speak to each other. Both kinds
of energy can be redirected by rhetors who practice the kairotic savvy to what tactic are
appropriate in a particular rhetorical situation.
As critical rhetoricians, we do not need to abandon the study of public discourse,
politics, and consciousness if we want to think about the brain and body’s internal
rhetoric, because intervention “in one register will reorganize patterns of organization in
the other register, not because one determines the other, but because the two registers are
ontologically connate” (Wilson 385). A humanistic critical orientation that purports to
stand “outside” of, or “above,” neurophysiological processes cannot account for the locus
of the thought that the critic expends on the target of his or her criticism. Likewise, a
posthumanist criticism that kills off the subject and declares agency to be an illusion of
power and discourse has difficulty attending to events, such as phantom limbs, that
indicate fissures between epistemology and ontology, wherefrom a pre-discursive bodily
agency appears to makes claims and demands. What we need, then, is a new critical
orientation that is grounded in the rhetorical tradition, yet responsive to new insights into
the science of human communication, and to new developments in the techniques of
persuasion. In the final section, I will briefly make a case for the value of “the New
Vitalism” for critical rhetorical studies.
New Vitalism and Critical Rhetoric
The dominant tendency “within contemporary rhetorical theory has been to
identify rhetoric with the symbolic,” and to set this dyad in opposition to the corporeal
body and the physical world (Engnell 22). This tendency is most likely attributable in
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large part to the influence of Burke. While Burke is arguably the theorist most
responsible for bringing the body back into the fold of rhetorical studies in the 20th
century, he is also steadfast in his belief that in the last instance, language is the prime
mover of human thought and action, and that there is a fundamental distinction between
words and things.
Burke summarizes this as the distinction between “action” and “motion,” which
corresponds to a distinction between mind and brain. He writes, “there is the dimension
of sheer physicality (sheer ‘motion’) by which a word is uttered, transmitted, heard, read,
etc. Or there is the sheer physicality of the motions of the brain when the brain is in any
way using words, ‘thinking’” (Burke 1970: 16). These motions are aspects of man’s
“animality,” and his symbolicity “adds a dimension of action not reducible to the nonsymbolic” (Burke 1970: 16); in other words, language grants actionable life to the
essentially inert corporeal matter that makes up the engines of thought, such as the organs
of the central nervous system. The nervous system generates, via motion, the symbolic
flows of thought and expression that the human agent can direct towards willed action in
the world. By contrast, lower animals, because they lack language, are driven by motion
alone, merely reacting to stimuli they encounter in their environments. Burke explains:
“where symbolic operations can influence bodily processes, the realm of the natural (in
the sense of the less-than-verbal) is seen to be pervaded, or inspirited, by the realm of the
verbal, or symbolic. And in this sense the realm of the symbolic corresponds...to the
realm of the ‘supernatural’” (1970: 17).
Burke is reticent to grant nature or the body agency, and in this respect he
demonstrates one of the defining characteristics of modern rhetorical study: a discipline
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wide pushback against the notion of self-motivating or self-organizing vitalistic systems
of the sort routinely described by mysticism and science. Vitalist orientations are widely
considered politically dangerous and threatening to the field of rhetoric because they
refrain from situating the human at the center of all events. Vitalism lost intellectual
currency in the early part of the 20th century because humanist philosophers and theorists
resisted the idea that a life force could exist which granted meaning to human events; the
(somewhat anthropocentric) presumption was that humans bestowed meaning to matter
by recognizing and categorizing it.
The earliest manifestations of vitalism appeared in the early 19th century, a time
when many poets and philosophers became interested in myth, mysticism, and
spiritualism, which they believed could counter emerging mechanistic and scientific ways
of understanding the nature of existence. In the late 19th century, the study of vitalism
merged scientific and humanistic questions regarding the nature of affective transmission
or contagion:
How was it that certain fashions, fads and trends seemed to spread throughout
populations with a rapidity that seemed to defy the action of logic or rationality?
How did certain fears and forms of hysteria, mania and emotion spread such that
they appeared to bypass rationality and reason? What caused individuals in
groups to behave in ways that might perplex, bemuse or undermine their sense of
themselves as subjects in other contexts? What enabled certain individuals to
command the obedience, compliance, love and adoration of others, such that they
would be exalted and revered as charismatic leaders? (Blackman 27)
All of these social phenomena seemed to indicate porousness in the boundaries that
separated the self and other, the human and non-human, the symbolic and the material,
and they all suggested that communication was the invisible link that bound these spheres
together in ambiguous ways. Intellectuals of the time studied occurrences such as
hypnotic trances, séances, psychic mediation, and psychotic hallucinations for clues as to
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how communicatory practices harnessed some vital force that induced altered states of
being. While in our era, the study of mysticism has for the most part fallen from
academic fashion, some theorists in the humanities and social sciences continue to
investigate the non-linguistic, non-rational, affective components of communication with
an eye towards developing theories that address the “issues of change and transformation
through a recognition that materiality is governed by relations of indeterminacy,
contingency, and openness” (Blackman 29).25 This work in social and cultural theory is
being described as a new materialist vitalism. The new vitalism takes as a cornerstone
principle
the notion that the driving force or forces behind any life process—be it
evolutionary, psychological, chemical, biological, or otherwise—cannot be
reduced or understood wholly by rational law. However, to drive a life process of
any degree of complexity and longevity, a locomotive of some kind must be
prefigured; and vitalism takes energy inherent to the process as its power source,
rather than something outside of it. (Venus)
This emphasis on the interior dynamics that compel transformation stands in contrast to
that of liberal humanist criticism, which “normally contrasts the ideality of the human to
the materiality and mechanism of the non-human” (Lash 324). Vitalism stresses the selforganization of humans and non-human matter, whereas most contemporary cultural and
rhetorical theory emphasizes the various ways that external symbolic systems organize
human thought and action. This leads critics down a well-worn path of inquiry that ends
in explanations of causality that point to determinative macrostructures of power
manifested in discursive practices that shape cognition and behavior. The dominant
theory of embodied subjectivity in the humanities suggests that subjects are inscribed by
culture, but stops short of explaining how corporeal matter enables or resists inscription.
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Instead, this theory holds that once we become cognizant of what’s happening to us, we
can choose to refuse it. However, as I’ve illustrated in this chapter, the body is capable of
refusing our refusal. This indicates that there is something going on that escapes the grasp
of constructivist critical paradigms, and this “something” is what the new vitalism seeks
to capture.
Rhetorical theorist Byron Hawk argues that “vitalism has been constructed as the
negative opposition to our contemporary rhetorical practices” (3). According to Hawk,
many rhetoricians associate vitalism with Romanticism, and fear that embracing vitalism
will draw attention away from the ideological structures that construct the illusion that
there is an autonomous self that can create and express itself free from cultural
constraints. Hawk disputes this association. Taking into consideration recent
advancements in what we know about the complexity of the relations that hold between
mind and body, and between mind-body and society, Hawk makes a case for what he
calls “complex vitalism”: “Rooted in biology and materiality, such an approach is far
removed from mysticism and romanticism but is genealogically linked through the same
grounding question and key assumptions” (6). To understand this genealogical linkage,
we should recall here that sophistic rhetoric is born from the mystic tradition of Gorgias’s
“sacred incantations sung with words” that “beguile,” “persuade,” and “alter” the soul
“by witchcraft.” The question Gorgias sought to answer in his Encomium of Helen—
which agency within the subject compels action in response to rhetoric?—is largely the
same question pursued by many contemporary neuroscientists, affect theorists, and
Vitalists, and the answer Gorgias arrives at—it is not the rational, willful mind, but a vital
force that joins the symbolic and somatic—links the mystic rhetorical tradition to
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contemporary neuroscience. Both Gorgian sophistry and recent cognitive neuroscience
are premised on the inextricability of the word and the world, the symbolic and the
corporeal.
Recent neuroscience stresses that agency and subjectivity are not strictly cognitive
possessions; they are, rather, the result of complex negotiations that take place between
various agential entities dispersed throughout individual bodies, and between those
entities and other bodies. Agency and subjectivity are relational—they depend upon interand intra-subjective processes that unfold over time, and that obey a logic that is often
outside of our awareness and control. Because a sense of a stable (individual or social)
body depends on consubstantial relations between different agential sites within and
between bodies, we can say that humans are better characterized as “affective
communities” rather than unified subjects. Affective communities is a term coined by an
important figure in new vitalist thought, Felix Guattari, who maintains that the individual
is always a group subject (Genosko 2000). For Guattari, “an affective community
requires that it is not only the unified ‘we’ that needs to be fragmented from within”
(Bertelson and Murphie 152). It is also the “I,” which is always already a “multiplicity
within oneself” (Guattari 216). Guattari argues that understanding the individual and the
group as eddies within vital flows of energy and affect should inform our understanding
of the politics of difference: “It is a matter not only of tolerating another group, another
ethnicity, another sex, but also for a desire for dissensus, otherness, difference. Accepting
otherness is a question not so much of right as of desire. This acceptance is possible
precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity within oneself” (216). If we
accept that multiplicities exist within bodies, we may be compelled to refashion our
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critical practices to more fully address not only how subjects should act within society,
but also how subjects might foster better relations among the various constituencies that
make up the self, with an understanding that the introduction of new linguistic frames
might not be sufficient to the task of realigning affective impulses and intellectual
orientations to meet particular ideological goals. It may be insufficient precisely because
the intellect is not the master of the body, and nor is the body the ruler of the mind.
Rather, these loci are points on a vitalistic circuit that is animated by linguistic symbols,
among other things, including neurochemicals, pheromones, hormones, genetic codes,
and many other non-discursive yet influential vital forces.
Among the many subfields operating under the umbrella of contemporary cultural
theory, material or corporeal feminism has most enthusiastically embraced a neovitalism. Material feminists maintain, “nature is more than a passive social construction
but is, rather, an agentic force that interacts with and changes the other elements in the
mix, including the human” (Alaimo 7). Theorists such as Elizabeth Grosz, Elizabeth
Wilson, and Claire Colebrook advocate a “new vitalism” as a response to a sense of “the
exhaustion and limits of the linguistic paradigm” (Colebrook 52). Vitalism, in this
contemporary iteration, is not understood as the spirit that infuses matter, but rather as an
acknowledgment of forces—be they evolutionary or neurological or physical--that
operate in and through corporeal bodies, and joins them with their material, ecological,
and social environments. New Vitalists turn their sights to the somatic responses that
cannot be referred to the agency of the subject, but that nevertheless exert influence on
thought and behavior. These theorists are emboldened by recent developments in brain
science that move away from a reductive search for proof for cultural and behavioral
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phenomena in the inert matter of the brain, and instead understand such phenomena as
“both formed through time and grounded in the body and its processes” (Colebrook 52).
The New Vitalism proposed by some feminist theorists refuses “the idea that
matter needs to be granted meaning by thought” (Colebrook 56). They focus on
dynamism—the potential that inheres in matter, but a potential that may act on its own
accord, and sometimes contrary to the wishes of humans. One of the central topics in this
approach is the question of agency, particularly the agency of bodies and natures (Alaimo
and Hekman 7). According to Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, vitalism prompts us to
consider anew the location and capacities for agency.... Conceiving matter as
possessing its own modes of self-transformation, self-organization, and
directness, and thus no longer as simple, passive, or inert, disturbs the
conventional sense that agents are exclusively humans who possess the cognitive
abilities, intentionality, and freedom to make autonomous decisions and the
corollary presumption that humans have the right or ability to master nature. (100)
Perhaps we cannot master nature, but we can talk to it, and become consubstantial with it,
if we know how to speak its language. Ramachandran’s work provides a vivid example
of the practical advantages to be gained by incorporating material vitalism into rhetorical
theory. It bridges the chasm that separates “the corporeal from the social (usually read as
the discursive or textual)” that has “created an impasse in studies of embodiment”
(Blackman 31). If we understand that forms of symbolic activity animate both the social
sphere and the body’s interior, we may be less inclined to segregate and extoll the
importance of one form over the other.
New vitalist theories “find bodies exhibiting agentic capacities in the way they
structure or stylize their perceptual mileu, where they discover, organize, and respond to
patterns that are corporeally significant”; they describe “how living matter structures
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natural and social worlds before (and while) they are encountered by rational actors”
(Coole and Frost 20). The overriding purpose of this dissertation is to promote the idea
that critical rhetoricians should seek to function as social physicians. This requires us to
attend to, and be fluent in, the language of both the social symbolic, and bio-symbolic
vectors of communication, because one melds inexorably into the other. The new vitalism
investigates the confluence of agencies that collectively comprise the circuit of
communication, and rhetoricians who wish understand how consubstantial bonds are
formed or broken should engage with the work being produced within this emerging field
of research.
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CHAPTER 6
An Uncritical Condition: Rhetorical Violence and “Brain Trauma”
In public discourse, violence is generally characterized as an act of antagonistic
physical force directed from one individual towards another that moves the recipient’s
body through space and time. “Violent rhetoric,” on the other hand, usually refers to
visual signs or spoken words that trigger emotional distress in targeted audiences because
these symbolic expressions indicate a rhetor’s desire, potential, or intention to commit
acts of physical violence against them in the future. If rhetorical violence influences the
actions of those to whom it is directed, it does so by persuasion, albeit a form of
persuasion that is ominously shadowed by the specter of coercion. And if we accept these
criteria, then it follows that rhetoric cannot be literally violent itself, since it does not
directly or immediately move corporeal matter. Violent rhetoric can only inspire violent
action, after it has passed through the mediating screen of the “mind.” The question of
how violent rhetoric compels action in some people and not others remains unanswered.
This question has taken on increased urgency in recent years due to incidents such
as Jared Loughner’s January 2011 massacre of six bystanders at a Tucson, Arizona
political event held by U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords, and the November 2009
Fort Hood shooting, in which U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, reportedly under the
influence of Jihadist rhetoric, was charged with gunning down thirteen people and
wounding thirty others. Commentators in the national press struggled to articulate what,
if any, connection there was between the inflammatory rhetoric that has become the
common vernacular of political discourse, and the physically violent actions committed
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by the gunmen. Journalists and pundits often employed environmental metaphors to
describe the way violent energy unleashed by vitriolic rhetoric seems to hang in the air,
and periodically stirs someone to shed blood. It was observed that “implicit instigations
to violence have become a steady undercurrent” in political speech. They claimed,
“building levels of vitriol in our political discourse... have surely contributed to the
atmosphere in which this event transpired,” and speculated that “political passion” has
“created a climate promoting violence” (Hulse and Zernike). Paul Krugman baldly
asserted that “violent acts are what happen when you create a climate of hate.” There is
clearly something going on, but it’s unclear exactly what it is, or what can be done to
remedy the situation. What have contemporary rhetoricians offered to clarify the
ambiguous relationship between violent rhetoric and physical violence?
The answer is, surprisingly little. Most critical inquiries into rhetoric and violence
focus on the ideological and representational aspects of violent rhetoric.26 Such work
makes arguments about what should or should not be represented in speech or on screens,
and formulates interpretive strategies that may enable subjects to critique what they say
and hear. Ideological criticism is guided by the assumption that changes in the patterns of
representation and reception will counteract the potentially deleterious effects of violent
words and images by equipping subjects with a “critical consciousness” through which to
filter the rhetoric they encounter. This presumes, of course, that the cognitive apparatus
of consciousness is the chief means by which people come to make judgments about what
to believe, and how to act in the world. In previous chapters, I have attempted to call
these presumptions into question by demonstrating that the internal dynamics that lead to
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conscious decisions take place on a pre-linguistic, unconscious plane, in the neural
networks by which the brain and the body communicate with each other and engage with
the external, social world. I explained that rhetoric is a force that physically alters the
body’s interior, and influences perception prior to thought. In this chapter, I will apply
those insights to the problem of violence. Specifically, I want to chip away at the
opposition between symbolic and material violence, for if encounters with rhetoric
physically shape the neural mechanisms that enable or inhibit a range of possible future
actions, than symbols are not merely abstract structures, but also blunt instruments. I will
argue that greater attention must be given to the neurophysiological damage wrought by
rhetorical violence. This is an invisible violence for two reasons. First, it occurs below
and prior to the subject’s intellectual apprehension, and second, rhetorical studies lacks
an adequate theoretical lens with which to examine it, and bring it into the light of critical
inquiry.
From a neurorhetorical perspective, critiques of violent rhetoric that conceive
violence as a problem of representation sometimes arrive too late in the game, because
the event of violence has already occurred; that is, the subject of violence “has already
been affected and effectuated by the affective encounter with the style and content” of the
representation (Abel 144, emphasis in original). That is, subjects may have been
neurologically traumatized by rhetorical encounters in such a way that prevents them
from thinking critically about future encounters. Criticism that focuses only on
representation often overlooks this, and proceeds from the assumption that people can be
immunized against the effects of violent words and images if they are given the right
interpretive framework through which to intellectualize what they see and hear.
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While in rhetorical studies the immediacy of the event is often devalued in favor
of the representation of the event, it is my contention that the potential for trauma that
inheres in the force of the event has neurological effects that may diminish a subject’s
capacity to represent and resignify violent experiences. We need a critical rhetorical
theory that engages with affective registers of experience “below” the intellectual
apprehension and regulation of the self-aware subject, because this is often the level at
which rhetorical violence moves us. If we only address violent representation in terms of
what they mean (linguistically), we miss what they do (affectively), and what things
mean is always correlated to how they make us feel, and not the other way around.
I submit that people’s critical capabilities are their most effective protection
against rhetorical violence. However, one cannot be critical if one lacks the neuronal
functions required to engage in sophisticated cognitive operations of self-reflection,
skepticism, and empathy. As I’ve described elsewhere in this dissertation, contrary to the
humanistic faith in the people’s inherent potential for agential freedom that is maintained
by many rhetorical critics, neuroscientists and affect theorists show us that agency and
critical sophistication are dependent on the cultivation of dense neuronal networks of
communication. If these networks are not given the symbolic and material resources they
require to flourish, they wilt, and as neural networks go, so go the subject’s capacity for
critical agency.
Kenneth Burke tells us that “all living things are critics”: criticism is a definitive
component of the human condition (1984a: 5). It might be more accurate to say that most
of us are born with an innate capacity for criticism, but if we don’t use it, we lose it. We
all have an in-built neural potential for critical thought, but because the brain is not a
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hard-wired machine, it’s not something we naturally or inevitably get to keep. Neural
connections that are not regularly activated fall into disrepair and eventually cease
working altogether. Doidge explains: “Neuroplastic research has shown us that every
sustained activity ever mapped—including physical activities, sensory activities,
learning, thinking, and imagining—changes the brain as well as the mind. Cultural ideas
and activities are no exception” (288). We might add “critical thinking” to that list. But,
because plasticity is “competitive,” each time “the plastic brain acquires culture and uses
it repeatedly, there is an opportunity cost: the brain loses some neural structure in the
process” (Doidge 298). Social experience is always “political,” and “violent,” insofar as
it inaugurates an internal struggle for dominance within neural circuitry. However, this is
not a zero sum game. A astute critical mind requires the establishment of neuronal
democracy, whereby no one structure is permitted to grow unchecked, at the expense of
others contradictory structures.
Non-democratic ideological institutions can ensure their perpetual viability by
defining, via discursive and embodied practices, which synaptic networks are allowed to
grow in subjects, and which are not, and in so doing these institutions enact physical
violence without leaving an external mark. Doidge notes that totalitarian regimes seem to
intuit people’s neuronal vulnerability, and exercise power through rhetorical exercises
that target young, developing brains. He cites a math quiz distributed in North Korea that
asks, “Three soldiers from the Korean People’s Army killed thirty American soldiers.
How many American soldiers were killed by each of them, if they all killed an equal
number of enemy soldiers?” (Doidge 305). By establishing an affective network that
articulates Americans with antagonistic Otherness and violence retribution, this rhetoric
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aims to constitute something deeper than a “difference of opinion” about ideological
perspectives; rather, it creates “plasticity-based anatomical differences, which are much
harder to bridge or overcome with ordinary persuasion” (Doidge 305). Reiterations of a
rhetorical claim reinforce its prominence in thought, and “each thought alters the physical
state of [the] brain’s synapses at a microscopic level” (Doidge 212). If the claim is not
assiduously buttressed by competing claims, eventually it can be fused into a state of near
permanence, while simultaneously dissolving the brain capacity to form a contradictory
idea. Therefore, dogmatism and piety are not only ideological problems; they are also
neurological conditions, wrought through violence that is both rhetorical and physical at
the same time. Michael McGee, in his discussion of Isocrates, has referred to rhetoric as
a kind of “social surgery.”27 The relevance of McGee’s insight deepens if we consider
that rhetoric is in many respects akin to neurosurgery performed without breaking the
skin.
The same might be said of criticism, that which has the potential to be ideological
rigidity’s nemesis. “To be critical” is not only a mental orientation; it is also a material
means of organizing the structures of the brain. If we take seriously the notion that to be
alive is to be a critic, then diverse, challenging discourses and experiences are the
substances—as real and necessary as air or water—which allow us to live.28 But while
the strategic deprivation of life-sustaining physical materials such as air and water
commonly falls under the rubric of violence, the withholding of symbolic materials is not
afforded the same treatment in the vernacular, perhaps because critics theorize rhetorical
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violence as an assertive force, delivered via representations. An alternative could be to
focus on what is withheld, for violent rhetoric is most influential when subject lack the
neurocognitive apparatus to compartmentalize and resituate symbolic inducements.
In the next section, I will review some of the intellectual currents within the
critical rhetorical tradition that frame the debate about violence and rhetoric for many
contemporary scholars. The contributions of Pierre Bourdieu on symbolic violence, and
Judith Butler on hate speech, are important theoretical guides for critical rhetoricians.
Bourdieu and Butler differ on what subjects are capable of doing to resist or subvert
symbolic forms of violence, because they disagree on the role the corporeal body plays in
the formation of subjectivity. While Butler is hesitant to allow for a physiological body
that is wounded by words, there is a gap in her theory of the origins of subjectivity that
presents an opportunity to introduce the communicative networks of the central nervous
system into the discussion. I will propose that Catherine Malabou’s concept of the
“neuronal subject” fits into this gap, helps us to overcome the impasse between linguistic
and materialist theories of subjectivity, and opens up new ways to recognize the violence
of rhetoric.
Symbolicity and Violence
A “cherished topos of the rhetorical tradition” is the notion that persuasion is an
“alternative to violence” (Kennerly 274). This idea dates back to the earliest rhetorical
theory of the ancient Greeks, who personified persuasion in the Goddess Peitho, and
violence in the Goddess Bia. John T. Kirby explains that for ancient rhetoricians, the
juxtaposition of peitho and bia was meant to signify an antithetical collocation of ideas:
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“I will try to persuade you but, failing that, I will force you” (3). This distinction
between persuasion and force retains currency in contemporary rhetorical scholarship.
Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin note that contemporary rhetorical scholars “have prided
themselves on the eschewal of physical force and coercion and the use in their place of
language and metalanguage, with refined functions of the mind, to influence others and
produce change” (3).29 Rhetoricians often proceed from the assumption that “rhetoric
manages violence by substituting contestory...words for violent actions” (Hunter 3).
The traditional opposition between rhetoric and violence is correlated to the
traditional opposition between symbolicity and physical materiality. Carole Blair notes
that in “recent memory, rhetoric has been defined by, and theorized according to, its most
ephemeral quality: its symbolicity”; she observes that there is a “near consensus” among
rhetoricians about its basic symbolic character (18). Celeste Condit describes this
consensus as a reiteration of the “‘common-sense’ dismissal of language by many people
on the grounds that it is immaterial—mere words, nothing but air vibrating, the opposite
of ‘deeds’ or the real” (1999: 327). Rhetoric, then, is commonly understood as a vehicle
for carrying meaning to a receptive mind. The mind is a mediating presence that in turn
orders another vehicle—the body—to act. According to most rhetoricians, if rhetoric is
capable of violence, it is symbolically, or metaphorically violent, insofar as it does the
motivational work of physical coercion without directly moving the flesh. Distinctions
between the symbolic and the material have made it difficult for rhetoricians to
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Foss and Griffin argue, however, that the exercise of influence to change minds is itself a form of
violence. To remedy this, they formulate a theory of “invitational rhetoric”: “an invitation to understanding
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adequately account for how seemingly disembodied discursive practices induce people to
physically act in ways that appear to be unreflective and automatic.
Noting the tendency among rhetoricians to “divorce the mind from the body, with
the latter seen as inferior,” James Aune recommends that critical rhetoricians “reframe
the notion of ‘ideology’ into ‘symbolic violence’” so as to more fully capture the fact that
symbolic structures of power permeate lived experience at every register of being, and
not only the cognitive and linguistic (2011: 430, 432). Aune submits that if “we
complicate the traditional liberal opposition between rhetoric and violence to include
ideology as symbolic violence, we will end up with a richer reflection on the relationship
between rhetoric and social change” (2011: 430).
Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence” a “gentle violence, imperceptible and
invisible even to its victims” (2001: 1). Symbolic violence “operates in the realm of doxa,
the typical condition of correspondence between a social order and agents' internalized
dispositions of perception, appreciation, and action structured by and thus adapted to that
very social order. The correspondence makes the social world appear natural, even to
those who fare badly in it” (Jung108). It is the means by which the oppressed come to
tacitly accept the terms of their oppression, at “the level of the most profound corporeal
dispositions” (Bourdieu 1993: 55). Ideology, for Bourdieu, is a fully embodied practice, a
way of being. It determines not only how we think, but also how we perceive and move
through the world. Symbolic violence is manifested in an unconscious relationship
between external economic and social structures, and internal structures of thought and
perception, or “socially inculcated beliefs” (Bourdieu 1998: 103). Our desires, emotional
reactions, and opinions are all produced by our immersion in an ideological system that
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we cannot recognize because it permeates even the sensory and cognitive structures we
use to bear witness to, and reflect upon, our environment. Ideology might be considered
violent because it forcefully delimits that which is perceivable and thinkable, no less than
blinders and chains ascribed a particular conception of reality to the captive audience in
Plato’s cave.
As Moon-Kie Jung notes, the term symbolic violence “derives its rhetorical force,
in part, from its jarringly oxymoronic pairing of ‘symbolic’ and ‘violence,’ disturbing
commonsensical boundaries of what violence is and bridging the often, if falsely,
counterposed spheres...of meaning and materiality” (110). Bourdieu positions physical
violence as something that only becomes necessary when powerful institutions fail to
exercise sufficient or effective symbolic violence. Physical coercion is unnecessary in a
fully-functioning state of hegemony because for subjects, consenting to the will of power
is a force of habit, which takes root in the body prior to or simultaneous with the
development of a subject’s sense of self-identity. Subjectivity and subjugation are
rendered synonymous. Symbolic violence induces people to “build up nonconscious,
unwilled strategies for avoiding the perception of other possibilities” (Hoy 15).
According to Bourdieu, symbolic violence is more insidious and efficient than physical
coercion because it forestalls acts of critical contrarianism and subversion by making
those acts seem unnatural and undesirable. The subject of symbolic violence doesn’t
behave in ways that accord with the dominant ideology because he fears torture or
imprisonment; he does so because he genuinely believes, in his mind, brain, and body,
that that is the “normal” or “correct” way to behave.
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Bourdieu is a social scientist, not a critical rhetorician, and as such he is more
invested in developing comprehensive explanatory theories than emancipatory rhetorical
practices. His theory of symbolic violence is useful for ideological criticism because it
fleshes out our understanding of how ideology is manifested in physiology, and offers an
analytical framework with which to interpret social embodiment. However, some critics
invested in social change find Bourdieu’s ideas restrictive, because in his view, ideology
almost wholly determines social existence, and offers little space for subjects to conceive
of or perform alternative ways of being. As Romand Coles observes, “there is precious
little in [Bourdieu’s] writing to suggest that body practices themselves can be structured
in ways that tend to generate imaginative critical interrogations, flexibilities, push-back
against the limits of the self-evident and radical transformation” (289). Bourdieu
maintains that cultural habits, embodied through practice and strengthened through
repetition, precede and frame consciousness such that
the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture . . . are placed
beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary,
deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more
ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious,
than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the
hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole
cosmology, an ethic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as
‘stand up straight’ . . .(1977: 94).
If ideology penetrates to such a deep register of corporeal life as to take on the qualities
of ontology, where are we to find the critical foothold from which we can begin the
process of transformation? Judith Butler is critical of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic
violence because it tends towards an “overdetermined” view of subjectivity in which
“subjective dispositions are too tightly tied to the social practices in which they were
forged” (Lovell 11). With Bourdieu, we have no grounds on which to justify our hope
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that the subject of symbolic violence will have the cognitive wherewithal to recognize,
and refute, the ideological structures which imprison him or her, because cognitive and
emotional habits compel the subject to cling, obstinately, to the forms of life that make up
his or her social reality. Butler, on the other hand, insists on a certain agential freedom to
introduce variations into social practices that break up totalizing structures of belief.
Butler claims that Bourdieu makes social institutions “static,” and thus “fails to grasp the
logic of iterability that governs the possibility of social transformation” (1997: 147).
Resistance, according to Butler, occurs in individual psychology, through the
performance of personal narratives that subvert hegemonic norms. Hegemonic
normativity is a discursive narrative into which most subjects script themselves through
their unconscious adherence to rules of social expectation. These expectations severely
limit—but do not foreclose altogether—the range of what is thinkable and doable for a
subject within the dominant ideology; therefore, they may be considered a form of
symbolic violence. However, for Butler, ideology does not insinuate into the organs and
sinews, as Bourdieu would have us believe.
According to Butler, there is neither a “natural” physical body, nor a psychic
interiority that pre-exists cultural inscription. She maintains that social reality is not
grounded in physical or material conditions, but is continually created as an illusion
"through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social sign"(1990b: 270). The
body, too, is a symbolic construction, insofar as we only understand bodies through the
discursive frames available to us in our culture. Butler explains: "One is not simply a
body, but, in some very key sense, one does one's body and, indeed, one does one's body
differently from one's contemporaries and from one's embodied predecessors and
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successors as well...The act that one does, the act that one performs, is, in a sense, an act
that has been going on before one arrived on the scene" (1990b: 272). Her sense that the
body is always symbolic, constituted by ideas rather than neurons, underpins her
arguments about the nature of the link between rhetoric and violence.30
According to Butler, the “I” which recognizes its self is an illusory product of
discursive structures, always already divided from itself by the non-presence of language.
Therefore, when rhetorical violence is committed against a subject, it must occur on a
representational plane; it impacts the discursive structures are the building blocks of
identity. For instance, if a subject is assigned an injurious name, such as “queer,” that
assignation will be “violent” to the subject to the extent to which it invites physical
violence from others, or limits the freedom the subject enjoys to take his or her place in
the social order. On the other hand, the subject still has the capacity to choose to
recontextualize the injurious label and treat it as an affirmation instead of denigration.
Being called a “queer” may hurt my feelings, but my feelings aren’t composed of
neurochemicals, they are symbolic and linguistic scripts that write me into the story of
my life. So, if I experience emotional pain, it is because I don’t like how the other has
authored my self-image. My recourse is to borrow language from other, more favorable
narratives in order rewrite my queerness as a mark of positive distinction, and embody it
as such in my public performance of self.
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It should be noted that in her most recent work, Butler has moved closer to acknowledging the
intersection of the symbolic and the affective registers, and her forthcoming collaboration with Malabou
may provide us with clarification concerning her understanding of the significance of the pre-linguistic
proto-self. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am focusing primarily on Gender Trouble and Excitable
Speech, because the ideas expressed in those works continue to exert massive influence on cultural and
rhetorical theorists interested in the problem of rhetorical violence.
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Butler insists on the symbolic character of the violence engendered by rhetoric
because she wants to oppose the theory of the performative employed by legal
theoreticians such as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine McKinnon, who claim,
“representations have the power to enact what they depict, and should therefore be
censored” (Salih 108). Butler maintains a temporal and categorical distinction between
the expression of violent rhetoric, such as hate speech, and the potentially deleterious
effects it has on the audience, because the absence of such a gap would eliminate the
potential for resistance: if subjects are immediately constituted by language, there is no
space in which they can refuse to accept or subvert the terms implied in that language.
If powerful individuals and institutions engage in symbolic violence when they
impose restrictive labels on people, nevertheless, we cannot assume that the intended
audiences of that hate speech necessarily interpret the violent rhetoric in the manner that
was intended by the speaker. Butler’s theory of critical agency rests on the possibility that
people to whom hate speech is directed may repurpose, rather than recoil from, violent
rhetoric, and thereby turn the tables on their would-be oppressors. Butler writes:
The gap that separates the speech act from its future effects...begins a theory of
linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the restless search for legal
remedy. The interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition
and resignification of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through
time, become disjointed by their power to injure and recontextualized in more
affirmative modes” (1997: 15).
The corollary of this optimistic stance is that producers of hate speech cannot be held
fully accountable for their rhetorical violence. Because subjects retain a degree of agency
in their ability to resignify hate speech, the wounding that hate speakers intend to enact is
never assured, and never predictable; therefore, the speaker cannot be identified as guilty
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of violence because the effects of rhetorical violence, unlike those of physical violence,
can never be located in an observable material form.
Butler breaks with the moral causality between subject and act that is taken for
granted by the law and argues that both the originators and recipients of speech are not
pre-constituted biological agents, but rather, they are constructions of rhetoric—Butler
calls these subjects a “belated metalepsis,” or subject-effect (1997: 50). Hate speakers are
no more to blame for their speech than victims are to blame for the speech directed
against them because social linguistic practices produce both parties—they are links on a
citational chain that precedes them. Put very simply, according to Butler, the “word of the
law requires someone or something to blame in cases of hate speech or obscenity, so it
points the finger at something it creates in order to prosecute” (Salih 105). Butler renders
it impossible to identify who or what is culpable for, or wounded by, hate speech, and
encourages us to turn our attention away from individuals and their bodies and towards
the linguistic system that constructs the ideas of individualism and corporeality. Rather
than censor texts or punish purveyors of violent rhetoric, Butler claims, “it is more
effective to engage in the difficult effort of reading those texts against themselves” (Salih
109).
But for subject to read a text against itself, and resignify its meaning, that subject
must make a conscious decision to do so. This requires a great deal of emotional fortitude
of the sort that is only available to those who are gifted with the symbolic resources
necessary to resignify violent rhetoric. To speak of critical agency as a process of
willfully (mis)reading injurious language is to presume access to both alternative
narrative structures from which the subject may draw to resignify meaning, and,
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inseparably, the agential capacity to intentionally override and redirect the affects of hurt
and rage into linguistic channels. At the core of this presumption is confidence that
symbolic thought produces affect, rather than the other way around: I am hurt when I am
called “faggot” because I know that word is meant to wound me, but by the same token, I
can alleviate that hurt by consciously holding that designation as a point of pride and
solidarity. What if, however, I do not live in a culture in which there are other “faggots”
with which I can imaginatively or physically commune? What if my identity is
constructed by the affective component of injurious language, so that I cannot conceive
of reconceiving of myself as something other than degraded?
Here we come to the question of who, or what, we address when we attempt to
instruct subjects on the techniques of critical reading and reflexive self-consciousness
that would allow them to read injurious texts against themselves. If there is no
subjectivity or identity before interpellation into the social field, than there is no entity
that can experience symbolic violence until that entity is constituted by symbolicity.
Nevertheless, the subject must come into existence through some originary impetus that
precedes entry into the symbolic—otherwise, who or what would heed the initial call
from the symbolic order? The possibility of the subject’s eventual experience of selfhood
must be initiated by some pre-linguistic animating presence that intrinsically desires selfpreservation and individuation. Butler allows “that although agents are socially
constructed through the cultural ascription of multiple subject-positions, nonetheless, the
intentionality behind these...performances is driven by a desire for self-identity”
(Boucher 120-121). What feels this desire? Butler suggests that the root of the
intentionality by which subjects engage in first, the original move towards the symbolic
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order, and later, counterhegemonic performances and readings, is located in the primary
narcissism of auto-affection: she claims that the “I” comes “into social being … because I
have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism takes
hold of any term that confers existence” (1997: 104). Diane Davis explains that Butler is
referring to a “preoriginary rhetoricity” that is based in the “very first ‘emotional tie’”
that is “formative of the ego—so we’re really talking about the ‘passionate attachment,’...
something or someone who doesn’t yet exist, a relation (without relation) to the other that
is older than and productive of the relation to the self” (2010: 26). Once this autoaffective impulse enters into the symbolic order, Butler maintains that it becomes capable
of resignifying wounding words within the temporal gap between utterance and act.
Geoff Boucher astutely points out that there is a contradiction between Butler’s
postulate that the speaking and thinking “I” is a linguistic construct, and her claim that
there is an agential animating impulse that precedes discursivity (122). Butler claims that
identity is always a doing-with-symbols, yet it seems that the body is doing something
prior to its apprehension of the symbolic tools of language: it is evincing an affective
attachment to life. Boucher writes, “in developing her apparently social constructivist
theory of subjectless agency, Butler has not, in actuality, dispensed with the assumption
of a pre-discursive individuality. She has only translated the register of its existence, from
self-knowledge, to auto-affection” (121). Yet as soon as she raises the specter of a prediscursive, affective body, she flushes it from the scene, and channels it into the trap of
the symbolic order. At the same time, she strategically revivifies the auto-affective entity
when she is called upon to answer why a subject would want to subvert hegemony
through performance: it is because the subject is still driven by an affective desire for
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self-preservation and recognition, and this desire can break through socio-linguistic
restraints and compel the subject to act. For Boucher, Butler’s insistence on autoaffection is problematic because it leads her to “neglect the material aspects of the social
formation” (133). Echoing Bourdieu’s criticism of Butler, Boucher believes that her faith
in the “pre-social kernel” of the auto-affective impulse allows her to circumnavigate the
ways in which power and ideology can trample a subject’s will for transformation.31 I
agree, but would add that Boucher’s critique is weakened by his unwillingness to address
the neurological aspects of the social formation. The pre-social kernel may be
synonymous with the pre-linguistic brain, which is vulnerable to symbolic violence.
We might ask: if the body is “affectable,” and imbued with a will-to-identity
before it can recognize or use language, why should we assume that this pre-linguistic,
affectable, agential pre-subject disappears once the being enters into the realm of
symbolicity? Moreover, why should we assume the agential body is not capable of being
wounded by socio-linguistic experience in ways that impede the subject’s ability to
engage in the resignification of wounding words? In the next section, I will explore the
possibility that the pre-subject of which Butler speaks may be productively read through
Malabou’s concept of the proto-self, what Damasio calls “the ensemble of brain devices
which continuously and nonconsciously maintain the body within the narrow range and
relative stability required for survival. These devices continually represent,
nonconsciously, the state of the living body, within its many dimensions”; they are “the
nonconscious forerunner for the levels of self which appear in our minds as the conscious
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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With specific reference to Butler, Bourdieu writes of those characteristics “which, deeply rooted in things
(structures) and in bodies, are not negated by a simple act of verbal naming and are not to be abolished by
an act of performative magic” (1998: 110).
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protagonists of consciousness: core self and autobiographical self” (2000: 22, emphasis in
original)
While the register of being that experiences auto-affection may lack the symbolic
tools to engage in self-reflective thought, it is nevertheless apparently capable of
signifying things to itself, even before it has access to language. We might then surmise
that language is neither the only coding system by which we render experience
communicable to the self and others—affect also informs us about ourselves—nor is it
the exclusive currency of rhetorical violence.
The challenge for critical rhetoricians is to heed Butler’s warning about the
political danger that inheres in a theory of rhetorical violence that too tightly ties
representation with action, for this opens the door for censorship; at the same time, we
must be attentive to the vulnerabilities of the human body that Butler perhaps too easily
glosses over in a dogged attempt to preserve the possibility for agential resignification
and resistance. Bourdieu begins to draw our attention to these vulnerabilities, but he does
so in a way that closes down critical efforts to intervene in symbolic violence before
they’ve been inaugurated. For Bourdieu, the problem of critics such as Butler is that they
disembody subjectivity, suspend it airily in the flows and redirections of language. What
Bourdieu does not account for, however, is the plasticity of the brain, its capacity to
reconfigure its circuitry in response to changed circumstances, and the corresponding
alterations these plastic changes bring to consciousness and affective disposition. If we
are to formulate a theory that brings together Butler’s optimism for social change and
Bourdieu’s cautious view of the body and it’s hidden vulnerabilities, we might begin by
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reconsidering the theory of the social construction of subjectivity that undergirds both of
their theories of symbolic violence.
Butler’s understanding of the subject as something constituted in language leads
her to underestimate the degree to which bodies are vulnerable to wounds that strike
below the register of linguistic signification, and therefore potentially impact the capacity
of afflicted subjects to engage in subversive acts of resistance. To explore these
vulnerabilities, I’ll argue, we need to locate the “scene of the crime” of violence in the
auto-affective proto-self that exists prior to signification. Butler believes the proto-self is
“insignificant” because it does not respond to, or use, language; therefore, it cannot be
wounded by social experience. For Butler, the proto-self is a means to an end; it serves as
a launching pad from which the nascent being achieves subjectivity. However, if the
proto-self could be shown to perform agential operations, then it would follow that social
forces could also curtail its agency, which is to say, it would be vulnerable to violence.
Neuroscientific evidence suggests that the proto-self doesn’t transform into a linguistic
self upon entry into the social order, as a pupa blossoms into a butterfly. Rather, the
proto-self coexists with the linguistic self, throughout life, and changes in one register of
being effect changes in the other.
The Neuronal Subject
Catherine Malabou claims we can locate a proto-self that exists prior to signification in
the brain. She writes that the proto-self is a “pre-conscious biological precedent out of
which alone can be developed the sense of self…and the temporal and historical
permanence of the subject” (Malabou 2008: 59). The proto-self emerges as the neural
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cells multiply and enable the nascent being to receive and produce symbolic thought and
expression. The result is neither a biologically pre-determined being, nor one that is
wholly constructed by socio-linguistic practices. Rather, “the transition from a purely
biological entity to a mental entity takes place in the struggle of the one against the other,
producing the truth of their relation (Malabou 2008: 81). According to Malabou,
contemporary neuroscience allows us to rethink the dynamics of subjectivity so that the
singular individual isn’t always already under erasure, but is produced and affirmed
instead. However, to suggest that subjectivity is a neural phenomenon does not mean it is
ever stable or permanent condition, because the brain is constantly being reconfigured by
social experience. Indeed, as Malabou notes, “neuronal functioning and social
functioning interdetermine each other and mutually give each other form…to the point
where it is no longer possible to distinguish them” (2008: 8). In other words, social
experience, including rhetorical activity, shapes thought and perception by constituting
and reconstituting the neural circuitry that produces consciousness and affect.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, within the body, prior to entry into the
social symbolic order, representational activity takes place via the feedback loop by
which the proto-self monitors the state of the total organism. Damasio explains:
The proto-self is a coherent collection of neuronal patterns which map, moment
by moment, the state of the physical structure of the organism in its many
dimensions. This ceaselessly maintained first-order collection of neuronal occurs
not in one brain place but in many, at a multiplicity of levels, from the brain stem
to the cerebral cortex, in structures interconnected by neuronal pathways. These
structures are intimately involved in the process of regulating the state of the
organism. The operations of acting on the organism and of sensing the state of the
organism are closely tied. (2000: 154)
To review: the proto-self, while not linguistic, nevertheless communicates with itself. It
represents itself to itself with a virtual body image that it constantly compares to the
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information relayed by the material body. Changes in the material body brought about by
events in the external world compel the proto-self to make corresponding alterations in
the body map, and to initiate affective states. Affect is the way the brain modifies itself.
Affects allow the proto-self to prepare the body to assume a somatic state appropriate for
the exigencies of social experience. For example, in threatening situations, the proto-self
induces anger or fear. These feelings then impact the cognitive stance a subject assumes,
narrowing or expanding the subject’s capacity for reflective thought based on the
demands of the situation. We cannot consciously apprehend these internal processes, but
nevertheless they occur, and influence our perception of, and behavior in response to,
external events.
Malabou argues that “to speak of cerebral auto-affection...is to admit that the
brain is capable of looking at itself, touching itself as it constitutes its own image...it
operates as a kind of mirror within which the brain sees itself live” (2012: 42). The image
of the mirror here has twofold significance; in fact, we might think of it as a two-way
mirror that cleaves and connects biological and social experience. On one side of the
mirror, the brain looks at its physical self, and compares that to the internal representation
of itself that it holds in the body image. On the other side the mirror, the brain looks at
other people, or representations of other people, and mimics what it sees. The cells in the
brain that engage in this mimesis are called “mirror neurons.” Davis explains that
what is so interesting about [mirror neurons] is that they act as both sensory and
motor neurons, firing in association not only with the execution but also with the
observation of an action. This means that the same mirror neurons fire in my brain
whether I actually grab a pencil myself or I see you grab one, indicating no
capacity to distinguish between my grasping hand and what is typically (and
hastily) described as a visual representation of it: your grasping hand. (2008: 131)
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Davis uses mirror neurons to deconstruct the Burkean notion that rhetorical identification
occurs purely in the psychic/symbolic realm. Mirror neurons shatter “the presumption of
an originary biological disconnect between self and other,” because they indicate that
“identification surely does not depend on shared meaning: a mimetic rapport precedes
understanding, affection precedes projection” (Davis 2008: 131). If this is the case, then
subjectivity cannot be understood as something that only comes about after entry into the
symbolic, at the moment when the nascent being recognizes itself in opposition to the
Other of its representation. Instead, there is a neuronal subjectivity, or proto-self, that is
capable of being affected by external events at level prior to signification. This suggests a
human capacity to be “‘directly and immediately’ induced to action or attitude by
another, sans all logical foundation and cognitive discretion; it involves a nonrepresentable and each time originary identification that takes place behind the back and
beyond the reach of critical faculties” (Davis 2008: 140).
Just as the Butlerian subject is always in the process of being rewritten by flows
of language emerging from multiple sites of power, the proto-self “emerges dynamically
and continuously out of multifarious interacting signals that span varied orders of the
nervous system” (Damasio 2000: 154). This dispels the Cartesian myth of the “ghost in
the machine,” because there is no central authorial presence in the brain; the proto-self is
a product of communication between various agencies dispersed throughout the
organism, and between these agencies and the external world. While the proto-self is
embodied in neural circuitry, it is not static or settled, for neural circuitry is plastic and
open to reconfiguration, through rhetorical activity that connects inner and outer worlds.
Damasio writes, “The story contained in the images [of the proto-self] is not told by some
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clever homunculus. Nor is the story told by you as a self because the core of you is born
as the story is told, within the story itself” (2000: 191). This observation should prompt
us to rethink the narrative processes upon which critical rhetoricians focus critical efforts,
as the proto-self is as vulnerable to suggestion, and violence, as is our linguistic self—
indeed, there is a dialogue between these two intertwined modes of subjectivity that often
passes under the radar of critics.
One implication of the imbrication of the linguistic and proto selves is that we
must pay close attention to how effects in one produce corresponding effects in the other.
This runs contrary to the tendency in the humanities to employ a top-down approach to
cultural phenomena, whereby changes in mentality are assumed to produce changes in
affect and behavior, and to the tendency in the sciences to start from the “bottom” of
evolutionary biological imperatives and work “up” to thought and attitude. Rather, we
might consider affect as a force or language that mediates between the top and bottom.
Malabou argues that our emotions constitute “the most sensitive point of our fragility”;
they are an “absolutely vulnerable zone” that “can be wounded at any moment” (Malabou
2012: 48). Malabou is not here weightlessly reiterating commonsensical idea that we all
“sensitive,” that our feelings are “easily hurt.” Rather, she is pushing criticism into the
folds of the brain, to the cerebral sites associated with emotion, for the purpose of
illuminating the ways in which social events that excite or inhibit affect physically wound
the plastic brain. These wounds, in turn, influence our capacity to emotionally withstand
or appropriately respond to other social events.
Malabou explains, “[H]igh-level cognitive processes—such as language, memory,
reason, or attention—are not necessary for the constitution of the ‘proto-self.’ These
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functions are, however, structurally linked to emotional processes, and the selective
reduction of emotion is just as damaging to rationality as excessive emotion” (2012: 47).
The structures that link them are synaptic connections that facilitate communication
between neural circuits. When internal communication breaks down, there is a
corresponding change in subjectivity—“the self is likely to begin to disintegrate”
(LeDoux 2002: 323). What might cause such a communication breakdown? Any
traumatic event that induces disconnection between brain regions, leading to a shift in the
balance of power by which excessive reason or emotion assume a role of dominance in
the cerebral domain.
The neuronal subject can be damaged both by physical and symbolic injury—both
may be considered forms of violence, as both are materially manifested in neural matter.
As Malabou explains, neuroscience shows us that “the difference between ‘material’ and
‘psychic’ is very thin, perhaps even non-existing”; accordingly, the border between
physical and mental injury cannot hold, because both forms of trauma cause “material
destruction” in the brain, which “obviously and undeniably implies psychic alteration and
modifications” (Malabou qtd. in Vahanian 8). Taken further, we are almost constantly
confronted with traumas of greater or lesser degrees of intensity, so we face the risk of
the loss of our sense of self at every moment. Malabou call this “the great metaphysical
lesson of neurobiology today: not to consider brain damage as an isolated possibility, rare
things that happen in hospitals, but to consider them as a constant possibility” (qtd. in
Vahanian 9).
The concept of trauma that Malabou introduces is different from the one
developed in the psychoanalytic tradition. According to Freud, trauma “is traumatic only
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to the extent that it triggers an internal conflict that exists before it” (Malabou 2012: 79).
From a Freudian perspective, a soldier who returns from combat and exhibits the
disaffection that characterizes what we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
was not traumatized by the gruesome scenes she witnessed on the battlefield; rather, the
emotion aroused by these scenes overwhelmed the soldier’s mind and broke down the
defense mechanisms by which she repressed painful sexual memories from his past. The
shattered psyche permits buried suffering to seep into consciousness. Freud explains,
“We describe as ‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside that are powerful enough to
break through the protective shield” (18: 29). As I detailed in the last chapter, Freud did
not believe emotionally traumatic experiences caused a physical disturbance in circuitry
of the brain because he maintained that the brain lacks the physical equipment to
represent itself to itself; therefore, it displaces excessively stimulating impulses into the
representations that constitute the psyche. Therefore, emotional trauma is played out on
the psychic/symbolic stage, and the physical brain is merely the material foundation on
which that stage is built. “The psychical regime of events, for Freud, is autonomous; it
does not depend upon any organic causes—especially not upon cerebral causes. This
autonomy manifests itself precisely through the independence of fantasmic work whose
only creative resources come from the psyche and not the brain” (Malabou 2012: 98).
Developments in what we know about the brain and its relation to cognitive
psychology lead contemporary scientists to insist that traumatic events create lesions in
material structure of the brain, and thus create a new identity for the subject. If traumatic
events do awaken buried memories, the act of recalling the past will necessarily alter the
content and vision of that which is being recalled. Because neuronal subjectivity is
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always in the process of being reconstituted by social experience, the identity a subject
contingently assumes in the present will influence how the subject interprets his or her
past. A traumatized individual will not bear the same relation to his former self as he did
before the experience of trauma. Malabou writes, “The traumatic event, in a certain
sense, invents its subject. The past of the traumatized individual changes, becomes
another past...Accordingly, a new subject enters the scene in order to assume this past
that never took place” (2012: 152). This insight has had profound effects for how
therapists understand and treat post-traumatic stress disorder, which is now understood
not as a psychic disorder rooted in sexual etiology, but a neurological one, brought about
by changes in the neural circuitry that governs affect. In traumatic disorders, the neuronal
structures that fit affect into a regulatory framework based on social norms are fractured
by events that reveal the arbitrary nature, and inadequacy, of those frameworks.
Few of us have the misfortune of being subjected to the horrors of war. Of what
relevance are the neurocognitive problems of soldiers to everyday citizens? Malabou
makes the provocative claim that post-traumatic stress is now a general social condition,
“a universal state of stress,” occasioned by a contemporary sociopolitical scene that
relentlessly presents subjects with “the absence of sense” (2012: 155). Noting that
terrorist attacks and unprovoked wars share a characteristic dearth of clearly defined
goals, motives, lessons, or responsible parties, she declares that we have “entered a new
age of political violence in which politics is defined by the renunciation of endowing
violence with a political sense” (Malabou 2012: 155). We might say that violence is
rendered traumatic when it exceeds the interpretive frames through which we understand
it. If I am unfaithful to my partner and she hits me, I understand why she acted violently.
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If, however, I am in a loving relationship and my partner hits me and leaves without
explanation, I may be traumatized, because my affect cannot be mapped with an
explanatory schema. This is based on the same neurological principles at work in
phantom limb syndrome: a communication breakdown between cognitive and affective
elements of the brain and body engendered by external events bring about a radical
disruption of a subject’s (illusory) sense of a stable identity. Furthermore, what is true of
a severed relationship or a severed limb also applies to the severance between
expectations and events in the political domain. When a terrorist attack opens up a
disjuncture between Americans’ collective positive self-image, and the negative image
held of America by a significant portion of the world’s inhabitants, American brains
could be said to be traumatized, even if they were not directly touched by burning debris.
Given the ubiquity of violent political events, and the constancy of our exposure
to their images, we cannot pinpoint exactly which one of them represents the traumatic
event; “the multiform presence of the absence of any responsible instance or author
makes the natural catastrophe of contemporary politics into a daily occurrence”
(Malabou 2012: 155, emphasis in original). Analyses of political violence need to
consider events as serial occurrences that traumatize because they continually prevent
violence from ever being fully captured in a secure interpretive schema.
We are not neurologically equipped to respond with what we might consider an
appropriate sense of shame and outrage to the violent mages and words that confront us
every day on the screens with which we are surrounded. The human brain is designed to
produce bursts of strong feeling in the face of occasional encounters with stressful
circumstances. When threat and fear become the norm rather than an anomaly, the plastic
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brain organizes itself to accommodate the excess of affect that threat and fear evoke,
minimizing affective output so as to maintain a state of homeostatic equilibrium. As a
result, we assume the attitudinal symptoms that were once attributed to the “shell shock”
exhibited by traumatized warriors: disaffectedness, passivity, and a general lack of
empathic identification with other beings.
Violence, in the broadest sense, occurs when social conditions forcefully disrupt
the in-built human neurological disposition to unconsciously identify with the suffering
of others. Malabou claims this condition is a product of “the heterogeneous mixture of
nature and politics at work in all types of violence, this mixture where politics is annulled
as such so that it assumes the face of nature and where nature disappears beneath the
mask of politics. This globalized heterogeneous mixture of nature and politics is brought
to light by the worldwide uniformity of neuropsychological reactions” (2012: 156,
emphasis in original). Rhetoricians tend to be constitutionally adverse to such
universalizing claims. However, the basic neurological principles that make people
vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder operate in all neurologically intact subjects—
we are all vulnerable to the brain damage wrought by exposure to affectively charged
words and images. The performative styles with which subjects express political
disaffection may vary according to socially constructed, culturally specific norms, but the
underlying neurophysiological operations that cause trauma can be said to be consistent
across cultures, because they occur at a register of experience that precedes language and
cognition.
Of course, there are many varieties of traumatic events available to subjects.
Some we eagerly seek out, such as excitingly violent films, television shows, music, and
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games, and some are foisted upon us, such as bullying, hate speech, prejudicial treatment,
and physical assault. It is worth noting, however, that the attitudinal and behavioral
outcomes of exposure to various modes of trauma tend to be strikingly consistent.32 As
Malabou asks, “how could we not be struck by the obvious similarity between the general
comportment and behavior of a social outcast and a person with a brain lesion? How
could we avoid drawing a connection between neuropathological disaffection and
‘disaffiliation’?” (2012: 159). The congruencies between people who have suffered brain
injuries, and those who have suffered social marginalization, could be attributable to the
fact that, at the microscopic level, emotional distress caused by rhetorical or symbolic
affronts to one’s social standing is manifested in neurological injuries—a deformation of
the neural circuitry with which the brain represents itself to itself that effects what
amounts to an ontological change in the subject’s conscious thought. This could shed new
light on the reasons some individuals commit acts of physical violence by helping us to
overcome the reductive dichotomies of rhetorical and physical violence. It may be that
rhetorical violence is not an incitement to physical violence: rhetorical violence is
physical violence.
The Politics of Rhetorical Violence
The political implications of rhetorical theories of violence that segregate the
physical from the symbolic become apparent when we examine the public debates that
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I do not mean to imply that playing a violent video game and being the target of hate speech are
equivalent in terms of violent impact. My point is that both of these events are “violent” insofar as they
alter neural circuitry, and that one’s vulnerability to such violence is increased if one lacks the neural makeup required to buffer these experiences with countervailing thoughts and emotions. What is often
colloquially called “moral fiber” is correlated to nerve fibers in the brain. When we speak of moral fiber,
we often think of this as a self-cultivated or self-abandoned quality, and reduce it to decisions a subject
chooses to make. If we articulate moral decision-making to neuroplastic brain development, we see that a
subject’s capacity to make complicated judgments is dependent on choices others have made concerning
what areas of the brain the subject is allowed to develop.
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inevitably follow after shocking instances of public violence, such as Loughner’s killing
spree in Arizona. Participants in these debates tend to formulate explanatory theories that
gravitate towards opposing poles of a dyad that pits rhetorical inducement versus
neuropathology, which is in essence a restaging of the nurture verses nature dichotomy
that still has tremendous currency as a terministic screen through which all questions
concerning violent behavior tend to be filtered in the public arena.
Those who adhere to an ideology of rugged individualism tend to dismiss the
notion that social forces, including rhetoric, impact acts of judgment. We can witness this
attitude played out in the responses right-wing political pundits offered to the charge that
their violent rhetoric somehow influenced Jared Loughner to massacre people gathered at
Gifford’s rally. Tucson conservative radio host Jon Justice said, “There isn’t any
correlation...This is a crazy person! Politics is out the window — [Loughner is] a nutbag!
No amount of controlling talk radio is going to change that!” Another conservative
Arizona radio personality, Barry Young, said: “[Progressives critics] are telling us that
we have to make sure our words and phrases don’t incite crazy people. I have one
problem with that: They’re crazy” (qtd. in Dolnick and Williams). Katie Pavlich, editor
of the popular conservative website Townhall.com, answers “[H]ysterical liberal
arguments that Loughner was somehow influenced by right-wing hateful rhetoric,’” with
a very succinct retort: “Loughner is crazy. End of story.” This is a sentiment shared by
right-wing media pundit Bill O’Reilly, who wrote: “The killer, Jared Loughner, is a
psychopath. Civilization has always had them and always will. There is no solution to the
likes of Loughner.” O’Reilly goes on to say that “equating mass murder with rhetoric” is
“Unbelievable.” Likewise, former Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin
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blithely dismissed “those who claim political rhetoric is to blame for the despicable act of
this deranged, apparently apolitical criminal.”33 As support for her stance, Palin cited
President Ronald Reagan’s pronouncement, “We must reject the idea that every time a
law’s broken, society is guilty rather than the lawbreaker.” The public, it seems, found
the right wing explanation convincing: a CBS News poll found that only 32% of
Americans believed that there was a link between violent political rhetoric and the
Loughner’s actions. Sixty-nine percent of Republicans said there was no connection,
while 19% said it was in some way related. Among Democrats, 42% saw a connection
between violent rhetoric and the events Tucson, compared to 49% who said the two were
unrelated (Carty).
The American public, it seems, generally adheres to a materialist epistemology
pithily encapsulated in the nursery rhyme that encourages children to believe that sticks
and stones may break their bones, but words can never hurt them. Rhetoricians flip this
folk wisdom on its head, and maintain that words can indeed hurt people, by virtue of
their representational qualities, directing people’s attention to certain aspects of reality
while deflecting others. From this perspective, language does not damage people
physically; rather, it constitutes the social and psychological conditions by which people
may get the idea that it is ethically or morally justifiable to enact physical violence
against other people. This view overlooks the possibility that symbols can themselves act
violently, by physically altering the communication networks that link the brain and the
body, and connect brain-bodies with the external world.
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It must be noted that in the same essay in which Palin dismisses rhetoric’s power to incite violence, she
also argues that “journalists and pundits should not manufacture a blood libel that serves only to incite the
very hatred and violence they purport to condemn. That is reprehensible.” The irony, presumably, was lost
on Palin.
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It is superficially satisfying to posit rhetoric as an alternative to physical violence.
Doing so implicitly frames rhetorical critics as potential peacemakers, and thus makes a
case for our continued relevance in public affairs. However, there are significant
drawbacks to advocating a purely symbolic theory of rhetorical violence. If we lose sight
of the body’s organic vulnerability, and position language as a force that is influential but
immaterial, then when it comes to addressing the relationship between rhetorical violence
and physical violence, we can only speculate about what words or tropes seem to have
inspired aggressive behavior. The issue has most commonly been approached from a
preventive point of view–namely, by calling for censorship of the “words that wound.”
But as Butler has argued, censorship by the state is hardly a productive answer, because
to trust state institutions such as the law with the role of a sole arbiter who decides what
utterances are to be legitimately considered harmful, is to deny an individual an
experience of critical agency with which to assess things by him or herself.
One manifestation of the censorial impulse is the call for greater “civility” in
public discourse, a particularly popular gesture among rhetoricians, especially in the
wake of political violence that is linked to rhetoric (Aune 2011: 432). The problem with
this, as Joshua Gunn points out, is that “the repeated and often passionate calls for more
‘civil’ public discourse is often just an appeal for the appearance of procedural civility in
a manifestly uncivil, disrespectful, or otherwise oppressive state of affairs.”34 Civility can
operate as a mode of self-censorship, and can be wielded as a rhetorical weapon by those
who wish to marginalize challenging voices—one man’s earnest demand for recognition
can be read by another man as an “uncivilized” declaration of hostility, and as such, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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call for civility can itself be a form of violence, insofar as it may become inadvertently
implicated in the silencing that is often a precursor for outbursts of physical violence.35
Speaking to the discursive aftermath of the Loughner killings, Erik Doxtader argues, “the
call for citizens to make a pledge to civility is a reply to the affront of rhetorical
appearances that abstains from an underlying question of the word’s response-ability”
(421). Civility often functions as a way to temporarily avoid or mask the problem of
violence rather than address it in all its complexities, and “out-right denunciations of
violence may foreclose rather than protect the agency of its victims’’ (Rand
476). Arguably, violence is valuable to critical and activist endeavors—when faced with
oppression and the abuse of power, acts of intervention directed towards disrupting
structures of power and erecting new ones in their place necessarily involve some
imposition of rhetorical force that may be justifiably described as violence.
As we endeavor to formulate a full-bodied theory of rhetoric violence, we must
bear in mind Bourdieu’s lessons concerning the deeply embodied, unconscious pull of
ideological habit; otherwise, we run the risk of reinforcing the “scholastic illusion” that
‘‘‘raising consciousness’ will create liberation, failing to recognize the inertia which
results from the inscription of social structures in bodies” (Aune 2011: 433). Attention to
both the social structures that produce ideology, and to the corporeal structures that are
materially constituted to reproduce ideology, are necessary if we’re to make a clear
assessment of the depth and breadth of ideology’s reach. Following Malabou’s arguments
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&(!For a forceful refutation of the call for “civility” in rhetoric, see Lozano-Reich and Cloud (2009). The
authors specifically respond to Foss and Griffin’s theory of invitational rhetoric, and note that in some
contexts, such as the pedagogical situation and in discussions among material equals, invitation is
appropriate; in others, however, this approach can be disabling to the oppressed” (222).
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concerning the neuronal subject, we see that “symbolic violence” has direct physical
effects on the corporeal body; therefore, time-honored distinctions such as those routinely
held between rhetoric and violence, and between symbolicity and materiality, are
rendered porous. This should increase our sensitivity to modes of violence that normally
go unrecognized because they are “merely” representations of violence, not real violence.
I submit that critical agency that stems from knowledge of the brain’s malleability
might be the path towards a more affirmative approach to countering violence. We might
begin by reconceptualizing what we mean when we speak of “brain damage.” Damage,
whether the term refers to the structure of a building or the structure of a mind, usually
implies an assertive force enacted against a stable structure that results in a negative deformation of an idealized original form. When this understanding of damage is applied to
human beings, the address of violence comes either after the event of its occurrence—
“justice” as a matter of revenge—or before its occurrence by way of pre-diction (an
expression of abuse is prevented before it has a chance to take form). In either case, the
locus of responsibility is placed decisively on individual subjects, rather than on the
social structures that produced them as subjects. If we agree that individual subjects are
symbolic expressions produced by the brain (both in terms of the “I” expressed internally
to the self in consciousness, and the “he/she/it” recognized externally in social and public
affairs), and that the flourishing of the brain’s potential is not guaranteed by the mere fact
of its existence, but is dependent in substantial ways on access to symbolic resources,
then individuals and institutions which deny those resources must also be considered as
possible perpetrators of violence.
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Brain damage must not only be recognized as an intrusion upon an established
form, such as a blow to the head, or an injurious epithet directed against one’s social
identity. Brain damage should also encompass the intentional withholding of the
symbolic materials required by the subject to construct a brain capable of withstanding
the unavoidable violences of social life. These violences are “unavoidable” because the
brain is always already being manipulated and physically reconfigured by forces that act
upon it without the consent of the conscious subject. Technically, a rhetoric of peace and
love “violently” impacts neural networks in the same manner as a rhetoric of anger and
aggression—there is no escaping this kind of violence, but there are ways of buffering its
effects. Taken further, if a subject is exposed only to the former rhetoric, at the expense
of the latter, he or she is rendered more dangerously exposed and vulnerable to
suggestion and control than if he or she was subjected to the affective turbulence that
follows from a cacophony of contradictory directives. This claim can be grounded in
neuroscientific evidence.36 The cultivation of confusion compels the brain to engage in a
cognitive struggle with complexity, and complex cognition is, quite literally, the lifeblood
of dense neuronal connectivity in the prefrontal cortex, the region of the brain responsible
for critical thinking, skepticism, and self-reflexivity. If these connections are not
regularly activated, they die out, and so too does the subject’s capacity to resignify or
refuse to accept rhetorical propositions.
Let me be clear: it is not my intention to simply claim that all rhetorical
exchanges are equally “violent,” even though they may all reconfigure neural networks.
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It is not my intention to uncritically proclaim the superiority of scientific “truths” to those contingently
arrived upon through social and rhetorical activity. Rather, I raise the issue of scientific evidence not as
ontological claim, but an epistemological and rhetorical one: for better or worse, scientific data carries great
weight in public opinion, and as such, should be marshaled in critical efforts to intervene in politic affairs
in the spirit of Gayatri Spivak’s call for “strategic essentialism.”
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Certainly there is a significant difference between rhetorical activity that communicates
acceptance and goodwill, and rhetoric that degrades and delegitimizes. The problem that
inheres in attempting to determine rhetoric’s violent character according to the intent of
the speaker, or the reception of the addressee, is that the statuses of intent and reception
are conceptually overdetermined. As poststructuralist theorists remind us, what one
intends by a message may not correspond with the other’s interpretation of that message.
Attempts to pin down “violent” meaning expose us to the same risks that attend the call
for civility in discourse: what is violent, or uncivil, is in the eye of the beholder, and if we
grant the power to determine meaning to juridical bodies, we invite censorship and the
reification of potentially oppressive normative codes of morality. These are precisely the
things that a neurorhetorical theory of violence aims to counter.
If we stretch the term violence too far, it becomes meaningless, and open to
appropriation by any group that wishes to silence the challenging or transgressive rhetoric
of another group. I contend that violence does not necessarily inhere in epithets, slurs, or
condemnations, even though such linguistic forms may hurt the feelings of the people
they are directed against, and alter their neural pathways. Rather, violence occurs when
subjects are not allowed access to contradictory discourses that can disperse the impact of
violent speech. For illustration, let’s consider the matter of so-called “brainwashing,” the
“most commonly used word for the process whereby a charismatic group systematically
induces high levels of ideological obedience” (Zablocki 160). This is a term that is
largely ignored or discredited by contemporary rhetoricians, most likely because it
implicitly evacuates agency from the scene, and because it is often wielded by
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reactionary conservative critics to incite panic about the predominance of liberal ideology
in the university classroom.37
However, we find instances of brainwashing with disturbing regularity, often
involving the abduction of children by charismatic adults. In such cases, media
commentators often puzzle over the fact that the abducted youth did not escape when
given the opportunity.38 Confusion as to why abductees seem to lack agency in these
situations may be due to a general undervaluation of rhetoric’s neuro-constitutive power.
In a context in which a subject is repeatedly presented with one set of rhetorical claims,
and deprived of competing claims, the subject cannot enact agential refusal indefinitely
because the neural networks that enable them to conceive of alternatives to their present
predicament die out from disuse, and the networks that represent the subject’s new reality
become stronger and colonize the space previously occupied by the neglected circuitry.
As neuroscientist and philosopher Kathleen Taylor explains in her discussion of
brainwashing, "Beliefs are mental objects in the sense that they are embedded in the
brain. If you challenge them by contradiction, or just by cutting them off from the stimuli
that make you think about them, then they are going to weaken slightly. If that is
combined with very strong reinforcement of new beliefs, then you're going to get a shift
in emphasis from one to the other" (qtd. in Jha). Rhetorical techniques that induce
brainwashing include isolating the individual and controlling their access to information,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&*!See, for example, David Horowitz and Jacob Laksin, One-Party Classroom: How Radical Professors at
America’s Top Colleges Indoctrinate Students and Undermine Our Democracy (New York: Crown Forum,
2009)
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For example, conservative pundit Bill O’Reilly raised eyebrows when he said of Shawn Hornbeck—who
was abducted at the age of 11, held for four years, and was found in Missouri in 2007—that "there was an
element here that this kid liked about this circumstances" and that he "do[esn't] buy" "the Stockholm
syndrome thing." O’Reilly held out the possibility that Hornbeck made “a conscious decision to accept his
captivity because" his kidnapper "made things easy for him. No school, play all day long."
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challenging their belief structure and creating doubt, and repeating messages in a
pressurized environment (Jha). Within this set of discursive practices, we cannot identify
a specific instance of rhetoric that is “violent,” because the damage words are capable of
inflicting is dependent on the social environment that is set up to ensure that their violent
potential is realized. A powerful figure, whether he is a cult leader, a politician, or a peer,
may call us a derogatory name, but unless the conditions are set by which we have little
or no access to any other means of framing our self-identity, such injunctions will most
likely have limited violent effect. On the other hand, if we are simultaneously assigned an
identity and prevented access to other possible identifications, we are rendered
neurologically vulnerable to a degree that may cancel out our capacity to refuse the
assignation. The critical theory of rhetorical violence that I am promoting is focused on
the systematic establishment of social contexts characterized by the elimination of
rhetorics that produce cognitive dissonance. It is healthy to undergo challenges to our
sense of self, even if those challenges are emotionally disruptive. The real danger lies in
rhetorics that consolidate and stabilize subjectivity, because this engenders an uncritical
condition whereby subjects passively accede to the status quo of their present
circumstances.
The advantage of incorporating the concepts of deprivation and lack into a
rhetorical theory of violence is that it broadens attention, and increases sensitivity to,
instances of violence that otherwise escape commentary for lack of an adequate
vocabulary with which to talk about them. We begin to see that, at a macropolitical
level, rhetorical acts by the state which consistently frame a group as dangerous or
undesirable, and suppress counterarguments through force of censorship, libel, or slander
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are, in neurologically material ways, acts of violence through denial in and of themselves,
and should be rhetorically addressed as such. Doing so equips critical rhetoricians and
democratic political activists with a resonant vocabulary that can be operationalized in
the effort to speak back to powerful political and economic institutions’ efforts to pass
legislation that forbids the teaching of critical thinking in high school curricula, defunds
public media that issues counterstatements to the consumer capitalistic and nationalistic
ethos disseminated by corporatized media outlets, censors the public dissemination of
images that reveal the horrors of war, curtails discussion of “alternative” relationship
structures in public schools, and restricts citizen’s access to classified information. Full
disclosure of the human condition in all of its horror and beauty enables people to
conceive of alternative possibilities to the circumstances they face in the isolated contexts
of their own lives. Regimes of power that rigorously manage the range of experience or
knowledge in the name of morality, security, or economic interest also manage the neural
networks of citizens, which in turn manages potential threats to power that might come if
affect was allowed to flow in unpredictable, unruly channels.
Butler addresses the institutional management of affect and its relation to political
violence in her 2009 book Frames of War. She claims, “The critique of violence must
begin with the question of the representability of life itself: what allows a life to become
visible in its precariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from
seeing or understanding certain lives in this way?” (2009: 51). The answer, she believes,
is the media’s tendency to only represent particular kinds of life as “grievable”: the lives
of those who are aligned with the dominant ideology of the society from which the media
originates. The precariousness of the lives of other groups often passes without comment,
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and as a result, we feel nothing about their suffering, and are therefore not motivated to
take political action to alleviate it.
Butler writes that political violence “sustains its practices through acting on the
senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively, deadening affect in response to
certain images and sounds, and enlivening affective response to others” (2009: 52). The
solution, she argues, is to offer “interpretive matrices for the understanding of war that
question and oppose the dominant interpretations—interpretations that not only act upon
affect, but take form and become effective as affect itself” (2009: 52). More specifically,
she prompts us develop interpretive frames that prompt people to recognize “we are
bound to one another” in the precariousness of our lives (2009: 43).
This, Butler hopes, will lead to a new appreciation for the merits of “nonviolence”—a refusal to reiterate the violent dynamics of social categorization through
which we are formed as subjects. In her view, to act non-violently is “to assume
responsibility for living a life that contests the determining power” of the violent relations
that produces one subjectivity (Butler 2009: 170). Non-violence requires a self-conscious
struggle against rage and aggression: “being mired in violence means that even as the
struggle is thick, difficult, impeding, fitful, and necessary, it is not the same as
determinism—being mired is the condition of possibility for the struggle for nonviolence...” (Butler 2009: 171). Non-violence comes down to a conscious choice subjects
must make about how to respond to violence that is directed again them. It is “the
obligation of the disposed to decide whether to strike back and, if so, in what form...the
non-reciprocated violent act does more to expose the unilateral brutality of the state than
any other” (Butler 2009: 178). We should, in short, strive to act as pacifists and martyrs,
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with the hope that the public avowal of our injurability will act rhetorically to compel
others to identify with us, and to recognize that injurability is a “generalized condition”
(Butler 2009: 178). Thus constituted as potential victims of violence, they will cease
acting violently.
For the injunction of non-violence to make sense, there must be a change in
mediated representations of the lives of Others so that we come to realize that all lives are
precarious, and grievable, regardless of political or ideological affiliation: “non-violence
is derived from the apprehension of equality in the midst of precariousness” (Butler 2009:
181). We should therefore “find and support those modes of appearance and
representation” that offer access to the suffering of others (Butler 2009: 181). To those
media and institutions that are inegalitarian in their representations of suffering, we
should direct a “carefully crafted ‘fuck you’” (Butler 2009: 182). In other words, we need
to practice rhetorical violence in order to secure the conditions from which we can begin
to practice rhetoric of non-violence. This “aggression and rage” is permissible, Butler
maintains, as long as “we” who are issuing the “fuck you” to power are not “discrete
subjects calculating in relation to one another,” but rather, are a “shared precariousness,”
a sort of disembodied collective affective force premised in mutual recognition of our
interdependence (Butler 2009: 182).
Individual decision, Butler believes, “cannot finally be the ground for the struggle
for non-violence. Decision fortifies the deciding ‘I,’ sometimes at the expense of
relationality itself” (2009: 183). To decide to act is to reiterate the violence of
differentiation that founded the illusion of subjective individuality. Nevertheless,
something must be done by someone if we are to bring about the changes in media
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practices necessary to enable people to collectively arrive at the conclusion that we are
united by shared vulnerability, rather than divided by tribal affiliation. Who is going to
initiate the process of change, if not discrete subjects calculating in relation to each other?
Butler makes the provocative claim that collective non-action is a form of
revolutionary action. When confronted with injustice or injury, our best option, according
to Butler, is to refuse to fight back against the aggressor; instead we should turn our
attention towards demonstrating or revealing what has taken place. She cites approvingly
Walter Benjamin’s remark that “Perhaps revolutions are nothing other than human beings
on the train of progress reaching for the emergency brakes” (Butler 2009: 184).
This might strike the reader as distressingly similar to William F. Buckley’s
declaration that a conservative is a “fellow who is standing athwart history yelling
‘Stop!’” The key difference is that Buckley does not shy from intentional, even violent,
intervention into political affairs in order to steer history towards a particular ideological
trajectory. Conservatives may find much to like in Butler’s theory of violence. Her faith
in people’s ability to break from their own histories of violence and subjugation, and to
refuse to identify themselves according to the injuries that they perceive as having been
done to them, accords with the principles of self-determination that form the bedrock of
conservative thought, even if Butler would discourage the individualism that attends to
these principles.
In Frames of War, Butler dips her toes in the primordial pools of affect that gather
beneath the surface of conscious thought, but she quickly climbs back into the realm of
semiosis to rehearse the claim that changes in representations will trigger a corresponding
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cultural-wide change in the way people feel, and think about, violence. Her argument that
limited media representations of violence create limited interpretive frames into which
people fit affective intensities fails to address a major problem: a lifetime of exposure to
limited frames constitutes patterns in neural circuitry that limit people’s receptivity to
jarring new ideas. Because these frames are wired into the brain, shocking images of
American war atrocities that contradict the prevailing nationalistic ethos will not easily
dislodge them. More likely, the brain will explain away contradictions by rationalizing
the violence it encounters according to pre-established ideological narratives.
Networks of political power, networks of media representations, and synaptic
networks of neural communication are contiguous entities, joined together by currents of
affective energy that passes through and between people and institutions, tying them
together in increasingly tight formations of uncritical consensus and unified purpose. The
brain-body-culture network established in most adults does not come undone if it is
exposed to new information about the state of the world as easily as Butler presumes.
Bruce Wexler explains that by early adulthood, the neuroplasticity of the brain is greatly
reduced, and this leads to a fundamental shift in the relationship between the individual
and the environment. During the first part of life, the brain and mind shape themselves to
the major recurring features of their environment; by early adulthood, the individual
attempts to make the environment conform to the established internal structures of the
brain and mind. The adult brain is more apt to fit new information into time-tested
interpretive frames, embedded in neural networks, in order to reduce contradiction and
thereby maintain homeostatic equilibrium. The gradual reduction in our brain’s plasticity
as we age alters our “perception of the external world according to preexisting
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structures,” which consequently leads us to attempt to alter “the course of events in the
external...interpersonal world in such a way as to increase the likelihood that subsequent
events will be consistent with the preexisting internal structures” (Wexler 143).
If we want to increase people’s sensitivity to violence and empathy for those who
suffer, we need to articulate violence with negative affects in developing brains, at every
step in the process of socialization, especially in the arenas of education and
entertainment. This is, by most definitions of the term, a violent act—it is the willful
administration of emotional distress to vulnerable people, for the purposes of shaping
identity and attitude in a way that coheres with a particular ideological vision. The
alternative, however, is to gamble that people will be moved by non-violent
poststructuralist philosophical entreaties to turn away from thrillingly violent spectacles
that offer the mindless euphoria of self-certainty and tribal belonging. Everything we
know about history, neuroscience, and politics suggests that this is not a wise gamble to
make.
When violence happens, it is often assumed to be the result of bad judgments
made by faulty minds, but rarely is the question of how minds are constituted rhetorically
treated with the patience and complexity of thought it requires, perhaps because we have
not sufficiently accounted for the question of what constitutes rhetoric. A critical
neurorhetorical approach allows us to frame symbolic violence as a material, potentially
traumatic force that can operate simultaneously on the planes of attribution (the
introduction of ways of thinking) and deprivation (the denial of alternative modes of
thinking). This insight increases sensitivity to abuses of institutional power that might
otherwise escape commentary because they do not produce a visible sign, and they elude
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the critical frames we currently use to interrogate violence.
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CHAPTER 7
OUTLINE FOR A CRITICAL NEURORHETORIC
Given a contemporary cultural, social, and political scene that is saturated with
words and images designed specifically to deliver an affective punch rather than a
persuasive rational argument, I became interested in learning more about the vectors of
human being that respond to, and are responsible for, these entreaties. Some element in
the pre-linguistic corporeal body seemed to be involved, but the vast majority of the
rhetorical theory and critical commentary I encountered insisted that people were being
persuaded to make bad mental calculations based on the faulty linguistic frames, given to
them by powerful institutions, through which they interpreted their lived experience.
When I sought out studies in the humanities that would give me insight into where, and
how, exactly, these linguistic frames establish residency in the body, I found that
“although there has been a tremendous outpouring of scholarship on ‘the body’ in the last
twenty years, nearly all of the work in this area has been confined to the analysis of
discourses about the body” (Alaimo and Hekman 3). This work, in my estimation,
foreclosed attention to the physiological processes of the body’s interior that produce
affect and predispose thought to move in particular trajectories.
Rhetoricians consistently declare that bodies and emotions are “socially
constructed” in discourse, and therefore could be, presumably, reconstructed through
rhetoric that builds new, and better, discursive frames of interpretation. Yet both my
personal experience and my observations of public affairs indicated to me that virtually
all people are capable of intellectually holding one set of ideas about ethics and politics
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while acting on contradictory impulses that seemed rooted in something below, or outside
of, consciousness. This is the phenomenon Gorgias sought to explain in his Encomium of
Helen. For Gorgias, “language causes real changes in the material world—to bodies,
selves, objects, and situations” (Rivers and Tirrell 46). I was struck by the fact that
Gorgias did not stipulate a hierarchy of influence by which transformations in situations
produce changes in bodies, or vice versa. Instead, he suggested that the corporeal and the
ideational were different parts of a single circuit composed of the body, the word, and the
world. If we dismantle this circuit and isolate just one of these parts for the purpose of
making claims about the nature of human events, we are left with a limited interpretive
apparatus through which to perceive and evaluate those events.
In order to widen the scope of critical rhetorical theory, I went in search of critical
perspectives that existed outside of the mainstream of rhetorical scholarship, and found
valuable and underexploited resources in the fields of contemporary neuroscience and
affect theory. Some rhetoricians argue that the insights offered by these fields of study
cannot be allowed within the rhetorical tradition because they are not within the
rhetorical tradition. In this dissertation, I have attempted fight against this tautological
argument from two directions. First, I maintain that disciplinary prejudice is
counterproductive to the growth of critical rhetorical studies, because the relevance of
critical rhetoric as a means to bring about social change is directly correlated to its
capacity to respond to, and transform, a socio-political field that is perpetually in a state
of flux. Like the apocryphal shark that must keep swimming or die, critical rhetorical
studies must move in concert with the culture, both in terms of the subjects it takes as
legitimate sites of critical inquiry, and in the analytical resources it draws upon to
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theorize practical interventions. Second, I submit that if we listen more carefully, we find
that recent neuroscience echoes many of the claims that rhetoricians in the Sophistic and
mystic traditions made thousands of years ago: namely, that symbolic activity is
physically and physiologically transformative, and the material transformations wrought
by rhetoric have implications for subjects’ capacity to engage in critical thought and
agential judgment. Neuroscientific research offers specific information about
physiological operations that can help rhetoricians produce new tactics and strategies to
counteract rhetorical practices that target the pre-conscious body. In addition, the
language of neuroscience can be a useful tool in critical efforts because of the prestige it
carries, for better or worse, in the minds of many citizens. We can either attempt to
systematically delegitimize scientific discourse in the public sphere, or tactically deploy it
for political purposes. It is my contention that the latter option is preferable, if our goals
are to promote social change. Alternatively, we can strive to defend a construction called
“the rhetorical tradition” as a matter of Idealistic principle, but if we choose to do so, we
should be aware that the rhetorical tradition neither begins with Aristotle, nor ends with
Kenneth Burke.
If this dissertation is successful, it will have convinced the reader that a critical
neurorhetoric can supplement contemporary cultural and rhetorical theory by grounding
studies of the representational body in a critical vocabulary that lets us talk about what
those representations do to corporeal bodies once they pass through the sensory organs of
the body’s exterior. Pruchnic observes that from the perspective of science, the
“[P]rimary forms of persuasion and motivation are seen to emerge from neurological
chemistry,” yet within rhetorical studies, “our traditional access and possible resistance to
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such forces seem restricted to a meta-level of analysis” (2008a: 172). The body’s interior
is uncharted territory for rhetoricians. Critical neurorhetoric provides navigational tools.
We needn’t abandon the concepts that have oriented the discipline for the last several
decades; we only need to update them so that we may keep up with “changes in
technoscientific and economic production,” such of as those channeled through the
internet, that have made way for “the appearance of new flows of power focusing more
specifically on affective capacities and the internal neurology of human bodies to produce
discrete capacities rather than generic identities” (Pruchnic 2008a: 196).
Critical rhetoricians should not engage neuroscience because neurocriticism is
suddenly au courant in the humanities; rather, this engagement is important and
necessary because the nature of constitutive experience has changed. In any given era,
new technologies, new persuasive techniques, new forms of social organization, and new
centers of power demand new rhetorical strategies of intervention. In our era, the culture
is becoming increasingly individualized. Economic and political institutions routinely
encourage Americans to identify not with broad social categories of race, class, gender,
sexuality, or political affiliation, but rather, with niche’ groups that represent seemingly
idiosyncratic clusters of desire and anxiety. Marketers draw from vast amounts of data to
craft rhetoric that speaks directly to consumer’s individual habits of consumption;
political campaigns no longer rely on sweeping oratory addressed to the nation, but
instead use personalized emails and web-based advertisements that are designed to foster
identifications with individuals who fall within the parameters of narrow demographic
categories. Rhetorical theories that track social changes according to macropolitical
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structures are bound to miss the micropolitical techniques of persuasion that are
increasingly ubiquitous in both the private and public realms.
Critical neurorhetoric is uniquely situated to attend to micropolitical rhetorical
practices, as it takes as its object of study the individual brain and body and examines
these things in relation to institutional power, without arguing for the hierarchal
importance of one over the other. Instead, critical neurorhetoric seeks to understand the
working of power and ideology through a circuitous network of influence that
encompasses the distributions of material and symbolic resources, the rhetorical activities
that legitimize or call into question patterns of distribution, and the neurophysiological
dynamics which either promote or inhibit a subject’s capacity to recognize the ideological
structures that constitute him, and to conceive of personal and cultural practices that
could establish alternative ways of being.

The following principles could form the foundations of a critical neurorhetoric
that is attuned to the Sophistic and Burkean rhetorical tradition, informed by—and
genially exploitive of—insights generated by neuroscience, and responsive to the unique
cultural and social problems of the 21st century:
1. The body is always already a symbolic entity that moves, and is moved by, social
experience, but the nature of that symbolicity is not always or necessarily
linguistic. The brain checks the body’s perceptions against internal
representations of that world, and makes available to consciousness a synthesis of
the two. Language is one of the screens through which sensory data passes en
route to being rendered cognitively meaningful, but it is neither the only one, nor
is it, in all cases, the one most influential one.
!

$+&!

!

2. Repetition of thought breeds belief, but “belief” is not merely an attitude or
orientation captured in language, it is also a physiological structure inscribed on
the brain. The brain’s internal map, materially manifested in neural pathways,
becomes strengthened each time its expectations of the world are confirmed by
experience, whether that entails the existence of an arm or the character of a
certain social group. Eventually these representations become self-sustaining, so
that deviations from expectation are easily dismissed as anomalous, or even
seemingly inconceivable.
3. While interpretive habits become increasingly intransigent when they are
rehearsed over time, they are very rarely permanent. Rhetoric has the power to
induce the plastic brain to reorganize its physiological structures, and these
material changes have epistemological and political consequences as the thinking
subject is called upon to make sense of his or her phenomenological experience.
However, we can almost always talk our way out of that which we’ve been talked
into. Because brains are neither inert tabula rasas, nor inevitable products of
genetic pre-determinants, there is hope for renewal. Critical rhetoric can be a
healing practice, but as with all such practices, it must evolve in step with the
pathologies it seeks to address.

Critical neurorhetoric emphasizes that a pre-subjective force “always already constitutes
the ontological grounding for the very operations of any theory or critical act of response
and, as a result, directly impacts how we do theory and criticism” (Abel 2008).
Traditional rhetorical criticism often summons affect as a means to diagnose what
contextual factors caused an emotional reaction in people. Neurorhetorical criticism
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would draw attention to the ways in which the neurological constitution of subjects
produces the contexts that in turn produce certain trajectories for emotional response.
When examining a social conflict, a critical neurorhetorician would be as interested in the
confluence of socio-biological factors that generate discursive outcomes, as he or she
would be in the discursive texts or performances that appear on the scene as a result of
those factors. Critical neurorhetoric does not take people at their word; it instead
speculates as to why people arrive at the words they offer to themselves and others, and
draws liberally from scientific knowledge to develop compelling explanatory theories and
critical interventions.
We could also envision practical application of critical neurorhetoric in rhetoric and
composition pedagogy. Composition instructors routinely require students to analyze
cultural texts such as advertisements, television shows, and films in order to identify the
ideological arguments “concealed” within discourse and imagery. This pedagogical
practice is driven by the hope that students might “change their minds” about the cultural
products they enjoy and consume once they become aware of the social ills that these
products spread throughout the body politic. The engine of this practice is the drive
towards self-reflexivity: students are asked to step outside of their enjoyment of a text
and reflect upon that text’s meaning from a critical distance. If we take seriously the ideas
I’ve outlined in this dissertation—that rhetoric is addictive to the brain, that our brainbodies think for themselves, and that the trauma of immersion in mediated violence
flattens out our natural capacity to identify with the suffering of others—we may come to
the conclusion that the pedagogical exercise of textual criticism may not be the most
effective way to reconstitute students as critical agents. We can never fully step outside

!

$+(!

!

of ourselves and our affective attachments, as that which one steps out of “consists of the
same affective force field as that which one steps into at the moment of reflexivity: any
self-reflexivity is itself affected by the affective forces giving rise to the reflecting ‘self’”
(Abel 2008; emphasis in original). As currently practiced in rhetoric and composition
classrooms, critical analyses of cultural texts too often implicitly prompt students to
demonstrate that they have learned to “think critically” about cultural texts and events
that they previously—that is, prior to reading critical essays assigned in class—
approached with unfettered affective desire. But we must ask: with what part of their
brains and bodies are students “thinking critically”? If composition teachers
unquestioningly align critical thinking with self-reflexive cognition, then critical thinking
of this sort is insufficient as a means of transforming students’ affective attachments to
ideas and objects. At best, students may hold their affective impulses at bay long enough
to type a term paper that denies those impulses in the name of abstract intellectual
principles.
A critical neurorhetorical pedagogy would ask students to read their own bodies
as texts that represent power relations through the language of affect.39 Instead of asking
what words or images mean to them, students would strive to suspend judgment, and
question what images do to them: what visceral reactions do the symbols trigger, before
cognition imposes a narrative structure or moral imperative? Why are particular affects
articulated to particular symbols, and what are the cultural and social forces that
established this link? How do the affective intensities that some students report differ
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Abel (2007) uses the term “masocriticism” to describe the process of intentionally suspending recourse to
history and context in encounters with texts. My thoughts concerning the potential pedagogical application
of neurorhetorical principles are indebted to Abel’s application of masocriticism to literary texts.
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from those expressed in other students, and what are the implications of these differences
in terms of hindering or facilitating cross-cultural cooperation? Posing these sorts of
questions may provide a way for students to analyze the ways in which social experience
has constituted them as corporeal subjects, and offer a point of entry into a discussion of
how we might go about re-constituting ourselves through practices which wed the
somatic and intellectual registers of being. Rather than resignifying a text’s or event’s
meaning through the application of a borrowed theoretical paradigm, we might allow
these things to do their work to us—make us suffer, or exult, or feel rage or pity—and
only afterwards reflect upon the ways in which the circulation of affects delivered
through texts binds us together in social formations that are defined by shared structures
of feelings rather than by symbolic identifications. We might begin to question whether,
for instance, our social allegiances are to symbolic constructions such as a nation, a city,
or an institution, or to patterns of affect given form in emotions such anger, empathy, or
love. Disarticulating affect and emotion from the symbolic structures to which they’ve
been linked through habitual practices could, perhaps, open the door to new articulations,
and the formation of new social affiliations.
If widely adopted in college writing classrooms, critical neurorhetorical pedagogy
may have significant implications for the health of American democracy. Young people
often abandon the socially challenging ideas they acquire in college once they are faced
with the demands of a “real world” characterized by incessant pressure to labor and
consume; these ideas can quickly come to be viewed retrospectively as unrealistic and
impractical, applicable to term papers but not to everyday life. However, a critical
practice that is premised on a radical distrust of one’s own automatic visceral
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compulsions and mental orientations, and one that is habitually performed rather than
intellectually professed, has the potential to establish roots in the central nervous systems
of those who undergo such training, and therefore outlast the college years and continue
to exert influence as students transition into becoming responsible democratic citizens.
The discipline of rhetoric was created in ancient Greece to equip citizens with the
communicative skills necessary to meet the challenges of democracy. Originally,
rhetorical studies sought to empower the privileged few with the ability to persuade
others to identify with their ways of thinking. As we consider the direction the field is to
take in the future, it is my contention that we should seek to formulate a rhetoric that
discourages both scholars and citizens from too easily identifying with their own deeply
embodied habits of thought and feeling. Critical rhetoricians must able to develop timely
new approaches—a daunting enough task—without the added burden of unproductive
territorial disputes at the disciplinary borders.40 Rhetorical scholars are, at least in theory,
uniquely trained to challenge the stability of borders, and to redraw them as the
exigencies of the rhetorical situation change. It is my hope that this dissertation speaks to
the dynamism of critical rhetoric, and challenges the notion that “tradition” is
synonymous with “preservation.”
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Let me make clear that I recognize the value of productive disputes within the discipline. In the
dissertation, I will develop more fully the distinction, as I understand it, between productive and
unproductive criticism. For now, I will roughly characterize it as the difference between arguments that ask
what works, and those that merely argue for what should or should not be, often with recourse to claims
about what has or has not been.
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